On Sun, 22 Sep 2019, Nemo via cctalk wrote:
We had a secure (but not tempest) room built for us by an authorised
contractor and they forgot to install A/C. It was unusable until a
portable A/C was placed in it with complicated baffles letting the hot
air out.
Nobody except a college administra
On 18/09/2019, Guy Sotomayor Jr via cctalk wrote:
>
[...]
> Yea, I had to make a trip to a “secure facility” once and there were entire
> “tempest” rooms with conditioned power and no external communications
> equipment.
We had a secure (but not tempest) room built for us by an authorised
contrac
> On Sep 18, 2019, at 9:59 AM, Chris Elmquist wrote:
>
> On Wednesday (09/18/2019 at 09:19AM -0700), Guy Sotomayor Jr via cctalk wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Sep 18, 2019, at 12:42 AM, Liam Proven via cctalk
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 02:19, Paul Koning via cctalk
>>> wrote:
>
On Wednesday (09/18/2019 at 09:19AM -0700), Guy Sotomayor Jr via cctalk wrote:
>
>
> > On Sep 18, 2019, at 12:42 AM, Liam Proven via cctalk
> > wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 02:19, Paul Koning via cctalk
> > wrote:
> >>> ...
> >> Speaking of timing, that reminds me of two amazing secu
> On Sep 18, 2019, at 12:42 AM, Liam Proven via cctalk
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 02:19, Paul Koning via cctalk
> wrote:
>>> ...
>> Speaking of timing, that reminds me of two amazing security holes written up
>> in the past few years. Nothing to do with the Spectre etc. issue.
>>
On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 02:19, Paul Koning via cctalk
wrote:
> > ...
> Speaking of timing, that reminds me of two amazing security holes written up
> in the past few years. Nothing to do with the Spectre etc. issue.
>
> One is the recovery of speech from an encrypted VoIP channel such as Skype,
Windows _is_ Bells and Whistles, plus a couple of gongs.
No ... The GONGS is the chinese knock off.
On 9/17/2019 1:08 PM, Fred Cisin via cctalk wrote:
On Tue, 17 Sep 2019, Paul Koning via cctalk wrote:
I could easily imagine a computer science exam question "Describe in
one paragraph the specific design error that enabled the Meltdown
attack".
I used to have some related questions in my mic
> On Sep 17, 2019, at 6:51 PM, dwight via cctalk wrote:
>
> ...
> This latest one is bad for a touch typer or those that always enter the
> password in the same way. It looks for the timing of when you hit keys and
> then makes guesses on what keys would typically take that length of time to
ng
Cc: General Discussion: On-Topic and Off-Topic Posts ;
SIMH
Subject: Re: [Simh] Fwd: VAX + Spectre
I can simplify the question a bit. I have to be careful as I work for
Intel and I've been involved with a small bit of it on our end and some of
the lawyers are a bit touchy about the who
I can simplify the question a bit. I have to be careful as I work for
Intel and I've been involved with a small bit of it on our end and some of
the lawyers are a bit touchy about the whole situation. So I need to add
- these opinions are my own not necessarily my employers.
Basically, if you h
On Tue, 17 Sep 2019 at 21:09, Fred Cisin via cctalk
wrote:
> One student (who later became my best friend and buddy)
> skipped the technical details and said, "The primary design error for
> MacOS and Windoze (sic) is that they placed a lower priority on security,
> than on being able to transpar
On 9/17/19 3:08 PM, Fred Cisin via cctalk wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Sep 2019, Paul Koning via cctalk wrote:
>> I could easily imagine a computer science exam question "Describe in
>> one paragraph the specific design error that enabled the Meltdown
>> attack".
>
> I used to have some related questions i
On Tue, 17 Sep 2019, Paul Koning via cctalk wrote:
I could easily imagine a computer science exam question "Describe in one
paragraph the specific design error that enabled the Meltdown attack".
I used to have some related questions in my microcomputer operating
systems class. One student (wh
> On Sep 17, 2019, at 2:35 PM, allison via cctalk wrote:
>
>>> ...
>
> I see this as a question of the number of angels that can dance on the
> point of a pin. But could GCC compile code that has system access to
> do nasties is a more complex question. Then again how does it get
> system
On 9/17/19 1:49 PM, Warner Losh via cctalk wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 17, 2019, 6:40 PM Paul Koning via cctalk
> wrote:
>
>> Yes, I understand that a number of ISAs are vulnerable. The original
>> paper by Kocher clearly mentions both x86 and ARM.
>>
>> The reason I forwwarded the question is that I'm
On Tue, Sep 17, 2019, 6:40 PM Paul Koning via cctalk
wrote:
> Yes, I understand that a number of ISAs are vulnerable. The original
> paper by Kocher clearly mentions both x86 and ARM.
>
> The reason I forwwarded the question is that I'm not aware enough of all
> the VAX variants to answer whethe
Yes, I understand that a number of ISAs are vulnerable. The original paper by
Kocher clearly mentions both x86 and ARM.
The reason I forwwarded the question is that I'm not aware enough of all the
VAX variants to answer whether there are any VAXen with speculative execution.
If no, then we're
Paul - be careful. All CPU's post the IBM AGS that used branch prediction
are suspect. Russ Robelen (who was the 360/50 lead, worked on 360/90 and
lead AGS) has the speculative executing patent. I tweaked him when it all
came out and said - look at what you did.
What Russ and team are great i
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