On Wed, Sep 06, 2000 at 11:50:17AM -0400, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Ray Dillinger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> I have long felt that PGP missed a trick when it didn't have
>> automatic expiry for keys -- It should be possible to build
>> into each key an expiration date, fixed at the time of its
Safuat Hamdy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> G: generator
> a: secret value
> A: public value G^a
>
> and for the signature
>
> k: secret random value
> R: G^k
> and
> s = a h(m) + k g(R) mod n (*)
>
> where h is a hash-function, n is the group order, a
Tom Weinstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> "William H. Geiger III":
>> [...] Netscrape, Micky$loth, & RSADSI may have no problem selling
>> false security to their customers, [...]
> Despite your contempt for Netscape and Microsoft, they do, in fact,
> sell strong crypto products where they are able t
"James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> How very virtuous: How about we put 56 bit crypto in, but
> instead of the browser saying "secure document", the browser
> says "weakly secure document. Encryption weakened to meet
> the requirements of government eavesdroppers"?
I suggesting (following
Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> On how to stego pgp messages. First you have to ensure that the data
> you are stegoing has a rectangular distribution [...]
[...]
> It might be nice to update stealth-2 for openPGP / pgp5. There you
> have the additional task of coping with Elgamal key exchange
Peter Gutmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> in ulf.cryptography:
[...]
> In any case what makes the SLE66 a more interesting target than most is that
> it's sort of certified at ITSEC E4 with an assurance level of high.
E4 is an assurance level, too; "E4" is about confidence in correctness
(with assurance
following master locations (the various
FTP mirrors you can find under http://www.openssl.org/source/mirror.html):
o http://www.openssl.org/source/
o ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/
Yours,
The OpenSSL Project Team...
Mark J. Cox Richard LevitteHolger Reif
On Tue, Jun 20, 2000 at 07:50:11PM +0200, Niels Möller wrote:
[...]
> On the other hand, if you don't care about making the hashing
> artificially slow, but have a reasonable amount of entropy to start
> with and just want to stretch it, you may want to look at the way ssh2
> does that. (Say you
On Wed, Jun 21, 2000 at 12:19:50PM +0200, Niels Möller wrote:
> Bodo Moeller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2000 at 07:50:11PM +0200, Niels Möller wrote:
>>> That is specified in draft-ietf-secsh-transport-07.txt, the
>>> relevant section is
>&
