Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Timothy Sipples
Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our
>Network Security Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

That's an "amusing" recommendation from your Network Security Team. Unless
security patches have been backported and applied to a particular
distribution of OpenSSH, OpenSSH 7.4p1 has at least three known security
vulnerabilities that I see: CVE-2018-15919, CVE-2018-15473, and
CVE-2017-15906.

So is your Network Security Team running around and getting lots of other
systems "updated" to an insecure release of OpenSSH (7.4), if those other
systems don't have backported security patches? Probably. Ooops.

I think you'll need to educate your colleagues (politely, diplomatically)
on how security patching and backporting works. It's great they're checking
-- too few organizations do even that -- but they're not checking well, and
their advice is not helpful.

As a general or at least widespread practice, and for decades now, software
version and release numbers often refer to *functional* levels. In Db2 for
z/OS, for example, this concept is now explicitly labeled "Function Level"
just to remove ambiguity, e.g. "Function Level 502." In contrast, security
updates and patches typically flow through the service stream, using
PTF/APAR numbers (as in z/OS), fixpack or service pack indicators (e.g.
"SP8"), date codes (e.g. "20190204"), or some other indicator that isn't
part of the major version and release level. That's what your security
teams should regularly check for, and that's how they should express their
recommendations if they spot something missing.

z/OS OpenSSH is a fully IBM supported component of z/OS. As long as you're
on a supported release of z/OS, then backported patches for security and
defects -- and sometimes functional improvements -- are available to you as
part of the service stream and should be promptly applied per your
preventive maintenance plan. (You should have such a plan.) As others have
mentioned, you should subscribe to the IBM Z Security Portal, and you
should also closely monitor at least the fixes marked HIPER.

Just to drive home this point, this practice isn't peculiar to mainframes
or even to servers. For instance, if you have a desktop or laptop PC
running Microsoft Windows, you can be running any of several functional
versions/levels of Windows that are all still Microsoft supported, with
security patches available for all those supported function levels. Just
looking at Windows 10, here are the versions that are still receiving
security updates from Microsoft (as I write this, and without any special
support contracts):

Windows 10, version 1703 (Enterprise and Education editions only)
Windows 10, version 1709 (Enterprise and Education editions only)
Windows 10, version 1803
Windows 10, version 1809

Yes, that's four versions of the Windows 10 product alone, in multiple
editions, that Microsoft is supplying with security patches through their
regular (non-extended) service streams. But if you have some security team
say, "You should install Windows 10, version 1803," that's bad advice as
such. Version 1803 as it originally shipped has several known security
defects. No, they need to check for specific security patches and, when
they find something missing, provide actionable advice on which specific
patches to apply. For Microsoft's products, patch identifiers start with
the letters "KB" followed by a sequence of digits. So the correct advice
would be something like this:

"According to our latest check, System XYZ123 is missing Microsoft security
patches KB012345, KB012346, and KB987653. Our preventive maintenance plan
for Windows desktops and laptops requires applying all security patches
within 45 days unless the operations team has granted a temporary waiver
for good cause, and subject to special conditions and limitations. Please
apply these missing security patches, and any others, right away. We will
check again within the next few days to verify that the patches have been
successfully applied."

Bonus points are awarded if your security teams also check for End of
Service dates (to keep on eye on whether you and others are getting too
close to the end of security patch availability), review preventive
maintenance plans, and make sure those plans are being followed well.
Example:

"Also, after you apply these patches, we recommend that you upgrade from
Windows 10, version 1709, to the latest version of Windows within the next
90 days. Version 1709 will reach End of Support soon and will no longer be
able to comply with our preventive maintenance plan."

Unfortunately you might have to tell your security team how to do their
jobs competently. Be gentle. :-)


Timothy Sipples
IT Architect Executive, Industry Solutions, IBM Z & LinuxONE
E-Mail: sipp...@sg.ibm.com

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Elardus Engelbrecht
Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>>Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our Network Security Team 
>>to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

z/OS OpenSSH at 6.4p1 is a fully supported by IBM. Your Network Security Team 
is asking you to 'upgrade', but actually they want to have you to upgrade to an 
unsupported open version of OpenSSH [on z/OS].

