Re: Has RSADSI Lost their mind?

2000-07-03 Thread Russell Nelson
Dave Del Torto writes: > ostensibly been offering for years, i.e. "CRYPT-PW" (which was always > people), and "PGP" (which never really worked anyway as you know if crypt-pw never worked either. At least, I could never get it to work. -- -russ nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://russnelson.c

Re: Driver's license scandals raise national security worries

2005-01-26 Thread Russell Nelson
R.A. Hettinga writes: > Similar scams have occurred around the country: > > _ In New Jersey, nine state motor vehicle employees pleaded guilty to a > scheme that involved payoffs for bogus licenses. > > _ In Illinois, a federal investigation into the trading of bribes for > driver's licens

Re: E-Mail Authentication Will Not End Spam, Panelists Say

2004-11-18 Thread Russell Nelson
R.A. Hettinga writes: > Any e-mail authentication system, for example, would check that the block > of Internet addresses assigned to an e-mail provider includes the specific > numeric address of a sender of a piece of e-mail. Huh? Somebody is confused here. DomainKeys is 1) an e-mail authent

Re: E-Mail Authentication Will Not End Spam, Panelists Say

2004-11-19 Thread Russell Nelson
R.A. Hettinga writes: > >mail, followed by email from strangers (which is where all the spam > >is). > > A whitelist for my friends, all others pay... > > oh, forget it. Anybody can pay to send email right now. You just go to paypal, type in the person's email, enter the amount of money y

Re: Challenge to TCPA/Palladium detractors

2002-08-10 Thread Russell Nelson
AARG!Anonymous writes: > I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal > for achieving the following technical goal: > > Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data > and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside >

Re: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)

2002-08-15 Thread Russell Nelson
Adam Back writes: > So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code > complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security, > but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity > metrics really do offer some security advantages over the curre