Jonathan Lemon scribbled this message on Nov 6:
> Try doing `iostat 1' while doing the transfers. This is what I see here:
>
> tty da0 da1 da2 cpu
> tin tout KB/t tps MB/s KB/t tps MB/s KB/t tps MB/s us ni sy in id
> TEST A:0.
> Is this a real problem, or is it a "well don't protect suid
> executables that way" problem? The permissions used in Linux's
> /proc seem to be more conservative and seem to prevent this.
Yes. This is a real problem. One of the security team has had
patches since before FreeBSD CON. There ar
On Sun, Nov 07, 1999 at 03:53:50AM +0900, Daniel C. Sobral wrote:
> [and, as you said, the same goes for nosuid -- and for nodev too]
>
> This doesn't enhance security. It enhances auditability. I like
> this. Add a syslog, and a sysctl to turn it on or off. It seems
> straight-forward and ligh
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Brian Fundakowski Feldman writes:
: It sounds to me that what you really want are the semantics of a
: symbolic link and not the semantics of a hard link. Is it just me,
: or does it seem as if the pathname of the executable being stored as
: a virtual symlink in pr
Brian Fundakowski Feldman wrote:
>
> It sounds to me that what you really want are the semantics of a
> symbolic link and not the semantics of a hard link. Is it just me,
> or does it seem as if the pathname of the executable being stored as
> a virtual symlink in procfs as "file" would solve th
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