As Timothy Sipples said, IBM will, if needed, backport the OpenSSH.

Timothy is right about Db2, it is also same with REXX. You get the official 
supported REXX at whatever z/OS level from IBM, but there are many commercial 
and free versions of REXX on other platforms.

So, in other words, the Network Security Team wants to have you to throw away 
official supported OpenSSH? No ways! I would simply refer them to IBM after a 
lot of explanation of course.

Groete / Greetings
Elardus Engelbrecht

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Fwd: Incoming | Computerworld SHARK TANK

2019-04-12 Thread Mark Regan
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3388298/incoming.html 
 
Regards,
 
Mark T. Regan, K8MTR
CTO1 USNR-Retired, 1969-1991
Nationwide Insurance, Retired, 1986-2017
 
 
 

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Allan Staller
Paul Gilmartin wote:
" Would IBM do better to apply IBM patches to the newest distribution rather 
than trying to upgrade an outdated version with APARs?  There's yet no 
assurance that IBM's patching won't regress a needed security patch
Is EBCDIC a culprit?"


This has nothing to do w/EBCDIC. This is a new standard from the IETF (or 
whomever).

Like any other software, OpenSSH was written to a certain spec. A new spec will 
require new code to support that spec.
Since OpenSSH is now a part of z/OS, obviously maintenance will be required.

As I said in my earlier post, IBM is (more or less) obligated to support the 
new standard. Whether this is done with a (PTF) or (FUNCTION SYSMOD) is 
irrelevant.
Patch (apply PTF) vs. Replace (apply new function) is  (IMO) *NEVER* a vendor 
decision.
Which update method produces the desired result with the least amount of effort?

It would not surprise me (I haven’t investigated) if IBM has supplied both 
methods.


To the OP:
It seems a PMR or call to your friendly IBM rep would provide the information 
needed.

HTH,


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  On Behalf Of 
Paul Gilmartin
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 3:16 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:01:15 +, Mark Jacobs wrote:

>I don't believe so. Latest version shipped with z/OS 2.3 is 6.4p1. IBM does 
>issue APARs against it for any problems found that are applicable to OpenSSH 
>on zOS. These is/was a list of them in one of the IBM OpenSSH manuals at one 
>time.
>
It's reasonable that Security Team look first at the version number and reject 
immediately if it doesn't meet criteria.  They haven't resource to examine 
every APAR cover letter (and integrity APARs may not be public.)

Would IBM do better to apply IBM patches to the newest distribution rather than 
trying to upgrade an outdated version with APARs?  There's yet no assurance 
that IBM's patching won't regress a needed security patch.

Why must IBM patch?  Is EBCDIC a culprit?  I hate EBCDIC!


>‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
>On Thursday, April 11, 2019 11:44 AM, Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>
>> Is there a way to upgrade OpenSSH on z/OS v2.2?
>> Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our Network Security 
>> Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

-- gil

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Re: Incoming | Computerworld SHARK TANK

2019-04-12 Thread ITschak Mugzach
That reminds me another story. ten years ago a client of us installed a new
hitachi disk array. The technician installed and configured the array, but
for some reasons, it was not immediately used by the client. few days
later, the client tried to connect to the array and it was down. it was
repeatedly don everyday afterwards. investigation showed that the the
people who cleans the computer room unplugged the power for the vacuum
cleaner... The array was using a standard power plug.

ITschak

On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 3:36 PM Mark Regan  wrote:

> https://www.computerworld.com/article/3388298/incoming.html
>
> Regards,
>
> Mark T. Regan, K8MTR
> CTO1 USNR-Retired, 1969-1991
> Nationwide Insurance, Retired, 1986-2017
>
>
>
>
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-- 
ITschak Mugzach
*|** IronSphere Platform* *|* *Information Security Contiguous Monitoring
for Legacy **|  *

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Re: Lousy error from HLASM in USS

2019-04-12 Thread Steve Smith
I think the grumpiness and sarcasm might be a bit over the top.  The error
does have roots going back to the middle ages, that when combined with
modern functionality, causes some odd results.  Anyway it's something that
doesn't happen very often.  If IBM thinks it's worthwhile, they'll improve
it.  I doubt there's any reason to worry about error message compatibility.

sas

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Re: Incoming | Computerworld SHARK TANK

2019-04-12 Thread Elardus Engelbrecht
ITschak Mugzach wrote:

>... investigation showed that the the people who cleans the computer room 
>unplugged the power for the vacuum cleaner... The array was using a standard 
>power plug.

Hahaha! I heard a similar, but false story. ( 
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/polished-off/ )

Apparently in a hospital in our country, some patients died during a specific 
shift. Same story, cleaners/janitors unplugged life supporting equipment to do 
their cleaning with vacuum cleaners and polishers and thus 'polished off the 
patients'.

Also there is a false rumour that in a San Francisco hospital, during Earth 
Hour the patients were killed during that hour...

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/hour-dearly-beloved/

;-)

Groete / Greetings
Elardus Engelbrecht

PS: Many years ago, after a mechanic swapped the oxygen and vacuum pipes and a 
patient died there-after, now these days all plugs and pipes (electrical, 
vacuum, oxygen, etc. ) are marked with different colors and shapes. Life 
supporting equipments plugs on the walls are marked with a warning that they 
are NOT to be unplugged.

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Re: Fwd: Incoming | Computerworld SHARK TANK

2019-04-12 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 08:35:39 -0400, Mark Regan wrote:

>https://www.computerworld.com/article/3388298/incoming.html
> 
Somehow similar, a GPS rollover glitch took down (some) NYC wireless
communications last week:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/nyregion/nyc-gps-wireless.html

... happens every 19.6 years; previously August, 1999.  You'd think they'd
learn.  Others cited at:
http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/tz/2019-April/027859.html
And even:
The Earth's not slowing down fast enough to suit Motorola
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/22/94#subj3

-- gil

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Dumps and cancelling jobs

2019-04-12 Thread Frank Swarbrick
The discussion about non-recoverable abends and cancelling jobs brings to mind 
an "issue" I've had since we migrated from z/VSE to z/OS in 2010.  If I recall 
correctly, if a job was cancelled in z/VSE the "dump analysis" product 
(Abend-Aid, IBM Fault Analyzer, et al) would still get control and produce a 
nice formatted dump.  With z/OS this does not appear to be the case.  So if we 
cancel a job that, for example, appears to be in a infinite loop we have no way 
to know even where within the program its looping, much less what the program 
data is.

Did we perhaps just miss some option that would allow our dump analysis program 
to take control when a job is cancelled?

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Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

2019-04-12 Thread Christopher Y. Blaicher
You probably will get what you want with C jobname,DUMP console command, or CD 
in a SDSF screen.

Chris Blaicher
Technical Architect
Syncsort, Inc.


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Frank Swarbrick
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 12:24 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Dumps and cancelling jobs

The discussion about non-recoverable abends and cancelling jobs brings to mind 
an "issue" I've had since we migrated from z/VSE to z/OS in 2010.  If I recall 
correctly, if a job was cancelled in z/VSE the "dump analysis" product 
(Abend-Aid, IBM Fault Analyzer, et al) would still get control and produce a 
nice formatted dump.  With z/OS this does not appear to be the case.  So if we 
cancel a job that, for example, appears to be in a infinite loop we have no way 
to know even where within the program its looping, much less what the program 
data is.

Did we perhaps just miss some option that would allow our dump analysis program 
to take control when a job is cancelled?

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:35:55 +0800, Timothy Sipples  wrote:

>Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>>Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our
>>Network Security Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.
>
>That's an "amusing" recommendation from your Network Security Team. Unless
>security patches have been backported and applied to a particular
>distribution of OpenSSH, OpenSSH 7.4p1 has at least three known security
>vulnerabilities that I see: CVE-2018-15919, CVE-2018-15473, and
>CVE-2017-15906.
>
I find these mentioned at site:ibm.com, mostly referring to AIX and IBM i.
Can the OP find relevant APARs/PTFs to show Security Team?

-- gil

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Seymour J Metz
WTF? A z/OS PTF *can* include a patch, but it is normally a total replacement. 
And it most certainly is a vendor decision how to install upgrades.

That said, IBM normally provides ++ APAR as a temporary expedient, and then 
provides a PTF with the appropriate SUP keyword. An RSU will have the PTF.


