Re: GnuTLS in Debian

2013-12-23 Thread Simon Josefsson
FWIW, I support moving forward with #6. /Simon You wrote: > My gut reaction was that #5 or #6 are the best option (leaning to > #6). However I guess I don't understand what making something a > system library effects the license? > > Andreas Metzler wrote: > >Hello, > > > >Debian ist still rel

Bug#745139: ITP: libykneomgr -- Yubico YubiKey NEO Manager library and tool

2014-04-18 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist * Package name: libykneomgr Version : 0.1.2-1 Upstream Author : Simon Josefsson * URL : http://opensource.yubico.com/libykneomgr/ * License : LGPLv3+ Section : utils This is a C library to interact with the

Re: sslv2 and openssl 1.0

2011-04-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
If there are any packages that uses SSLv2 by default you might want to file a security bug to get them fixed. I believe SSLv2 is really that bad, it just gives a false sense of security. /Simon -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-devel-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". T

Re: Crypto consolidation in debian ?

2011-04-28 Thread Simon Josefsson
Roger Leigh writes: > On Wed, Apr 27, 2011 at 09:30:05AM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote: >> Bastien ROUCARIES writes: >> >> >> Patches to WebAuth to support NSS are welcome, but I'm sure not going to >> >> bother.  Seems like a waste of time to me.  If I were going to port to any >> >> other crypto

Re: Crypto consolidation in debian ?

2011-04-28 Thread Simon Josefsson
m...@linux.it (Marco d'Itri) writes: > On Apr 27, Bastian Blank wrote: > >> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 07:20:55PM +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote: >> > The reason is that the kind of entities which require FIPS 140 probably >> > also tend to require corporate vendor support, which we do not provide. >> Wh

Re: Crypto consolidation in debian ?

2011-05-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Roger Leigh writes: > This is the root cause, I think. libgcrypt was developed as part of > gnutls, and although it's a separate library, it's insufficiently > generalised. It's implicitly doing things the way gnutls wanted them > doing, and rather than making the library completely general and

Re: Best practice for cleaning autotools-generated files?

2011-05-08 Thread Simon Josefsson
Enrico Weigelt writes: > * Henrique de Moraes Holschuh schrieb: > >> > I'm (as upstream) using serval macros in their own .m4 files (eg. >> > in ./m4/, maybe even sorted into subdirs). Can autoreconf figure >> > out the required search pathes all on its own ? >> >> The problem is that autorecon

Re: Copyright format “License” field: grant of license, license text?

2015-05-21 Thread Simon Josefsson
Niko Tyni writes: > On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 04:46:44PM +1000, Ben Finney wrote: > >> Files: libquux/* >> Copyright: […] >> License: GPL-2 or CC-BY-SA-3 >> You may modify and/or redistribute this work under the terms of >> either the GPL version 2 or later, or the Cre

Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-08-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
I believe the blog post below has relevance to Debian's stance on including minified JavaScript in packages: https://zyan.scripts.mit.edu/blog/backdooring-js/ To me the problem suggests that it is important from a security and accountability perspective to 1) include the human-readable source cod

Re: Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-08-26 Thread Simon Josefsson
Vincent Bernat writes: > ❦ 25 août 2015 22:46 +0100, Steve McIntyre  : > >>>Notably, one of the tool is Grunt and its myriad of plugins. Even if >>>Grunt was in Debian, we would also need Gulp, then Broccoli, because in >>>Javascript, there is always someone thinking that it should be possible >

Re: Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-08-28 Thread Simon Josefsson
Dmitry Smirnov writes: > On Monday 24 August 2015 13:54:21 Simon Josefsson wrote: >> I believe the blog post below has relevance to Debian's stance on >> including minified JavaScript in packages: >> >> https://zyan.scripts.mit.edu/blog/backdooring-js/ > >

Re: Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-08-31 Thread Simon Josefsson
Raphael Hertzog writes: > In both cases, I worked around the problem by shipping the upstream > sources in debian/missing-sources/ but I did not support doing changes > there and did not rebuild the embedded libraries. > > In some cases, I do replace the embedded library with a symlink to the > p

Re: Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-08-31 Thread Simon Josefsson
Raphael Hertzog writes: > On Mon, 31 Aug 2015, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> How would someone rebuild the minified javascript files from the >> missing-sources files? > > They would not? > > The modified non-minified files are perfectly usable even if they are a > bit

Re: Security concerns with minified javascript code

2015-09-06 Thread Simon Josefsson
Samuel Thibault writes: > I however agree that it seems poor practice to duplicate these build > modules in every packages. But if the required versions are different, > there is no real other way. There is another solution: put several different versions of the same source code into some Debian

GNU IceCat?

2015-09-07 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hi. Is there any reason (other than lack of manpower) that GNU IceCat is not packaged in Debian? I understand Debian has IceWeasel to (primarily?) fix the Firefox trademark issue and to have a mechanism to deal with security backports. IceCat has diverged from Firefox/Iceweasel and has a differe

Re: GNU IceCat?

2015-09-08 Thread Simon Josefsson
Riley Baird writes: >> Is there any reason (other than lack of manpower) that GNU IceCat is not >> packaged in Debian? >> >> I understand Debian has IceWeasel to (primarily?) fix the Firefox >> trademark issue and to have a mechanism to deal with security backports. >> >> IceCat has diverged fro

Re: GNU IceCat?

2015-09-08 Thread Simon Josefsson
Riley Baird writes: > On Tue, 08 Sep 2015 08:58:46 +0200 > Simon Josefsson wrote: > >> Riley Baird writes: >> >> >> Is there any reason (other than lack of manpower) that GNU IceCat is not >> >> packaged in Debian? >> >> >> >&

Re: glibc2.0-2.1 incompatibility: _xstat?

1999-05-21 Thread Simon Josefsson
Marco d'Itri <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >Is there a workaround, so that I can continue to use these libraries? > > Write a small shared library providing _xstat and preload it. I wrote this to do that, unfortunely it wasn't enough for my program (a program compiled with the Portland Groups' f

Bug#1042827: ITP: priv-wrapper -- library to disable resource limits and other privilege dropping

2023-08-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Hi! I am planning to package priv-wrapper: https://cwrap.org/priv_wrapper.html priv_wrapper aims to help running processes which are dropping privileges or are restricting resources in test environments. A disabled call always succeeds (i.e. returns

Re: Signature strength of .dsc

2023-12-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Salvo Tomaselli writes: >> hi, on "no public key" list there are my uploads, I'm debian maintainer >> (https://nm.debian.org/person/fantu/), I signed with my key and I have >> DM upload right for them >> (https://qa.debian.org/developer.php?login=fantonifabio%40tiscali.it) > > I think he just

Re: Signature strength of .dsc

2023-12-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
Judit Foglszinger writes: > Hi, > >> > Dmitri, could you re-run the numbers with the debian-maintainer keyring? >> >> That is correct. I have updated the results now. >> The 2,455 no public key has now become 1,238 > > Another is the DN keyring. > Also I'd expect many keys to be found in older v

Re: Signature strength of .dsc

2023-12-08 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jonathan McDowell writes: > On Mon, Dec 04, 2023 at 11:07:38AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Judit Foglszinger writes: >> >> > Dmitri, could you re-run the numbers with the debian-maintainer >> >> > keyring? >> >> >> >>

Bug#1059267: ITP: apt-verify - extend apt's gpgv-based verification mechanism

2023-12-22 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: si...@josefsson.org X-Debbugs-CC: debian-devel@lists.debian.org * Package name: apt-verify Version : 2.0 Upstream Contact: Simon Josefsson * URL : https://gitlab.com/debdistutils/apt-verify * License : AGPLv3

Bug#1059618: ITP: ssh3 -- faster and rich secure shell using HTTP/3

2023-12-29 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist X-Debbugs-Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org, debian...@lists.debian.org * Package name: ssh3 Version : 0.1.4 Upstream Contact: François Michel * URL : https://github.com/francoismichel/ssh3 * License : Apache-2.0 Programming La

