<sch...@eff.org> wrote: > One of the defenses people have talked about against hardware > fingerprinting is running inside a virtual machine. Normally, > software inside the virtual machine, even if it's malicious, > doesn't learn much about the physical machine that hosts the VM. > If you always use Tor inside a VM, then even if there's a bug > that lets someone take over your computer (or if they trick you > into installing spyware), the malicious software won't be able > to read much real uniqueness from the host hardware, unless > there's also a bug in the VM software. > > [...] There's probably more research to be done > about the conditions under which VMs can be uniquely identified > both "from the inside" by malware, and remotely by remote > software fingerprinting, absent VM bugs that give unintended > access to the host.
We documented, which data, malware inside a VM could collect to identify users. [1] That doesn't mean, we wouldn't be happy about sophisticated, dedicated research. However, here is a summary: - (Apart from obvious and known, IP, DNS, (browser) fingerprinting.) - internal LAN IP (of virtualized operating system) - time zone (of virtualized operating system) - username (of virtualized operating system) - hostname (of virtualized operating system) - mac address of virtual machine - mac address of host (if using bridged networking) or mac address of gateway (if using virtual internal networking) - virtual disk uuids - Some information about the real CPU, depends on VM software. There might be options to further hide information about the CPU. - Installed software packages. - If you copy data into the VM: metadata. [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX/SecurityAndHardening#TorBOXsProtocol-Leak-ProtectionandFingerprinting-Protection ______________________________________________________ powered by Secure-Mail.biz - anonymous and secure e-mail accounts. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
