Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-13 Thread Matus UHLAR - fantomas
On 09.02.12 11:43, Lyle Giese wrote: This is just my opinion, but this is not a bug. It's the side effect of a desirable feature called caching. It's a design flaw - you cache something forever, even if case you should not do it. The cache time is given and we should not expand it, for vali

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread michoski
On 2/9/12 9:43 AM, "Lyle Giese" wrote: > This is just my opinion, but this is not a bug. It's the side effect of > a desirable feature called caching. > > Yea, we can brainstorm how to mitigate the effect, but in order to > mitigate a problem, we have to know that there is a problem(revoked or >

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread Lyle Giese
On 02/09/12 09:56, Matus UHLAR - fantomas wrote: > Questions: > (1) It looks to me like if the ghost name is in our >DNS RPZ zone, then that 'fixes' the problem for >that name. Is this correct? Ghost domain could be redelegated to a new owner and become absolutely legal. On 09.02.12

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread Matus UHLAR - fantomas
> Questions: > (1) It looks to me like if the ghost name is in our >DNS RPZ zone, then that 'fixes' the problem for >that name. Is this correct? Ghost domain could be redelegated to a new owner and become absolutely legal. On 09.02.12 07:36, John Hascall wrote: Caveat Emptor -- if

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread Chris Thompson
On Feb 9 2012, Peter Andreev wrote: 2012/2/9 John Hascall [...snip...] (2) It also looks like restarting bind flushes the cache and that prevents the repopulation of the local cache with names which are ghosts (new different ghost names could, of course, be created).Is this corr

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread Gilles Massen
The easier way to mitigation is to enable dnssec validation on the resolver (which is a good thing anyway). From my tests this changes the behaviour of bind in so far that it respects the TTL of the NS set rather strictly, and returns to the parent on expiry. Looks like the most efficient long-te

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread John Hascall
> > Questions: > > (1) It looks to me like if the ghost name is in our > >DNS RPZ zone, then that 'fixes' the problem for > >that name. Is this correct? > > Ghost domain could be redelegated to a new owner and become absolutely > legal. Caveat Emptor -- if you buy a former TDSS (or

Re: CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread Peter Andreev
2012/2/9 John Hascall > > > Questions: > > (1) It looks to me like if the ghost name is in our >DNS RPZ zone, then that 'fixes' the problem for >that name. Is this correct? > Ghost domain could be redelegated to a new owner and become absolutely legal. > > (2) It also looks like resta

CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names) mitigation

2012-02-09 Thread John Hascall
Questions: (1) It looks to me like if the ghost name is in our DNS RPZ zone, then that 'fixes' the problem for that name. Is this correct? (2) It also looks like restarting bind flushes the cache and that prevents the repopulation of the local cache with names which are ghosts