At 09:02 23/09/1999 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>By example, I
>could verify the machine code for IDEA, but not PGP and certainly not your
>favorite version of UNIX.
Actually, while there are bugs and security holes, it's pretty certain that
V6 Unix didn't have any crypto trapdoors ... and
> >Did any of you see this
> >http://www.votehere.net/content/Products.asp#InternetVotingSystems
> >
> >that proposes to authenticate the voter by asking for his/her/its SSN#?
>
> It looked like the idea for this part was to prevent double voting,
> plus make sure that only authorized people cou
> Date: Thu, 23 Sep 1999 18:38:57 -0400 (EDT)
> From: Eli Brandt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> > Perry, if you really believe that the question of whether a given
> > lump of object code contains a Thompson Trap is formally undecidable
> > I'd be interested in seeing a proof.
Anonymous wrote:
> Ed Gerck wrote:
> >Did any of you see this
> >http://www.votehere.net/content/Products.asp#InternetVotingSystems
> >
> >that proposes to authenticate the voter by asking for his/her/its SSN#?
>
> It looked like the idea for this part was to prevent double voting,
> plus make
At 6:38 PM -0400 9/23/99, Eli Brandt wrote:
>Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> > Perry, if you really believe that the question of whether a given
> > lump of object code contains a Thompson Trap is formally undecidable
> > I'd be interested in seeing a proof. Otherwise Herr Goedel has
> > nothing to do wi
> > Perry, if you really believe that the question of whether a given
> > lump of object code contains a Thompson Trap is formally undecidable
> > I'd be interested in seeing a proof.
>
> That sure smells undecidable to me. Any non-trivial predicate P on
> Turing machines (non-trivial meaning
> There are no Turing machines. Real computers are finite, and real
> source codes are finite. I'm sure that if you set a limit on the
> length of the source code which is recognized by the supposed trap, a
> sufficiently large FSM can decide in a finite time whether there's a
> trap.
mere fini
Ray Hirschfeld wrote:
> > That sure smells undecidable to me. Any non-trivial predicate P on
> > Turing machines (non-trivial meaning that both P and not-P are
> > non-empty) is undecidable by Rice's Theorem. There are technical
> > issues in encoding onto the tape all possible interactions with
Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> >Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> > > Perry, if you really believe that the question of whether a given
> > > lump of object code contains a Thompson Trap is formally undecidable
[...]
> I am not asking about the class of all Turing machines, just one
> particular lump of object
At 06:38 PM 9/23/99 -0400, Eli Brandt wrote:
>Arnold Reinhold wrote:
>> Perry, if you really believe that the question of whether a given
>> lump of object code contains a Thompson Trap is formally undecidable
>> I'd be interested in seeing a proof. Otherwise Herr Goedel has
>> nothing to do wi
John R. Levine writes, quoting others:
> > >Did any of you see this
> > >http://www.votehere.net/content/Products.asp#InternetVotingSystems
> > >
> > >that proposes to authenticate the voter by asking for his/her/its SSN#?
> >
> > It looked like the idea for this part was to prevent double votin
At 11:18 PM 9/23/99 -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
>> >that proposes to authenticate the voter by asking for his/her/its SSN#?
>>
>> It looked like the idea for this part was to prevent double voting,
>> plus make sure that only authorized people could vote. It
>
>The disconnect here is that it does no
For the truly paranoid: it is perfectly possible to boostrap a working
Forth environment *by hand*, whether by hand assembly and flashing the
resulting image, or by porting eForth (or any Forths written in C) to
an embedded target.
You simply can't fit any Trojan in there: a minimal Forth OS can
> It seems clear that the system is primarily oriented towards preventing
> fraud by election officials and those involved in setting up the
> electronic voting. Historically, this is the greater danger in
> election fraud. Stuffing the ballot box is much easier if you are
> the one in charge of
Forwarded with permission (the permission being the short quote below,
the message being the long one). I don't have a copy of the
traceroute, but it definitely showed packets going from Washington DC
to NYC through Paris.
Dick St.Peters writes:
> Well, the questions were really intended to be
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Resent-Date: Thu, 23 Sep 1999 06:22:02 -0400
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 1999 06:21:56 -0400 (EDT)
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Subject: Extension for FC 00
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