On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 23:51:21 +0100, Mike Hearn wrote: > The goal of all that is that we get to keep our existing IPv4 based > anti-sybil heuristics, so we can’t possibly make anything worse, > only better. Plus, we’ve now set things up so in future if/when we > come up with a better anti-sybil system based on anonymous identities > or other fancy crypto, we can take out the “connect via clearnet” > step and go straight to using hidden services with only a very small > set of code changes and no new protocol work.
I think it might be ok to use proof-of-stake on as an anti-sybil scheme on tor.. people would obviously not want to associate their wallet with their IP address, but is there any harm in associating it with a (temporary) tor service id (especially one that isn't used for anything other than relaying bitcoin transactions)? If each node you connect too can sign some challenge with a key that controls some BTC (and your client node verifies that the funds are different) then that might be useful.. even if it were only a small 0.01BTC stake that would be similar to the cost of obtaining another IP through a cheap VPS or VPN and significantly higher than the cost to an attacker who is able to MITM everything and operate on any IP anyway. Rob ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CenturyLink Cloud: The Leader in Enterprise Cloud Services. Learn Why More Businesses Are Choosing CenturyLink Cloud For Critical Workloads, Development Environments & Everything In Between. Get a Quote or Start a Free Trial Today. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=119420431&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
