[tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[sy00963-...@yahoo.fr]

When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if he 
checks my activity on the network??
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[Runa A. Sandvik]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 7:45 AM, sy00963-...@yahoo.fr
 wrote:
> When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if 
> he checks my activity on the network??

She will be able to see that you are connecting to the Tor network,
but not what you are doing, which websites you are visiting, and so
on.

-- 
Runa A. Sandvik
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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?

[grarpamp]

>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people

The summary is probably...

Only those with access to the chip masks, or an equally serious
amount of reverse engineering gear, knows what goes into a chipset.
Therefore anything is possible. And if you're not proxying the output
of suspected spy systems through your own masks to validate them,
well... you could very well be screwed :)

The rest is documented stuff you can read in any spec sheet.
Part of that material is indeed new firmware capabilities and
ways to lock it down, or not.

Don't run windows or closed source stuff if you're concerned about
what it might phone home about. UUID's, serials, MAC's, your
data, etc.

If the platform + OS can't be trusted, neither can any app
running on it, including Tor. Act accordingly.

Nothing here related to Tor your questions should go to the
author of that post or comp.risks.
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[tor-talk] How to route all connection through tor ?

[J. Bakshi]

Hello list,

When using tor bundle what will be the setting in viladia
to route all connection through tor ?

Thanks
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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?

[grarpamp]

>>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people
>
> The summary is probably...

Meant largely as to the nebulous 'spying' by 'them'.
Not as to Seth's good post regarding the possibilities
with known technologies.

Hopefully it threaded that way.
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[grarpamp]

> When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if 
> he checks my activity on the network??

Generally speaking, a network admin can see that you are using Tor
(the packets moving), not what you're doing over it (the packet
contents).
If 'network admin' also means 'systems admin' of the system you are
using, then they can see everything.
If use of Tor is prohibited in that environment, find another place to run Tor.
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Re: [tor-talk] How to route all connection through tor ?

[proper]

baksh...@gmail.com wrote:
> When using tor bundle what will be the setting in viladia
> to route all connection through tor ?

No, Vidalia does not claim that and can not do that.

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[Philipp Winter]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 07:45:53AM +0100, sy00963-...@yahoo.fr wrote:
> When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if
> he checks my activity on the network??

The correct answers have already been given but you might also be interested in
this link:
https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https
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Re: [tor-talk] How to force redirect each application through separate SocksPorts? (preventing identity correlation)

[proper]

freebsd-lis...@fabiankeil.de wrote:
>  wrote:
>
> >  wrote:
> > > That's incorrect. Privoxy can change the forwarding settings based
> on
> > > tags:
> > >
> > > http://www.privoxy.org/user-manual/actions-file.html#CLIENT-HEADER-TAGGER
>
> >
> > Excuse me, if I misunderstood. It doesn't look like anyone done that
>
> > ever before (and documented that online). And for that reason, it were
>
> > nice, if you could create two examples.
>
> The documentation above has been available for years and already
> contains an example. Are you looking for something specific that
> the current documentation doesn't answer?
>
> > You suggest tagging the applications by user agent and forward-override?
>
>
> Yes.
>
> > That sounds like a nightmare.
>
> I've been doing it for years and think it's convenient,
> but of course it's a matter of opinion.
>
> >   I wouldn't know how to find gpg's user
>
> > agent, other than digging into the source code. And if they decide the
>
> > change the user agent with the next version of gpg, the function gets
>
> > broken.
>
> The User-Agent can be discovered by letting the proxy (or nc) log it.
> It is also usually constant between updates, so checking it once
> per update should do.
>
> gpg doesn't seem to set a User-Agent, but that not a problem
> as you can either let it use the default forwarding proxy or
> change the forwarding based on other criteria like the address
> of the keyserver.
>
> Fabian

Imho it's very improbable, that a significant amount of people will be able to 
do it that way. It's also complicated and error prone (human mistakes).

I am working on an anonymous operating system (TorBOX [1]) and made a 
modification to torsocks, called uwt [2].

Using uwt breaks down to "sudo ip=127.0.0.1 port=9053 uwt apt-get update" or 
"ip=127.0.0.1 port=9054 uwt gpg". It's also possible to create wrapper scripts, 
which do that in an automated way. (Documented under [2].) It's only a hack and 
a clean solution is much desirable.

