Level 3's IRR Database
Hi All, I've just noticed that Level 3 is allowing people to register space in its IRR database that A.) is not assigned to the people registering it and B.) is not assigned via/to Level 3. So, I have two queries A.) Are only customers of Level 3 allowed to use this database B.) Can someone from Level 3 please clarify if there are any plans to lock this down slightly At this point, it would seem that if you are a customer of level 3's, you can register any space you feel like in there, and announce anything you feel like once the filters propagate, which in my opinion completely nullifies the point of IRR in the first place. Though I think this also raises the question about IRR databases in general. Would it not be far more sane to have each RIR run a single instance each which talk to each other, which can be verified against IP address assignments, and scrap the distributed IRR systems that allow for issues like this to occur? (In the mean time I've emailed the relevant people to try and get the entries falsely registered in that database removed, and will wait and see if I get a response). Andrew Alston TENET - Chief Technology Officer Phone: +27 21 763 7181
Contact at level 3 RE IRR database?
Hi All, I was wondering if anyone had a direct contact at level 3 who deals with their IRR database, since my queries logged with them on Saturday to both noc@ and abuse@ have gone unanswered. I have just taken a look at the following: whois -h whois.radb.net \!gAS11908 and there is a *HUGE* amount of IP space registered in the Level3 IRR database that is propagating to the other databases that clearly does not belong to AS11908. (Beyond the initial prefix of ours that noticed). Thanks Andrew Alston TENET - Chief Technology Officer Phone: +27 21 763 7181
RE: Libya
>http://www.boingboing.net/2011/02/17/dhs-erroneously-seiz.html And people wonder why I have such deep concerns about RPKI how long before something like this happens with prefix certificates... ooops... we revoked a few thousand certs for a few thousand prefix's because they happened to have the servers serving 84 thousand domains we shut down by accident Nice real nice... Andrew
RE: Libya
>>> http://www.boingboing.net/2011/02/17/dhs-erroneously-seiz.html >> And people wonder why I have such deep concerns about RPKI. > there are a thousand means. the problem lies with the intent. Agreed... doesn't mean its a great idea to create an even easier way to screw up... Andrew
