ipant have its own copy.
>
>
> On Friday, 27 March 2015, at 2:32 pm, Robert McKay wrote:
>> Basically the problem with that is that someone could setup a single
>> full node that has the blockchain and can answer those challenges
>> and
>> then a bunch of othe
Basically the problem with that is that someone could setup a single
full node that has the blockchain and can answer those challenges and
then a bunch of other non-full nodes that just proxy any such challenges
to the single full node.
Rob
On 2015-03-26 23:04, Matt Whitlock wrote:
> Maybe I'm
On Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:28:15 -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> I've got a bitcoin-only exit running myself and right now there is
> absolutely no traffic leaving it. If the traffic coming from that
> node
> was legit I'd expect some to be exiting my n
Here's a packet dump of a connected client:
http://wari.mckay.com/~rm/unknown.tcpdump
Doesn't seem particularly abusive.. only one connection, not doing much
traffic. I don't have any easy way to deserialize this and see if it's
doing anything unusual but it's there if someone wants to have a g
e wrote:
>> I don't think it would be too hard to add support for a option to
>> the
>> seeder "for non-matching requests, forward to other DNS server at
>> IP:PORT", so you could cascade them.
>>
>> On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 4:51 PM, Robert McKay
e giving different authority sections.
>
> Hmm, but if I setup custom SOA record for it - it should work,
> right?
> What SOA name should it be actually, assuming that NS record for
> testnet-seed.alexykot.me [12] is pointing at alexykot.me [13]?
>
> Best regards,
>
>
Hi Alex,
I think the problem is with my suggestion to use bind forwarding..
basically bind is stripping off the authorative answer bit in the
reply.. this causes the recursor to go into a loop chasing the authority
server which again returns a non-authoritve answer with itself as the
authority
On Tue, 20 May 2014 01:44:29 +0100, Robert McKay wrote:
> On Mon, 19 May 2014 19:49:52 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Robert McKay
>> wrote:
>>> It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this
>>> can
>>>
On Mon, 19 May 2014 19:49:52 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Robert McKay
> wrote:
>> It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this
>> can
>> be done in a zone context.. then you can forward the different zones
>> t
It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this can
be done in a zone context.. then you can forward the different zones to
different dnsseed daemons running on different non-public IPs or two
different ports on the same IP (or on one single non-public IP since
there's really
On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 23:51:21 +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
> The goal of all that is that we get to keep our existing IPv4 based
> anti-sybil heuristics, so we can’t possibly make anything worse,
> only better. Plus, we’ve now set things up so in future if/when we
> come up with a better anti-sybil syst
On Sun, 8 Dec 2013 13:14:44 -0800, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 1:07 PM, Drak wrote:
>> Simple verification relies on being able to answer the email sent to
>> the
>> person in the whois records, or standard admin/webmaster@ addresses
>> to prove
>> ownership of the domain
>
>
On Fri, 5 Apr 2013 11:48:51 +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
> However, youre somewhat right in the sense that its a self-defeating
> attack. If the pool owner went bad, he could pull it off once, but
> the
> act of doing so would leave a permanent record and many of the people
> mining on his pool would
On Thu, 24 May 2012 12:33:12 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> There appears to be some non-trivial mining power devoted to mining
> empty blocks. Even with satoshi's key observation -- hash a fixed
> 80-byte header, not the entire block -- some miners still find it
> easier to mine empty blocks, rather
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