Bug#1059620: ITP: golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5 -- golang implementation of JSON Web Tokens (library)

2023-12-29 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson X-Debbugs-CC: debian-devel@lists.debian.org, debian...@lists.debian.org * Package name: golang-github-golang-jwt-jwt-v5 Version : 5.2.0-1 Upstream Author : golang-jwt maintainers, Dave Grijalva * URL : https

Re: Bug#1059618: ITP: ssh3 -- faster and rich secure shell using HTTP/3

2023-12-29 Thread Simon Josefsson
Philipp Kern writes: > On 29.12.23 11:30, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Package: wnpp >> Severity: wishlist >> X-Debbugs-Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org, debian...@lists.debian.org >> * Package name: ssh3 >>Version : 0.1.4 >>Ups

Re: Bug#1059618: ITP: ssh3 -- faster and rich secure shell using HTTP/3

2023-12-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Packaging of SSH3 is available here: https://salsa.debian.org/go-team/packages/ssh3 https://salsa.debian.org/jas/ssh3/ Thanks to the Salsa CI/CD pipeline there is an aptly repository available for easy testing, if anyone would like to experiment or help. Below you can find a snippet how you can

Re: Bug#1059618: ITP: ssh3 -- faster and rich secure shell using HTTP/3

2023-12-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Colin Watson writes: > On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 12:13:28AM +0100, Philipp Kern wrote: >> On 29.12.23 11:30, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> > SSH3 is a complete revisit of the SSH protocol, mapping its semantics on >> > top of the HTTP mechanisms. In a nutshell, SSH3 uses

Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Stephan Verbücheln writes: > On Sat, 30 Dec 2023 12:47:48 + Colin Watson > wrote: >> I also feel that something security-critical like this that's >> labelled by upstream as "still experimental" probably shouldn't >> be in a Debian release. > > It is written in Go. The problem of Go library

Re: Bug#1059618: ITP: ssh3 -- faster and rich secure shell using HTTP/3

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bastian Blank writes: > On Fri, Dec 29, 2023 at 11:30:14AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> * Package name: ssh3 > > This package name is clearly not acceptable. SSH is a well known name > and this project is completely unrelated to it. Agreed. Packagers have settled

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bastian Blank writes: > Hi Simon > > On Sun, Jan 14, 2024 at 10:47:18AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> As an analogy, consider the ./configure scripts that is generated by >> autoconf during build of many packages. The script typically generate >> code that is put

Bug#1060810: ITP: golang-github-sassoftware-go-rpmutils -- Golang implementation of parsing RPM packages

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-sassoftware-go-rpmutils Version : 0.2.0-1 Upstream Author : SAS Institute, Inc. * URL : https://github.com/sassoftware/go-rpmutils * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang

Bug#1060813: ITP: golang-github-qur-ar -- Golang ar archive file library

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-qur-ar Version : 0.0~git20130629.282534b-1 Upstream Author : Blake Smith, Julian Phillips * URL : https://github.com/qur/ar * License : Expat Programming Lang: Go

Bug#1060815: ITP: relic -- digitally sign Linux/Java/Windows packages

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: relic Version : 7.6.1-1 Upstream Author : SAS Institute, Inc. * URL : https://github.com/sassoftware/relic * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang: Go Description : digitally sign

Bug#1060816: ITP: golang-github-shibumi-go-pathspec -- gitignore-style pathspec pattern matching in Go

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-shibumi-go-pathspec Version : 1.3.0-1 Upstream Author : Sander van Harmelen, Christian Rebischke * URL : https://github.com/shibumi/go-pathspec * License : Apache-2.0

Bug#1060817: ITP: golang-github-spiffe-go-spiffe -- Golang library for SPIFFE support

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-spiffe-go-spiffe Version : 2.1.6-1 Upstream Author : Agustín Martínez Fayó, Andrew Harding, et al * URL : https://github.com/spiffe/go-spiffe * License : Apache-2.0

Bug#1060818: ITP: in-toto-golang -- framework for software supply chain integrity

