On 26/10/14 17:29, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I don't see why this should be so easily dismissed. It's leaked metadata. And
> combined with other sources it can provide more information.
Quote failure! I'm sorry about that. I did some stupid things with several
replies open at the same time and then p
On 26/10/14 16:19, Hauke Laging wrote:
> The statement "that you are about to encrypt to that key" does not make
> much sense if (like in this case) the "you" is a Tor connection.
I don't see why this should be so easily dismissed. It's leaked metadata. And
combined with other sources it can prov
Am So 26.10.2014, 16:12:15 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
> PS: I didn't quite understand the different "you"s in your mail; they
> all appear to refer to "anyone". But it doesn't seem important.
Kind of important for your argument.
The statement "that you are about to encrypt to that key" does not make
On 26/10/14 15:28, Hauke Laging wrote:
> THEY do know anyway that you (really you in this case) encrypt to a
> certain key as long as SMTP is used (as usual) and the target key ID is
> not hidden (as usual, too).
First of all, the number of parties in the know is enlarged by doing the
keyserver
Am So 26.10.2014, 14:14:25 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
> that you are about to encrypt to that key.
And who is "you"? 8-)
THEY do know anyway that you (really you in this case) encrypt to a
certain key as long as SMTP is used (as usual) and the target key ID is
not hidden (as usual, too).
Hauke
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Hi
On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 11:50:53 AM, in
, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> By the way, my search string was "keyserver lookup
> exposes keyring"
That's brilliant. I tried several options along the lines of: keys
refresh incremental random gnupg.
On 26/10/14 12:56, Hauke Laging wrote:
> I do admit that this may be interesting for certain people but I guess that
> this tool does not do "that" but solves a completely different problem.
However, it does broadly correspond to your later comments about periodically
refreshing even before the ex
Am So 26.10.2014, 08:19:28 schrieb NdK:
> Il 25/10/2014 20:09, Hauke Laging ha scritto:
> > I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for
> > the config file) which would automatically try to import an update
> > for the certificate if it has expired (both from the standard ke
Hi MFPA, gnupg users,
* MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net> [26. Oct. 2014]:
> Hi
>
>
> On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
> , NdK wrote:
>
>
>
>> IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
>> owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these ke
On 26/10/14 12:44, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> After several tries I finally had luck.
By the way, my search string was "keyserver lookup exposes keyring"
> It seems to live at https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh .
But this e-mail is to correct this bit: this is actually a reimplementation
On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 10:32:47AM +, MFPA wrote:
> Hi
>
>
> On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
> , NdK wrote:
>
>
>
> > IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
> > owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
> > keyring")
On 26/10/14 11:32, MFPA wrote:
> I couldn't come up with search terms to
> find it with a search engine.
After several tries I finally had luck. I also forgot the name :). But it's
parcimonie. It seems to live at https://github.com/EtiennePerot/parcimonie.sh .
HTH,
Peter.
--
I use the GNU Pri
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Hi
On Sunday 26 October 2014 at 7:19:28 AM, in
, NdK wrote:
> IIRC a tool exists to do that, in a way that makes it hard for keyserver
> owners to extract "social" metadata (like "these keys are on a single
> keyring"). Too bad I can't recall it
Il 25/10/2014 20:09, Hauke Laging ha scritto:
> I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for the
> config file) which would automatically try to import an update for the
> certificate if it has expired (both from the standard key server and
> from the preferred one if set
Hello,
I would like to suggest a new option for GnuPG (mainly intended for the
config file) which would automatically try to import an update for the
certificate if it has expired (both from the standard key server and
from the preferred one if set).
I guess that many users don't understand th
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