Feature request:
I don't know how much effort it were or how much time you still like to spend 
on privoxy... Could you add a feature?

- privoxy may provide multiple (http) listen ports
- each (http) listen port may be forwarded to a different parent proxy ip/port

[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX
[2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/torsocks

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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?

[proper]

 wrote:
> Similarly, having a GPS receiver in your phone does not mean that
> everyone you send an SMS to or everyone you call will learn your
> exact physical location.  However, it does mean that if there's
> spyware on your phone, that spyware is able to use the GPS to learn
> your location and leak it.  If you're worried about spyware threats
> on your phone, which can be quite a realistic concern, the GPS
> itself isn't necessarily the unique core of the threat, because
> there are also lots of other things in the phone that can be read to
> help physically locate you (like wifi base station MAC addresses,
> taking photographs of your surroundings with the phone's camera,
> recording the identities and signal strengths of the GSM base
> stations your phone sees...).  So a more fundamental question might
> be whether your phone operating system is able to either prevent
> you from getting malware or prevent the malware from accessing the
> sensors on your phone.

The situation on smartphones is much worse than on Windows.

Google may silently install malware on Android phones. The only way to prevent 
that, is not using the market, which is very inconvenient and barely anyone 
goes that way. The phone book and calendar is with default settings 
automatically mirrored on Google servers, most people have it activated.

I wrote more about that a while ago... [1]

[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Mobile

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[tor-talk] Bad Relay: Are there a mailing list / announce about it?

[Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)]

Hi all,

i wanted to ask if there is a mailing list and/or some notification
schema to know when a new Bad Relay is detected and blocked:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays

Are the tor-scanner announcing automatically something somewhere?

-naif
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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?

[proper]

 wrote:
> One of the defenses people have talked about against hardware
> fingerprinting is running inside a virtual machine.  Normally,
> software inside the virtual machine, even if it's malicious,
> doesn't learn much about the physical machine that hosts the VM.
> If you always use Tor inside a VM, then even if there's a bug
> that lets someone take over your computer (or if they trick you
> into installing spyware), the malicious software won't be able
> to read much real uniqueness from the host hardware, unless
> there's also a bug in the VM software.
>
> [...]  There's probably more research to be done
> about the conditions under which VMs can be uniquely identified
> both "from the inside" by malware, and remotely by remote
> software fingerprinting, absent VM bugs that give unintended
> access to the host.

We documented, which data, malware inside a VM could collect to identify users. 
[1] That doesn't mean, we wouldn't be happy about sophisticated, dedicated 
research. However, here is a summary:

- (Apart from obvious and known, IP, DNS, (browser) fingerprinting.)
- internal LAN IP (of virtualized operating system)
- time zone (of virtualized operating system)
- username (of virtualized operating system)
- hostname (of virtualized operating system)
- mac address of virtual machine
- mac address of host (if using bridged networking) or mac address of gateway 
(if using virtual internal networking)
- virtual disk uuids
- Some information about the real CPU, depends on VM software. There might be 
options to further hide information about the CPU.
- Installed software packages.
- If you copy data into the VM: metadata.

[1] 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX/SecurityAndHardening#TorBOXsProtocol-Leak-ProtectionandFingerprinting-Protection

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[tor-talk] Exclude nodes?

[andre76]

I want to exclude certain exit nodes.  The following is the text that
used to work in my Torrc file.  With 2.2.3.7 (got the version number
wrong I'm sure) it no longer works.

ExcludeExitNodes {GB}
StrictNodes 1


How can I fix it?



.

-- 
http://www.fastmail.fm - Or how I learned to stop worrying and
  love email again

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[tor-talk] WG: Questions about your project and about data security

[Schaefer, Viola Lea Marlene]

Hello again,



I´m a member of your list now. I hope you can

answer my questions now. You can find them by

scrolling down to my first mail.



Thanking you in anticipation,



Viola Schäfer









Von: Schaefer, Viola Lea Marlene
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 27. Juni 2012 15:04
An: tor-assista...@lists.torproject.org; tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: WG: Questions about your project and about data security


Dear Tor-Project-Team,



this is the forwarded E-Mail , which I sent two days

ago. Mr. Sandvik answered me yesterday and advised

me to send my questions to this address.

I would be very happy about an early answer!