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: in-toto-golang Version : 0.9.0-1 Upstream Author : Aditya Sirish, Christian Rebischke, Lukas Pühringer, et al * URL : https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang * License : Apache-2.0

Bug#1060819: ITP: golang-github-zeebo-errs -- errs is a package for making errors friendly and easy

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-zeebo-errs Version : 1.3.0-1 Upstream Author : Jeff Wendling * URL : https://github.com/zeebo/errs * License : Expat Programming Lang: Go Description : errs is a Go

Bug#1060820: ITP: golang-github-cyberphone-json-canonicalization -- JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) (Go library)

2024-01-14 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-cyberphone-json-canonicalization Version : 0.0~git20220623.57a0ce2-1 Upstream Author : Anders Rundgren * URL : https://github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization * License

Bug#1060834: ITP: golang-github-veraison-go-cose -- go library for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-veraison-go-cose Version : 1.2.1-1 Upstream Author : Veraison * URL : https://github.com/veraison/go-cose * License : MPL-2.0 Programming Lang: Go Description : go

Bug#1060836: ITP: golang-github-cavaliergopher-rpm -- A Go implementation of the RPM file format

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-cavaliergopher-rpm Version : 1.2.0-1 Upstream Author : Ryan Armstrong, et al * URL : https://github.com/cavaliergopher/rpm * License : BSD-3-clause Programming Lang: Go

Bug#1060839: ITP: golang-github-adamkorcz-go-fuzz-headers-1 -- helper functions for Go fuzzing (library)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-adamkorcz-go-fuzz-headers-1 Version : 0.0~git20230919.8b5d3ce-1 Upstream Author : Adam Korcz * URL : https://github.com/AdamKorcz/go-fuzz-headers-1 * License : Apache-2.0

Bug#1060840: ITP: golang-k8s-sigs-release-utils -- utilities for kubernetes Go release engineering (library)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-k8s-sigs-release-utils Version : 0.7.7-1 Upstream Author : Kubernetes SIGs * URL : https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/release-utils * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang: Go

Bug#1060841: ITP: golang-github-transparency-dev-merkle -- create and manipulate Merkle trees in Go (library)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-transparency-dev-merkle Version : 0.0.2-1 Upstream Author : Pavel Kalinnikov, Al Cutter, Martin Hutchinson, M Hickford, et al * URL : https://github.com/transparency-dev/merkle

Bug#1060842: ITP: trillian -- A transparent, highly scalable and cryptographically verifiable data store

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: trillian Version : 1.6.0-1 Upstream Author : Google * URL : https://github.com/google/trillian * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang: Go Description : A transparent, highly

Bug#1060852: ITP: golang-bitbucket-creachadair-shell -- implements basic shell command-line splitting for Go (library)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-bitbucket-creachadair-shell Version : 0.0.8-1 Upstream Author : Michael J. Fromberger * URL : https://bitbucket.org/creachadair/shell/ * License : BSD-3-Clause Programming Lang

Bug#1060853: ITP: golang-github-sigstore-protobuf-specs -- Sigstore Protocol Buffer code (library)

2024-01-15 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-sigstore-protobuf-specs Version : 0.2.1-1 Upstream Author : sigstore * URL : https://github.com/sigstore/protobuf-specs * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang: Go

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-16 Thread Simon Josefsson
Paul Wise writes: > On Mon, 2024-01-15 at 10:17 +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: > >> I asked for practical solutions, not theoretical ones.  We don't have a >> suitable way to rebuild all packages just because right now. > > There are some ideas on the static linking wiki page: > > https://wiki.debia

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-16 Thread Simon Josefsson
tis 2024-01-16 klockan 11:22 +0100 skrev Jérémy Lal: > > > Le mar. 16 janv. 2024 à 11:00, Simon Josefsson > a écrit : > > Paul Wise writes: > > > > > On Mon, 2024-01-15 at 10:17 +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: > > > > > > > I asked for practi

