[Emu] A review Re: [Nea] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-02.txt

2012-06-06 Thread zhou . sujing
Section 1 "The other type of PT, PT-TLS [I-D.ietf-nea-pt-tls], operates before the endpoint gains any access to the IP network. " ==>should be "after the endpoint have gained access to the IP network" "PT-EAP is an inner EAP [RFC3748] method designed to be used under a protected tunnel suc

Re: [Emu] A review Re: [Nea] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-02.txt

2012-06-06 Thread Sam Hartman
I don't believe that existing crypto binding is adequate for NEA's needs as discussed in draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-binding. Unfortunately, though, I'm not sure that tls-unique helps enough here. If the outer method actually does provide server authentication as deployed, then tls-unique is

Re: [Emu] A review Re: [Nea] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-02.txt

2012-06-06 Thread Joe Salowey
So, is your concern with using only MSK crypto binding with an inner EAP authentication method used to authenticate an unauthenticated/poorly authenticated tunnel or is it more specific to the nea-pt-eap method? For the first concern it may be sufficient to discuss the issue in the security c

Re: [Emu] A review Re: [Nea] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-02.txt

2012-06-06 Thread zhou . sujing
> On Jun 6, 2012, at 12:09 PM, Sam Hartman wrote: > > > I don't believe that existing crypto binding is adequate for NEA's needs > > as discussed in draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-binding. > > > > Unfortunately, though, I'm not sure that tls-unique helps enough here. If > > the outer method ac