Re: Selective DoS Attacks: Remailer Vulnerabilities

I wonder if the source of remailer unreliability could be further tracked down by providing a "publish" bit under the encryption at each layer. If the bit is set, the remailer publishes, on its own web site the incoming message, the decrypted message, and the outgoing message. If the bit is not s

Re: LA wiretaps -- full details available

The LA County Public Defender's Office has full information about their case against the LAPD and LA Sheriff's Office up on the web at: http://pd.co.la.ca.us/ It's particularly gruesome how the LAPD reported these wiretaps to the Federal wiretap report, which cypherpunks and policy-maker

Internet voting protocols

[Allowed through because we were discussing this, but I must say this is pretty content free... --Perry] We are happy to see the recent discussion about the VoteHere Election System, and the interest in secure Internet voting that it represents. We acknowledge that our web site does not accurate

Globalstar close to pact with FBI over wiretaps

Forwarded-by: David Wade <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Globalstar close to pact with FBI over wiretaps By John Borland September 13, 1999, 4:15 p.m. PT http://home.cnet.com/category/0-1004-200-117671.html A satellite phone firm is close to an agreement with federal law enforcement officials who had threa

Re: IBM to built crypto-on-a-chip into all its PCs

In , on 09/27/99 at 03:41 PM, Robert Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: >Probably IBM will first want to see how attractive the technology is to >punters. At least the approach of using an ancillary encryption chip >should keep IBM safe from the nigh

Re: grabbed video as a source of entropy

At 06:53 PM 9/24/99 -0700, Eugene Leitl wrote: > >I've recently aquired a video camera (bttv-based 3Com Bigpicture, can >do 30 fps true color 640x480). I've noticed that under certain >conditions images can become quite noisy. Does anyone has data on the >amount and quality of the entropy produced

Re: grabbed video as a source of entropy

David Honig writes: > Even if I had the same hardware, perhaps the tolerances on my ADCs are > different from yours. > > And illumination levels will affect certain kinds of noise. Sure, but the entropy generation rate will be in any case higher than stuff coming from /dev/dsp > The po

IP: Elliptic Curve 97-bit Challenge Broken

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 28 Sep 1999 16:17:07 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: IP: Elliptic Curve 97-bit Challenge Broken Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tue, 28 Sep 1999 15:44:17 -0400 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (D

Re: LA wiretaps -- full details available

Right. The scope of this violation of wiretap laws is breathtaking. There's no need for conspiracy theories anymore; we've got conspiracy theorems, complete with proof and everything. There's one amazing paragraph that deserves quotation here: [...] The [LAPD] engage in two totally different

Ft. Meade civilian airfield to open soon?

FINAL CLEARANCE SOUGHT TO OPEN TIPTON AIRFIELD JEFFERSON MORLEY WASHINGTON POST STAFF WRITER Thursday, June 10, 1999 ; Page M01 Section: Weekly - MD - Anne Arundel Anne Arundel County officials plan to open Tipton Airfield at Fort Meade as a general aviation airport this summer, once they re

Re: Ecash without a mint, or - making anonymous payments practical

>On Mon, 27 Sep 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> One small final comment: physical cash is not really anonymous (bills have >> serial numbers, and certainly coins may contain secret marks. Why? At 02:47 PM 09/27/1999 -0700, bram wrote: >I believe at least part of the reason is to make heists dif

Re: Selective DoS Attacks: Remailer Vulnerabilities

At 6:06 PM -0700 9/27/99, John Gilmore wrote: >I wonder if the source of remailer unreliability could be further >tracked down by providing a "publish" bit under the encryption at each >layer. If the bit is set, the remailer publishes, on its own web site >the incoming message, the decrypted mess

Re: Internet voting protocols

On Tue, Sep 28, 1999 at 09:52:41AM -0700, Andrew Neff wrote: > We acknowledge that our web site does not accurately reflect the protocols > on which we have built our products, and we will make the > appropriate changes. However, in creating the site, our intent was > only to provide marketing

IBM Micro Payments Version 1.3 to be released October 99

--- begin forwarded text From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1999 18:22:33 +0300 Subject: IBM Micro Payments Version 1.3 to be released October 99 Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Apologies for any multiple-posting of this note... Release 1.3

Re: Globalstar close to pact with FBI over wiretaps

Yet another illustration of how true security can only be provided by the users themselves on an end-to-end basis. Saltzer, Reed & Clark (authors of "End-to-End Arguments in Systems Design") have been proven right yet again. So has Machiavelli, author of "The Prince". The necessary hook for CDMA

Radicchio PKI standards group for mobile phones

Radicchio.org is the standards group (radicchio.com sells lettuce:-) Their web page is mostly under construction, but it's got a decent article on public-key infrastructures, and announces a conference "Wireless e-commerce: Clearing the Road for Global Expansion", 13-14 January 20

Re: IBM to built crypto-on-a-chip into all its PCs

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Tue, 28 Sep 1999, William H. Geiger III wrote: > In , on 09/27/99 >at 03:41 PM, Robert Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: > > >Probably IBM will first want to see how attractive the technology is to