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-16 Thread Simon Josefsson
"IOhannes m zmölnig (Debian GNU|Linux)" writes: > On 1/16/24 13:56, Jérémy Lal wrote: >>> >>> As Built-Using is for license compliance only, no? >>> >>> See >>> >>> https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-relationships.html#additional-source-packages-used-to-build-the-binary-built-using >> In

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-16 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bastian Blank writes: > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:59:30AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Rebuilding a bit more than what is strictly needed sounds fine as a >> first solution to me. > > Building maybe. But how do you want to publish them? The security > archive is

Bug#1061050: ITP: golang-github-common-nighthawk-go-figure -- Prints ASCII art from text

2024-01-16 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: golang-github-common-nighthawk-go-figure Version : 0.0~git20210622.734e95f-1 Upstream Author : Daniel Deutsch * URL : https://github.com/common-nighthawk/go-figure * License : Expat

Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3

2024-01-19 Thread Simon Josefsson
Adam Borowski writes: > On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 10:17:17AM +0100, Bastian Blank wrote: >> On Sun, Jan 14, 2024 at 04:24:57PM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> > Isn't that what the text refers to? Vendoring and static linking are >> > two examples of the same pr

Bug#1061153: ITP: sigsum-go -- tools for public and transparent logging of signed checksums

2024-01-19 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: sigsum-go Version : 1.7.1-1 Upstream Author : The Sigsum Project Authors * URL : https://git.glasklar.is/sigsum/core/sigsum-go * License : BSD-2-Clause Programming Lang: Go Description

Proposal for how to deal with Go/Rust/etc security bugs (was: Re: Limited security support for Go/Rust? Re ssh3)

2024-01-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
Simon Josefsson writes: >> > My naive approach on how to fix a security problem in package X >> > which is >> > statically embedded into other packages A, B, C, ... would be to >> > rebuild >> > the transitive closure of all packages that Build-Depend

Re: Proposal for how to deal with Go/Rust/etc security bugs

2024-01-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
Luca Boccassi writes: >> Having reflected a bit, and learned through my own experience and >> others' insights [1] that Go Build-Depends are not transitive, I'd like >> to update my proposal on how to handle a security bug in any Go/Rust/etc >> package and the resulting package rebuilds: > > Ther

Re: Proposal for how to deal with Go/Rust/etc security bugs

2024-01-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
Luca Boccassi writes: > On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 13:34, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> >> Luca Boccassi writes: >> >> >> Having reflected a bit, and learned through my own experience and >> >> others' insights [1] that Go Build-Depends are not trans

Bug#1061446: ITP: cosign -- Code signing and transparency for containers and binaries

2024-01-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Simon Josefsson * Package name: cosign Version : 2.2.2-1 Upstream Author : The Sigstore Authors * URL : https://github.com/sigstore/cosign * License : Apache-2.0 Programming Lang: Go Description : Code signing

Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hi I'm exploring how to defend against an attacker who can create valid signatures for cryptographic private keys (e.g., PGP) that users need to trust when using an operating system such as Debian. A signature like that can be used in a targetted attacks against one victim. For example, apt does

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bill Allombert writes: > Le Thu, Feb 01, 2024 at 10:38:03AM +0100, Simon Josefsson a écrit : >> Hi >> >> I'm exploring how to defend against an attacker who can create valid >> signatures for cryptographic private keys (e.g., PGP) that users need to >> tru

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hans-Christoph Steiner writes: > Thanks for digging in here, its very important work! I'd be happy to > contribute where I can. I'm a DD and a core contributor to F-Droid, > where we wrestle with basically the same issues. So we've thought a > lot about these kinds of things, but definitely do

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-05 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bill Allombert writes: > On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 08:49:09AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Bill Allombert writes: >> >> > Le Thu, Feb 01, 2024 at 10:38:03AM +0100, Simon Josefsson a écrit : >> >> Hi >> >> >> >> I'm

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-05 Thread Simon Josefsson
Stephan Verbücheln writes: > II. Typical Debian case > > 1. Debian developer signs source tarballs and upload them > 2. The signature only has to be secure until the code lands in the FTP > 3. Debian builds the binary packages > 4. Debian creates Release files with hashes of the packages > 5. The