--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Allan Staller 
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 9:12 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

Paul Gilmartin wote:
" Would IBM do better to apply IBM patches to the newest distribution rather 
than trying to upgrade an outdated version with APARs?  There's yet no 
assurance that IBM's patching won't regress a needed security patch
Is EBCDIC a culprit?"


This has nothing to do w/EBCDIC. This is a new standard from the IETF (or 
whomever).

Like any other software, OpenSSH was written to a certain spec. A new spec will 
require new code to support that spec.
Since OpenSSH is now a part of z/OS, obviously maintenance will be required.

As I said in my earlier post, IBM is (more or less) obligated to support the 
new standard. Whether this is done with a (PTF) or (FUNCTION SYSMOD) is 
irrelevant.
Patch (apply PTF) vs. Replace (apply new function) is  (IMO) *NEVER* a vendor 
decision.
Which update method produces the desired result with the least amount of effort?

It would not surprise me (I haven’t investigated) if IBM has supplied both 
methods.


To the OP:
It seems a PMR or call to your friendly IBM rep would provide the information 
needed.

HTH,


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  On Behalf Of 
Paul Gilmartin
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 3:16 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:01:15 +, Mark Jacobs wrote:

>I don't believe so. Latest version shipped with z/OS 2.3 is 6.4p1. IBM does 
>issue APARs against it for any problems found that are applicable to OpenSSH 
>on zOS. These is/was a list of them in one of the IBM OpenSSH manuals at one 
>time.
>
It's reasonable that Security Team look first at the version number and reject 
immediately if it doesn't meet criteria.  They haven't resource to examine 
every APAR cover letter (and integrity APARs may not be public.)

Would IBM do better to apply IBM patches to the newest distribution rather than 
trying to upgrade an outdated version with APARs?  There's yet no assurance 
that IBM's patching won't regress a needed security patch.

Why must IBM patch?  Is EBCDIC a culprit?  I hate EBCDIC!


>‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
>On Thursday, April 11, 2019 11:44 AM, Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>
>> Is there a way to upgrade OpenSSH on z/OS v2.2?
>> Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our Network Security 
>> Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

-- gil

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Paul Jodlowski
Gil:
I have not found any APARs/PTFs for z/OS. 
I will probably just stop the OpenSSH services (as I started for a proof of 
concept with CyberArk)

Thanks all for your suggestions

 

-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Paul Gilmartin
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 11:35 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:35:55 +0800, Timothy Sipples  wrote:

>Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>>Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our Network 
>>Security Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.
>
>That's an "amusing" recommendation from your Network Security Team. 
>Unless security patches have been backported and applied to a 
>particular distribution of OpenSSH, OpenSSH 7.4p1 has at least three 
>known security vulnerabilities that I see: CVE-2018-15919, 
>CVE-2018-15473, and CVE-2017-15906.
>
I find these mentioned at site:ibm.com, mostly referring to AIX and IBM i.
Can the OP find relevant APARs/PTFs to show Security Team?

-- gil

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Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

2019-04-12 Thread Charles Mills
Abend-AID has some global configuration options, right? I don't know the
product, but I recall seeing "no dump due to installation options" or
something like that.

(Not to disagree with @Chris who is of course correct.)

Charles


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On
Behalf Of Christopher Y. Blaicher
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 9:29 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

You probably will get what you want with C jobname,DUMP console command, or
CD in a SDSF screen.

Chris Blaicher
Technical Architect
Syncsort, Inc.


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On
Behalf Of Frank Swarbrick
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 12:24 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Dumps and cancelling jobs

The discussion about non-recoverable abends and cancelling jobs brings to
mind an "issue" I've had since we migrated from z/VSE to z/OS in 2010.  If I
recall correctly, if a job was cancelled in z/VSE the "dump analysis"
product (Abend-Aid, IBM Fault Analyzer, et al) would still get control and
produce a nice formatted dump.  With z/OS this does not appear to be the
case.  So if we cancel a job that, for example, appears to be in a infinite
loop we have no way to know even where within the program its looping, much
less what the program data is.

Did we perhaps just miss some option that would allow our dump analysis
program to take control when a job is cancelled?

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Seymour J Metz
Who says IBM patches?

How could EBCDIC conceivably be relevant?