Sincerely yours,



Viola Schäfer










Von: Schaefer, Viola Lea Marlene
Gesendet: Montag, 25. Juni 2012 15:30
An: h...@rt.torproject.org
Betreff: Questions about your project and about data security


Dear Tor Project-Team,



I am a Psychology student in Mainz, Germany who is working

on a project for social psychology about data protection on the

internet. I read about your project in an article of a German

newspaper called "Der Freitag" (issue of April 26th 2012).

I have prepared some questions about the Tor Project and about

what do you think about data security online. The questions are

as follows:



1. What are the main aims and the strategy of the Tor Project?



2.Many people seem to be very ingenuously spreading their private

data on the net. What do you think could be the reason(s) for that?



3.What makes Facebook so successful even if many users know about

the porous and apparently insufficient privacy protection of this platform?



4.Do you think that people, who use social networks like Facebook, are

actually willing to protect their data? Could it be possible to provoke

a behavioral change ? Or does it really not matter to most of the people

what happens with their private data?



5. If one would start a campaign in order to make people more careful

and conscious in protecting their data online, how should this campaign

work and look like?



So these are my questions so far :)





Hoping for an early answer,



Viola Schäfer




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Re: [tor-talk] possible to identify tor user via hardware DRM?

[Nick M. Daly]

On Wed, 27 Jun 2012 22:28:20 -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> Nick M. Daly writes:
> > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/freedombox-discuss/2012-June/004049.html
> 
> I find this message misleading in various ways.  The basic thing that
> I've been telling people is that there are few situations in which
> either PSN or TPM uniqueness makes things qualitatively worse.

Seth, thank you for your incredibly detailed response.  My biggest worry
was that I had somehow missed an entire class of tracking tools.
However, that doesn't seem to be the case.  A few hours after I sent out
this request, Ben on the FreedomBox list [0] also took the letter apart.
I'll make sure to pass your analysis along to the FBX list as well.

Thanks for your time,
Nick

0: 
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/freedombox-discuss/2012-June/004051.html


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Re: [tor-talk] Bad Relay: Are there a mailing list / announce about it?

[Damian Johnson]

> i wanted to ask if there is a mailing list and/or some notification
> schema to know when a new Bad Relay is detected and blocked:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays

Hi naif. Nope, the usual process is...
- Someone reports a bad exit on tor-assistants@.
- That email sits around for a while. Eventually the reporter or
someone else on the list reminds the authority operators that vote on
badexits about it.
- They flag the relay.
- Once I see that the relay has the flag I update the wiki.

If you just care about the first step then there's a tor-exitscanner@
list, though looks like it isn't public. If you just care about the
last step then you can subscribe to...
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-wiki-changes

... and just look for changes to the badRelays wiki. -Damian
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Re: [tor-talk] Bad Relay: Are there a mailing list / announce about it?

[Damian Johnson]

> If you just care about the first step then there's a tor-exitscanner@
> list

Oops, correction - didn't mean the tor-assistants@ reporting step. The
SoaT exit scanners report their results to tor-exitscanner@ so it's a
firehose that's mostly false alarms. I'm pretty sure that at present
Aaron is the only person sorting through it.
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[tor-talk] Fwd: [guardian-alpha] Orbot 1.0.9 (rc3/final) is out!

[Nathan Freitas]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1


Please let us know if you have any issues upgrading from a previous
version.

-  Original Message 
Subject: [guardian-alpha] Orbot 1.0.9 (rc3/final) is out!
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2012 11:18:03 -0400
From: Nathan of Guardian 
Organization: The Guardian Project
To: guardian-dev ,
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org, guardian-al...@lists.mayfirst.org

- -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1


We've posted the latest Orbot release to Google Play and our dev site,
and it will be up on torproject.org shortly.

Google Play:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android&;

direct APK + gpg sig:
https://dev.guardianproject.info/projects/orbot/files

What's in this version:
- - - faster, stronger, better!
- - - Tor now updated to 0.2.3.17-beta / Privoxy updated to 3.0.12
- - - supports obfsproxy type bridges
- - - reduced size of internal data storage requirements by 2MB
- - - tweaked layout for smaller screens / updated layout for larger screens
- - - improved wizard flow on non-root devices
- - - now supports install/run from SD (reduces internal storage by 5MB)
- - - fixes root detection and new binary installation
- - - geoip database now included for exit/entrance node control
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[tor-talk] Tor and firewall output rules

[Anton Korec]

Hi,

I'm new to this list, so I apologise when my problem has been solved already. 