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-06 Thread Simon Josefsson
tis 2024-02-06 klockan 16:50 +0100 skrev Hans-Christoph Steiner: > > > Simon Josefsson: > > Hans-Christoph Steiner writes: > > > > > Thanks for digging in here, its very important work!  I'd be > > > happy to > > > contribute where I ca

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-06 Thread Simon Josefsson
> > I've looked at Sigstore, it looks nice.  It seems to be architected > > for use > > cases that assume highly reliable and unblocked single domains.  > > That's a > > showstopper for us.  Also, the official client app is 100% JVM code > > right now > > (Java+Kotlin), so integrating Go binarie

Re: Transparency into private keys of Debian

2024-02-09 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hans-Christoph Steiner writes: >> In business, such things are confirmed (often badly) by independent >> audit. For a volunteer-driven community effort, we have to rely on >> everyone to exercise their best judgement in these sorts of matters. > > Debian could also get independent, professional a

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-03-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Antonio Russo writes: > 1. Move towards allowing, and then favoring, git-tags over source tarballs Some people have suggested this before -- and I have considered adopting that approach myself, but one thing that is often overlooked is that building from git usually increase the Build-Depends qu

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-03-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Gioele Barabucci writes: > Just as an example, bootstrapping coreutils currently requires > bootstrapping at least 68 other packages, including libx11-6 [1]. If > coreutils supported [2], the transitive closure of its > Build-Depends would be reduced to 20 packages, most of which in > build-es

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-03-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Sean Whitton writes: > Hello, > > On Sat 30 Mar 2024 at 12:19pm +01, Simon Josefsson wrote: > >> Relying on signed git tags is not reliable because git is primarily >> SHA1-based which in 2019 cost $45K to do a collission attack for. > > We did some analysis o

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-03-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jonathan Carter writes: > On 2024/03/30 11:05, Simon Josefsson wrote: >>> 1. Move towards allowing, and then favoring, git-tags over source tarballs >> >> Some people have suggested this before -- and I have considered adopting >> that approach myself, but one thi

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-03-30 Thread Simon Josefsson
Russ Allbery writes: > Simon Josefsson writes: >> Sean Whitton writes: > >>> We did some analysis on the SHA1 vulnerabilities and determined that >>> they did not meaningfully affect dgit & tag2upload's design. > >> Can you share that analysis?

Re: xz backdoor

2024-03-31 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bastian Blank writes: > On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 12:05:54PM +0500, Andrey Rakhmatullin wrote: >> On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 11:22:33PM -0300, Santiago Ruano Rincón wrote: >> > As others have said, the best solution is to relay on HSW for handling >> > the cryptographic material. >> Aren't these answe

Re: Git and SHA1 collisions

2024-03-31 Thread Simon Josefsson
Gioele Barabucci writes: > But pulling a successful collision attack is not a trivial task. For > instance, the xz attacker did not have all that was required to carry > it out (for example they had no direct access to the git > servers... yet). Is that necessary? It seems that if you have push

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
"G. Branden Robinson" writes: > At 2024-03-31T22:32:49+, Stefano Rivera wrote: >> Upstreams would probably prefer that we used git repositories >> *directly* as source artifacts, but that comes with a whole other can >> of worms... > > Speaking from my upstream groff perspective, I wouldn't _

Re: Validating tarballs against git repositories

2024-04-01 Thread Simon Josefsson
Colin Watson writes: > On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 11:33:06AM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Running ./bootstrap in a tarball may lead to different results than the >> maintainer running ./bootstrap in pristine git. It is the same problem >> as running 'autoreconf -

Re: gnulib

2024-04-18 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jonas Smedegaard writes: > That said, you are welcome to try nudge me if some concrete task > emerges where you image I might be of help. Thanks -- I'm moving this out of 921954@bugs and cc'ing debian-devel to allow others to help and to allow you from not having to feel a need to reply at all :

Re: Status of the t64 transition

2024-04-19 Thread Simon Josefsson
Sebastian Ramacher writes: > Hi, > > as the progress on the t64 transition is slowing down, I want to give an > overview of some of the remaining blockers that we need to tackle to get > it unstuck. I tried to identify some clusters of issues, but there might > be other classes of issues. Thanks

