Adam Back writes: > So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code > complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security, > but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity > metrics really do offer some security advantages over the current > situation.
You're wearing your programmer's hat when you say that. But the problem isn't programming, but is instead economic. Switch hats. The changes that you list above may or may not offer some security advantages. Who cares? What really matters is whether they increase the cost of copying. I say that the answer is no, for a very simple reason: breaking into your own computer is a "victimless" crime. In a crime there are at least two parties: the victim and the perpetrator. What makes the so-called victimless crime unique is that the victim is not present for the perpetration of the crime. In such a crime, all of the perpetrators have reason to keep silent about the comission of the crime. So it will be with people breaking into their own TCPA-protected computer and application. Nobody with evidence of the crime is interested in reporting the crime, nor in stopping further crimes. Yes, the TCPA hardware introduces difficulties. If there is way around them in software, then someone need only write it once. The whole TCPA house of cards relies on no card ever falling down. Once it falls down, people have unrestricted access to content. And that means that we go back to today's game, where the contents of CDs are open and available for modification. Someone could distribute a pile of "random" bits, which, when xored with the encrypted copy, becomes an unencrypted copy. -- -russ nelson http://russnelson.com | Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | businesses persuade 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | governments coerce Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX |
