> The reason I think that it's still difficult is because even immigration
> officials get duped all the time.
Cites, please. Show me studies showing how often immigration officials get
duped, and how often they correctly flag false passports.
When verifying an identity document, the null h
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: RIPEMD160
Hello David !
David Shaw wrote:
>> Just a question, and I don't have any intention about doing it, but,
>> is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when encrypting?
> Patch the source :)
> There is no way other than that. 3DES
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 12:07:08 AM, in
, David Shaw
wrote:
> On Mar 12, 2010, at 6:31 PM, Faramir wrote:
>> is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when
>> encrypting?
> Patch the source :)
> There is no way other than t
Hi there -
Thanks to your help, and David's, I have tried a few other things. Using yoru
script I found that indeed it was dtmx that was failing due to the file being
larger than 1555 bytes.
I deleted all of the commented lines such as this, and then ran dtmxwrite:
# Secret portions of key C8
MFPA wrote:
> On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 12:07:08 AM, in
> , David Shaw
> wrote:
>> On Mar 12, 2010, at 6:31 PM, Faramir wrote:
>>> is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when
>>> encrypting?
>> Patch the source :)
>> There is no way other than that.
>
> Wouldn't "--disable-cipher
On Sat, Mar 13, 2010 at 1:00 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > I'm a little confused as to how does that make it any different from
> using the Pidgin OTR method.
>
> It's a question of degree, not kind.
>
> > I simply open up an OTR session, ask my friend a question the answer to
> which is secret
Hello MFPA,
I couldn't respond to your post for a while. So here it is.
On Mon, 8 Mar 2010 21:38:18 + MFPA wrote:
>> I never asserted that you said the key's originator owned the
>> information stored in the key. I was quoting the context of what your
>> reply about the originator having "s
On Sat, Mar 13, 2010 at 1:14 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Even then — so what? Let's say the Type II rate is 25%. That's a very
> high Type II rate; most people would think that failing to recognize one set
> of fake IDs per four is a really bad error rate. Yet, if you're at a
> keysigning par
On Mar 13, 2010, at 1:13 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> There is no way other than that. 3DES is a required part of OpenPGP, so if
>> you remove it, you're not going to play well with the other programs out
>> there.
>
> --cipher-algo [something other than 3DES] won't do it? Faramir was askin
On Saturday 13 March 2010, erythrocyte wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 13, 2010 at 1:14 PM, Robert J. Hansen
wrote:
> > Even then — so what? Let's say the Type II rate is 25%. That's a
> > very high Type II rate; most people would think that failing to
> > recognize one set of fake IDs per four is a really
On Mar 13, 2010, at 5:55 AM, John Clizbe wrote:
> MFPA wrote:
>> On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 12:07:08 AM, in
>> , David Shaw
>> wrote:
>>> On Mar 12, 2010, at 6:31 PM, Faramir wrote:
is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when
encrypting?
>>> Patch the source :)
>>> There
2010/3/13 Ingo Klöcker
> Sorry, but your calculation is wrong. If the calculation was correct
> then with 5 encounters the probability would be 1.25 which is an
> impossibility. Probability is never negative and never > 1. (People say
> all the time that they are 110 % sure that something will hap
On Mar 13, 2010, at 5:14 AM, MFPA wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Hi
>
>
> On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 12:07:08 AM, in
> , David Shaw
> wrote:
>
>
>> On Mar 12, 2010, at 6:31 PM, Faramir wrote:
>
>>> is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when
>
Thanks David for helping to clarify.
-Original Message-
From: David Shaw [mailto:ds...@jabberwocky.com]
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 5:15 PM
To: Robert Palmer
Cc: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Subject: Re: updprefs command and changing key
On Mar 10, 2010, at 4:07 PM, Robert Palmer wrote:
> Dur
On Mar 13, 2010, at 5:22 AM, john espiro wrote:
> Hi there -
>
> Thanks to your help, and David's, I have tried a few other things. Using
> yoru script I found that indeed it was dtmx that was failing due to the file
> being larger than 1555 bytes.
>
> I deleted all of the commented lines suc
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi David
On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 12:58:40 PM, you wrote:
> It won't work anyway. You can't remove 3DES from the cipher
> preferences with disable-cipher-algo.
[...]
> To make matters worse, not only does it not work in
> preventing 3DES bein
On Mar 13, 2010, at 7:08 AM, erythrocyte wrote:
> However, the combined probability that at least one of the encounters would
> result in accepting a fake ID would be 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/4 = 1 .
99.6%; a little different. The binomial theorem gives us the correct numbers.
0 failures: 31.6%
1
> But all that aside, I'm pretty sure news reports, etc. of human traffickers,
> smugglers, spies, etc. all confirm the fact that national IDs such as
> passports can be forged and do in fact slip by immigration authorities pretty
> commonly.
Only because the news doesn't report on people who g
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
But all that aside, I'm pretty sure news reports, etc. of human
traffickers, smugglers, spies, etc. all confirm the fact that
national IDs such as passports can be forged and do in fact slip by
immigration authorities pretty commonly.
Only because the news doesn't report
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Saturday 13 March 2010 at 11:15:32 AM, in
, Paul Richard Ramer wrote:
> The issue of law is not "an integral part of the
> answer" to the question of what should be. It is an
> integral part of the answer to what is.
I see what you mean,
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
John Clizbe escribió:
> Faramir wrote:
>> Just a question, and I don't have any intention about doing it, but,
>> is there a way to disable the usage of 3DES in GnuPG, when encrypting?
>
> Sure, the source is available -- the result just won't be
On Sat, Mar 13, 2010 at 10:04 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>
> 99.6%; a little different. The binomial theorem gives us the correct numbers.
>
> 0 failures: 31.6%
> 1 failure: 42.2%
> 2 failures: 21.1%
> 3 failures: 4.7%
> 4 failures: 0.4%
Alrighty... :-) . So the combined probability that there
On 3/13/10 8:06 PM, erythrocyte wrote:
> Umm.. if I understand the nature of the probability tests or
> calculations just mentioned above
You don't.
If person A and person B disagree on whether something is fake, the
operating assumption is that it's fake. The burden is on the person
claiming it
On Mar 13, 2010, at 8:03 PM, Faramir wrote:
> It was just curiosity. By the way, is it possible to disable some
> other encryption algo, but without forcing GnuPG to use a chosen algo? I
> mean... lets suppose I don't want to use AES, but I'm ok with twofish,
> 3DES, and Camellia (any of there wo
On Sun, Mar 14, 2010 at 8:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 3/13/10 8:06 PM, erythrocyte wrote:
>> Umm.. if I understand the nature of the probability tests or
>> calculations just mentioned above, the results have to be accepted as
>> they are. They either got it wrong or right. Those individua
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
erythrocyte escribió:
...
> The combined probability that all individuals would accept a fake ID
> would be 1/4 * 1/4 * 1/4 * 1/4 = 0.00390625 .
>
> However, the combined probability that at least one of the encounters
> would result in accepting a
On 3/14/10 1:52 AM, erythrocyte wrote:
> From my understanding, the probabilities calculated give you
> random error. That is "given a population of 4 people, there is a
> 68.4% chance that there would >=1 failures purely by random effects
> regardless of what actions they may or may not take to in
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