Re: MD5 is an unreliable digest algorithm [was: Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21]

2009-05-24 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Actually, it is fairly common in certain circumstances: Certifying > that another user's key is correctly bound to their User ID (a.k.a. > "signing someone's key") is effectively making a signature over a > document that you did not originate. Yes. And then if you tak

MD5 is an unreliable digest algorithm [was: Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21]

2009-05-24 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 05/24/2009 02:15 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > It depends on what sort of threat you're facing. In this case, the MD5 > attack is predicated on the victim signing documents they did not > originate. This is often considered bad policy, since it tends to > facilitate attacks like this. This us

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-24 Thread gpg2 . 20 . maniams
Wow Felipe ... WowT On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 8:38 AM, webmas...@felipe1982.com <+gpg2+maniams+aec56db6fa.webmaster#felipe1982@spamgourmet.com> wrote: > > > As of this writing, no algorithm supported by GnuPG has been > > compromised. Even MD5 is still on its feet. > i don't think this is cor

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread Robert J. Hansen
webmas...@felipe1982.com wrote: > i don't think this is correct. See: > http://th.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/People/lucks/HashCollisions/ It depends on what sort of threat you're facing. In this case, the MD5 attack is predicated on the victim signing documents they did not originate. This is of

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread webmaster
> As of this writing, no algorithm supported by GnuPG has been > compromised. Even MD5 is still on its feet. i don't think this is correct. See: http://th.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/People/lucks/HashCollisions/ felipe ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gn

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread gpg2 . 20 . maniams
Dear Robert On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 6:42 AM, Subu wrote: > > > On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 6:15 AM, Robert J. Hansen - r...@sixdemonbag.org > <+gpg2+maniams+ba4eefb302.rjh#sixdemonbag@spamgourmet.com> wrote: > >> gpg2.20.mani...@dfgh.net wrote: >> > What are the algos that are compromised ? or N

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread Robert J. Hansen
gpg2.20.mani...@dfgh.net wrote: > What are the algos that are compromised ? or NOT to be used ? If this is > too long a list Sorry to be so late to the party -- As of this writing, no algorithm supported by GnuPG has been compromised. Even MD5 is still on its feet. That said, the SHA-1 and MD5

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread gpg2 . 20 . maniams
Dear Members What are the algos that are compromised ? or NOT to be used ? If this is too long a list What are the Algos that are _to_be_ /or/ _could_be_ used /or/ _not_yet_compromised_ I understand that choosing the key size and algo is something personal and others cant decide. but I'm tr

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Faramir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Allen Schultz escribió: > For the reason of SHA1 issues in the news, I've recently set up > a new OpenPGP key, and > will be transitioning away from my old one. ... > To fetch my new key from a public key server, you can simply do: > > gpg --keyser

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Allen Schultz wrote: > Thank you for the information. I will clearsign this using the > new key only. > Let me know if this signature does not work either. OpenPGP Security Info UNTRUSTED Good signature from Allen Schultz (aldaek) Key ID: 0xF556

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Allen Schultz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Thu, May 21, 2009 at 7:31 AM, Raimar Sandner wrote: > After all the _old_ key could have been compromised, that is what I meant :) Thank you for the information. I will clearsign this using the new key only. EE79C636 has already been updated [a

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Raimar Sandner
On Thursday 21 May 2009 15:15:18 Raimar Sandner wrote: > I believe (an I think others do too) it is good praxis to not sign new keys > even if you have signed the old one and the new key is signed by the old > one, without personally checking with the keyholder first. After all, the > new key could

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Raimar Sandner
Hello On Thursday 21 May 2009 11:35:44 Allen Schultz wrote: > For the reason of SHA1 issues in the news, I've recently set up > a new OpenPGP key, and > will be transitioning away from my old one. > This message is signed by > both keys to certify the > transition. I have not recieved signatures

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Charly Avital
Allen Schultz wrote the following on 5/21/09 5:35 AM: [...] > > Please let me know if there is any trouble, and sorry for the > inconvenience. [...] No inconvenience. Results of signature verification and key usage: -BEGIN GPG OUTPUT- gpg: Signature made Thu May 21 05:34:13 2009 EDT u

Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-21 Thread Allen Schultz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256,SHA1 For the reason of SHA1 issues in the news, I've recently set up a new OpenPGP key, and will be transitioning away from my old one. The old key will continue to be valid for some time, but i prefer all future correspondence to come to the new o