--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Paul Gilmartin <000433f07816-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ua.edu>
Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 4:16 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 16:01:15 +, Mark Jacobs wrote:

>I don't believe so. Latest version shipped with z/OS 2.3 is 6.4p1. IBM does 
>issue APARs against it for any problems found that are applicable to OpenSSH 
>on zOS. These is/was a list of them in one of the IBM OpenSSH manuals at one 
>time.
>
It's reasonable that Security Team look first at the version number and
reject immediately if it doesn't meet criteria.  They haven't resource to
examine every APAR cover letter (and integrity APARs may not be public.)

Would IBM do better to apply IBM patches to the newest distribution rather
than trying to upgrade an outdated version with APARs?  There's yet no
assurance that IBM's patching won't regress a needed security patch.

Why must IBM patch?  Is EBCDIC a culprit?  I hate EBCDIC!


>‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
>On Thursday, April 11, 2019 11:44 AM, Paul Jodlowski wrote:
>
>> Is there a way to upgrade OpenSSH on z/OS v2.2?
>> Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our Network Security 
>> Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

-- gil

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Re: Lousy error from HLASM in USS

2019-04-12 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 09:23:40 -0400, Steve Smith  wrote:

>I think the grumpiness and sarcasm might be a bit over the top.  The error
>does have roots going back to the middle ages,
>
IBM should operate a booth at Renaissance Faire.  Or Comic Con.

> ... that when combined with
>modern functionality, causes some odd results.  Anyway it's something that
>doesn't happen very often.  If IBM thinks it's worthwhile, they'll improve it.
>
That would be an RFE.  As new facilities such as zFS appear it happens
increasingly often.

> ... I doubt there's any reason to worry about error message compatibility.
> 
I'm staying with my assumption that the message is formatted by SYNADAF.
SYNADAF is admirable; it's reusable code.  Not every facility needs to write
its own diagnostic formatter.  But wide use engenders wide exposure to
incompatibility.  How many callers make assumptions about SYNADAF message
format?  Probably nonzero.  In:

https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLTBW_2.3.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r3.idad500/syndf.htm

The SYNADAF macro uses register 1 to return the address of an area 
containing
a message. The message describes the error, and can be printed by a later 
PUT,
WRITE, or WTO macro. The message consists mainly of EBCDIC information and
is in variable-length record format. The format of the area is shown 
following the
descriptions of the SYNADAF parameters.

I assume that's Y(count),X'',up to 32,752 bytes of message text.

What callers would suffer overruns copying an unexpectdly long message into a
static buffer?  Would some simply attempt to PUT it, as returned, to SYSTERM
and trigger a cascade of similar errors?

Regardless, it's lousy, and should be fixed.  As reusable code, not only for 
HLASM.

-- gil

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Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

2019-04-12 Thread Frank Swarbrick
This didn't help.

I see no indication that Fault Analyzer was invoked at all.  Usually when its 
invoked, even if the dump is suppressed, FA will write an informational message 
to the console.  This is not happening in this case.

Thanks,
Frank


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Christopher Y. Blaicher 
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 10:28 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

You probably will get what you want with C jobname,DUMP console command, or CD 
in a SDSF screen.

Chris Blaicher
Technical Architect
Syncsort, Inc.


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Frank Swarbrick
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 12:24 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Dumps and cancelling jobs

The discussion about non-recoverable abends and cancelling jobs brings to mind 
an "issue" I've had since we migrated from z/VSE to z/OS in 2010.  If I recall 
correctly, if a job was cancelled in z/VSE the "dump analysis" product 
(Abend-Aid, IBM Fault Analyzer, et al) would still get control and produce a 
nice formatted dump.  With z/OS this does not appear to be the case.  So if we 
cancel a job that, for example, appears to be in a infinite loop we have no way 
to know even where within the program its looping, much less what the program 
data is.

Did we perhaps just miss some option that would allow our dump analysis program 
to take control when a job is cancelled?

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Paul Gilmartin
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:54:08 +, Seymour J Metz wrote:

>Who says IBM patches?
> 
Read Timothy Sipples's ply.

