can't change to my real name on this mailing list

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 I don't know if this is more of a ThunderBird question. I have already changed this dummy kurtc name to my real name lawrence in the setting of my Gmail account, but somehow on this mailing list I still appear as "kurtc". I read it's because the outgoi

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

reynt0 wrote: > Wouldn't the claim be: "cannot listen in on such a > transaction between Alice and Bob without affecting the > transaction in a detectable way"? Depends on how pedantic you want to be, and how you define 'transaction'. Frankly, if I were to have proof of an eavesdropper, I would

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

On Fri, 22 Aug 2008, Charly Avital wrote: . . . What's available via the link at the online ScienceNews article seems to require a login. . . . When attempting to access the URL you indicated: I get a page with: *** No paper 'arXiv:804.0122' Right yo

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

reynt0 wrote the following on 8/22/08 5:10 PM: [...] > Here's a url for what seems to be the technical > description, at arXiv.org (found by search there): > > > What's available via the link at the online ScienceNews > article seems to require a login. Thanks for

Re: Securely delete files...

On Aug 22, 2008, at 2:38 PM, reynt0 wrote: On Thu, 21 Aug 2008, David Shaw wrote: . . . whether the filesystem you are using overwrites in place or not. Many modern filesystems (Reiser, XFS) do not necessarily overwrite in place. More primitive filesystems (like the FAT FS that is used o

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

On Fri, 22 Aug 2008, Charly Avital wrote: . . . This is a magazine feature, I don't know how accurate it might be; if someone cares to comment, I'll be grateful. Here's a url for what seems to be the tech

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

On Fri, 22 Aug 2008, Robert J. Hansen wrote: . . . There are no quantum encryption algorithms. None. What we have is quantum key exchange, where you use a handful of qubits to negotiate a random session key in a way that an eavesdropped cannot listen in on the transaction. If you're willing t

Re: Securely delete files...

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008, David Shaw wrote: . . . whether the filesystem you are using overwrites in place or not. Many modern filesystems (Reiser, XFS) do not necessarily overwrite in place. More primitive filesystems (like the FAT FS that is used on many external disks) do overwrite in place.

Re: Securely delete files...

On Aug 21, 2008, at 10:54 PM, Faramir wrote: Atom Smasher escribió: that's basically what sfill (part of the srm package from thc) does, per partition. the other way of doing basically the same thing: dd if=/dev/urandom of=/partition/tmp-file ; rm /partition/tmp-file Now, a lot of coffee

Re: gpg-agent ignores preset passphrase

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 > I tried to use "preset passphrase" feature but it does not work. > Log shows that gpg-agent seemingly receives passphrase but later > when agent should use the cached passphrase it ask for it again > from pinentry. > 2008-07-14 11:10:00 gpg-agent[30

Re: " Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

Charly Avital wrote: > "Quantum encryption is here, but the laws of physics can do much more > than protect privacy". There are no quantum encryption algorithms. None. What we have is quantum key exchange, where you use a handful of qubits to negotiate a random session key in a way that an eaves

" Welcome to the Quantum Internet" - By Davide Castelvecch

Hi, "Quantum encryption is here, but the laws of physics can do much more than protect privacy". This is a magazine feature, I don't know how accurate it might be; if someone cares to comment, I'll be grateful.

Re: Securely delete files...

David Shaw wrote: > Let's simplify things this way: you have regular people and forensics > lab people. You have single file shredding, and whole-disk shredding. > Regular people only have access to the disk that a computer can have. > That is, they are reading the disk using the disk interface.

Re: Securely delete files...

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 David Shaw wrote (in part): > That's exactly the problem - given modern disks, and modern > filesystems, there is not a perfect guarantee that you'll hit the same > disk blocks that the original file landed on. The disk could > invisibly remap