Re: gnulib

2024-04-19 Thread Simon Josefsson
Jonas Smedegaard writes: > Quoting Simon Josefsson (2024-04-18 09:34:26) >> Jonas Smedegaard writes: >> >> > That said, you are welcome to try nudge me if some concrete task >> > emerges where you image I might be of help. >> >> Thanks -- I'

Re: Binary conflict between Midnight Commander and MinIO Client

2024-04-21 Thread Simon Josefsson
Marco d'Itri writes: > On Apr 21, Mathias Gibbens wrote: > >> While that might work for them, it obviously doesn't at a higher >> packaging level. Per Policy Section 10.1, I'm bringing this to d-devel >> for any comments or suggestions on my plan for packaging the MinIO >> Client. Following wh

Re: Binary conflict between Midnight Commander and MinIO Client

2024-04-22 Thread Simon Josefsson
Philip Hands writes: > Mathias Gibbens writes: > >> On Sun, 2024-04-21 at 18:47 +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: > ... >>> /usr/libexec/minio-client/bin/mc -> /usr/bin/mcli > > Might I suggest that the link goes the other way, so that the symlink > lives in /usr

archive.debian.org mirrors

2024-04-27 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hi According to the mirror list https://www.debian.org/distrib/archive it should be possible to reach archive.debian.org via rsync, however this fails for me. Is this intentional, or can this be fixed? Further it seems mirrors are out of sync. I noticed that several mirrors lack buster. Acco

De-vendoring gnulib in Debian packages

2024-05-11 Thread Simon Josefsson
/rules to build everything from source code. For libntlm the essential diff between version 1.7-1, that used upstream tarball with pre-generated content and gnulib code, and latest version 1.8-3 that builds from a minimal source-only tarball is small: --- a/debian/control +++ b/debian

Re: De-vendoring gnulib in Debian packages

2024-05-11 Thread Simon Josefsson
Bruno Haible writes: > Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Finally, while this is somewhat gnulib specific, I think the practice >> goes beyond gnulib > > Yes, gnulib-tool for modules written in C is similar to > > * 'npm install' for JavaScript source code packa

Re: De-vendoring gnulib in Debian packages

2024-05-12 Thread Simon Josefsson
"Theodore Ts'o" writes: >> 1) Use upstream's PGP signed git-archive tarball. > > Here's how I do it in e2fsprogs which (a) makes the git-archive > tarball be bit-for-bit reproducible given a particular git commit ID, > and (b) minimizes the size of the tarball when stored using > pristine-tar: >

gzip --rsyncable (was: Re: De-vendoring gnulib in Debian packages)

2024-05-20 Thread Simon Josefsson
"Theodore Ts'o" writes: > On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 04:27:06PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Going into detail, you use 'gzip -9n' but I use git-archive defaults >> which is the same as -n aka --no-name. I agree adding -9 aka --best is >> an improv

Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-05-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
onal package. +- Drop references to libidn9 and libidn9-dev, last seen in 2003 + and didn't reach testing according to the tracker. + * For libidn11, drop confusing 'Replaces: libidn11-dev'. + + -- Simon Josefsson Sun, 16 May 2021 00:08:06 +0200 + libidn (1.33-3) unstable; u

Re: Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-05-24 Thread Simon Josefsson
mån 2021-05-24 klockan 20:45 +0200 skrev Timo Röhling: > Hi Simon! > > * Simon Josefsson [2021-05-24 19:34]: > > I want to upload a new upstream libidn release into Debian, but > > upstream > > has done a shared library transition. > You should probably read the

Re: Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-05-25 Thread Simon Josefsson
Andreas Metzler writes: > On 2021-05-24 Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Hi! This is for post-bullseye, but I appreciate guidance if anyone has >> time. Shared library version transitions trigger uncertainty in me. > >> I want to upload a new upstream libidn release into Deb