I'm runing new tor router as a non-exit relay, with ORPort 443 and DirPort 80. 
Server is running on Debian stable and tor version is 0.2.2.35. Tor is running 
under debian-tor user. I have restrictive iptables firewall rules (in both 
directions, INPUT and OUTPUT). I do not like fw rules of type "all outgoing is 
allowed". So I set fw up as found somewhere on torproject.org wiki, with 
"-m owner --uid-owner debian-tor":

IPTABLES -P INPUT DROP
IPTABLES -P OUTPUT DROP
IPTABLES -P FORWARD DROP
...
...
IPTABLES -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0.0.0.0/0 --sport 1024: -d ${MYIP} --dport 
443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state  

NEW,ESTABLISHED -m owner --uid-owner debian-tor -j ACCEPT

In such configuration fw has been dropping large numbers of packets with uid 0 
and packets with no uid set. And it seems that there was almost no tor traffic 
on relay. So I changed OUTPUT rule to:

IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state  

NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

and everything worked fine.
I tried to use 0.2.2.37, 0.2.3.17-beta precompiled deb packages, tried to 
compile from source downloaded from torproject.org, but packet dropping was 
the same on every version of tor.
Last thing I did, was update fw rules to:

IPTABLES -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0.0.0.0/0 --sport 1024: -d ${MYIP} --dport 
443 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state  

NEW,ESTABLISHED -m owner --uid-owner debian-tor -j ACCEPT
IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp -s ${MYIP} -d 0.0.0.0/0 -m state --state  

NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

to count packets traversing each OUTPUT rule (with and without uid to "debian-
tor" set). 22% of all packets (it is 11% of bytes of that traffic) sent by tor 
relay was uid not set to "debian-tor".

Why is tor sending packets with uid not set to "debian-tor"?

Regards
Tony


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Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[sy00963-...@yahoo.fr]

Thanks for the answer... I am using a PC in my work.. The PC is a part of the 
local network and I am not the admin on my PC (can't install programs, can't 
write on USB flashs, can't enter msconfig, ..etc.) If I good understood 
your answer, that's mean the admin of PC (the same of system admin of my PC, I 
think) can track all my activity on the PC.. that's right???




 De : grarpamp 
À : tor-talk@lists.torproject.org 
Envoyé le : Jeudi 28 juin 2012 11h18
Objet : Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator
 
> When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if 
> he checks my activity on the network??

Generally speaking, a network admin can see that you are using Tor
(the packets moving), not what you're doing over it (the packet
contents).
If 'network admin' also means 'systems admin' of the system you are
using, then they can see everything.
If use of Tor is prohibited in that environment, find another place to run Tor.
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Re: [tor-talk] WG: Questions about your project and about data security

[grarpamp]

> 1. What are the main aims and the strategy of the Tor Project?

You can find the answer to this by reading the Tor Project website:
https://www.torproject.org/
https://blog.torproject.org/
https://media.torproject.org/

Ony of many answers to questions 2, 3, 4 might be:
Users don't know, mixed with users don't care and are stupid, combined
with what they see as benefits carefully doled out to them as dog food
by said networks in order to get them to tell them everything as part
of their evil plan to own them.

As for question 5, also review:
http://www.aclu.org/
http://www.eff.org/
http://www.epic.org/

> So these are my questions so far :)

This list is mostly for things specifically regarding Tor.

Since you are in Germany, please also review:
http://www.ccc.de/
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor vs Network administrator

[Rejo Zenger]

On 28 jun. 2012, at 18:25, sy00963-...@yahoo.fr wrote:

> Thanks for the answer... I am using a PC in my work.. The PC is a part of the 
> local network and I am not the admin on my PC (can't install programs, can't 
> write on USB flashs, can't enter msconfig, ..etc.) If I good understood 
> your answer, that's mean the admin of PC (the same of system admin of my PC, 
> I think) can track all my activity on the PC.. that's right???

Yes. He could, for example, install a program that tracks everything you do, 
e.g. all of your typing. 

-- 
Rejo Zenger .  . 0x21DBEFD4 . 
GPG encrypted e-mail preferred . +31.6.39642738 . @rejozenger



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