Re: Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-05-26 Thread Simon Josefsson
Andreas Metzler writes: > On 2021-05-26 Guillem Jover wrote: >> On Tue, 2021-05-25 at 19:43:21 +0200, Andreas Metzler wrote: > [...] >> I'd probably instead make this a versioned Provides, so that the >> transitional package can be removed right away from systems, it does >> not interfere with t

Re: Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-05-27 Thread Simon Josefsson
Simon McVittie writes: > On Wed, 26 May 2021 at 19:18:24 +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Andreas Metzler writes: >> > Why not use a versioned Provides *instead* of the dummy package? >> >> Yeah, I never understand exactly when these dummy packages are needed. >

Re: Planning for libidn shared library version transition

2021-07-27 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hi! I'm now resuming work on the libidn shared library transition, and I'm ready for the upload to experimental. I wanted to ping back here to get more review. I'm following Andreas Metzler's outline, but included some tweaks suggested by Simon McVittie. I decided to do some more changes that a

Re: Debian choice of upstream tarballs for packaging

2021-08-18 Thread Simon Josefsson
Paul Wise writes: > Hi all, > > I noticed that sometimes Debian's choice of upstream source for > packaging can be suboptimal. This is especially apparent for the > different per-language upstream packaging ecosystems[1], where the > upstream packaging differs from the upstream VCS in some signif

Re: [RFC] changes to rsyslog - default to RFC 5424 format

2021-11-23 Thread Simon Josefsson
Michael Biebl writes: > Hi, > > we are early in the bookworm release cycle, so I guess it's the > perfect time to bring up this topic. Sorry for hijacking the thread, but perhaps now is a good time to stop using the legacy syslog time format and use the standardized RFC 5424 format? It is the d

Non-free RFCs in stretch

2017-03-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
Hi all, I have searched for non-free licensed IETF RFCs in the archive and found the files below in the stretch suite. Compare earlier work here [1]. I know this is late in the release cycle, but I believe these are real RC bugs so it appears to me that bug reports should be filed. I post this

Re: Non-free RFCs in stretch

2017-03-04 Thread Simon Josefsson
Sebastiaan Couwenberg writes: > On 03/04/2017 10:13 AM, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> I have searched for non-free licensed IETF RFCs in the archive and found >> the files below in the stretch suite. Compare earlier work here [1]. > > Instead of trying to get standards documen

Re: GNU IceCat?

2015-09-09 Thread Simon Josefsson
Moritz Mühlenhoff writes: > Russ Allbery schrieb: >> Simon Josefsson writes: >> >>> Is there any reason (other than lack of manpower) that GNU IceCat is not >>> packaged in Debian? >> >> I suspect it's mostly just resources, but it's an im

Re: GNU IceCat?

2015-09-10 Thread Simon Josefsson
> Hi Simon, > > > Perhaps the situation would be easier for the security team if a > > IceCat package in Debian was based on the same ESR release as > > Iceweasel? > > I believe the situation would be easier if the actual changes in > IceCat could be identified and isolated and then brought up fo

Re: GNU IceCat?

2015-09-10 Thread Simon Josefsson
Ian Jackson writes: > Simon Josefsson writes ("Re: GNU IceCat?"): >> What's a good way to do that efficiently? People have submitted bugs >> against Iceweasel to do some of the things that IceCat does by default, >> for example https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-b

Re: debian.org RTC: announcing XMPP, SIP presence and more

2015-11-12 Thread Simon Josefsson
"Iain R. Learmonth" writes: > Hi, > > On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 01:49:37PM +0100, Wouter Verhelst wrote: >> How does one use the damn XMPP service? > > Set an RTC password using db.debian.org. > > Your account username is wou...@debian.org. (Replace wouter with your LDAP > username if you're not wo

Re: tracker.debian.org replaces packages.qa.debian.org for email subscriptions

2015-12-09 Thread Simon Josefsson
Raphael Hertzog writes: > For package subscribers > --- > > In theory, as a package subscriber you have nothing to do, in practice, > depending on your mail filtering rules, you might have to adjust them. > Each forwarded mail now has headers like this: > > X-Loop: dispa..

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