>How could EBCDIC conceivably be relevant?
> 
The ssh command performs ASCII<->EBCDIC conversion (for pedants,
1047<->819).  I'd expect that to be IBM-specific.  Probably not relevant
to security, but additional code that must be supported in an IBM
instance, or conditionally bypassed if the sources are merged.

-- gil

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Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

2019-04-12 Thread Frank Swarbrick
I should clarify.  If I include a SYSABEND or SYSUDUMP DD in the JCL (which we 
generally do not do), if I cancel with dump I will get a standard z/OS dump.  
But the fault analysis tool is still not invoked.


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Frank Swarbrick 
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 11:00 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

This didn't help.

I see no indication that Fault Analyzer was invoked at all.  Usually when its 
invoked, even if the dump is suppressed, FA will write an informational message 
to the console.  This is not happening in this case.

Thanks,
Frank


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Christopher Y. Blaicher 
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 10:28 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: Dumps and cancelling jobs

You probably will get what you want with C jobname,DUMP console command, or CD 
in a SDSF screen.

Chris Blaicher
Technical Architect
Syncsort, Inc.


-Original Message-
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Frank Swarbrick
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 12:24 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Dumps and cancelling jobs

The discussion about non-recoverable abends and cancelling jobs brings to mind 
an "issue" I've had since we migrated from z/VSE to z/OS in 2010.  If I recall 
correctly, if a job was cancelled in z/VSE the "dump analysis" product 
(Abend-Aid, IBM Fault Analyzer, et al) would still get control and produce a 
nice formatted dump.  With z/OS this does not appear to be the case.  So if we 
cancel a job that, for example, appears to be in a infinite loop we have no way 
to know even where within the program its looping, much less what the program 
data is.

Did we perhaps just miss some option that would allow our dump analysis program 
to take control when a job is cancelled?

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Seymour J Metz
> Read Timothy Sipples's ply.

That talks about IBM receiving patches, not distributing them.


--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3


From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf of 
Paul Gilmartin <000433f07816-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ua.edu>
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 1:06 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:54:08 +, Seymour J Metz wrote:

>Who says IBM patches?
>
Read Timothy Sipples's ply.

>How could EBCDIC conceivably be relevant?
>
The ssh command performs ASCII<->EBCDIC conversion (for pedants,
1047<->819).  I'd expect that to be IBM-specific.  Probably not relevant
to security, but additional code that must be supported in an IBM
instance, or conditionally bypassed if the sources are merged.

-- gil

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testing connectivity for send

2019-04-12 Thread Stan Weyman
 

All apologies.  Thanks

 


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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Kirk Wolf
Right.  I was the first to mention "security patches" in this thread, and I
was referring to source patches made upstream to he code to fix bugs, CVEs,
etc.

Also - just because IBM ports a base version (6.4, 7.6), it doesn't mean
that they didn't (or won't later) backport bug fixes (security or
otherwise) that were made later in the upstream code.

On Fri, Apr 12, 2019 at 12:14 PM Seymour J Metz  wrote:

> > Read Timothy Sipples's ply.
>
> That talks about IBM receiving patches, not distributing them.
>
>
> --
> Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
> http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
>
> 
> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List  on behalf
> of Paul Gilmartin <000433f07816-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ua.edu>
> Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 1:06 PM
> To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
> Subject: Re: OpenSSH upgrade option
>
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:54:08 +, Seymour J Metz wrote:
>
> >Who says IBM patches?
> >
> Read Timothy Sipples's ply.
>
> >How could EBCDIC conceivably be relevant?
> >
> The ssh command performs ASCII<->EBCDIC conversion (for pedants,
> 1047<->819).  I'd expect that to be IBM-specific.  Probably not relevant
> to security, but additional code that must be supported in an IBM
> instance, or conditionally bypassed if the sources are merged.
>
> -- gil
>
> --
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>

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SMF Log Blocks

2019-04-12 Thread Stan Weyman
 

Does anyone have any experience with SMF LOG blocks returned from the
IXGBRWSE READCURSOR service.

 

   The doc says it returns a block of SMF records .  All return codes
are good after the IXGCONN and IXGBRWSE START but the returned area does not
seem to be SMF data.   Am doing a single LOG block request although I did
try to use MULTIBLOCKS=YES and the area returned appears the same except for
the IXGMBR header area and IXGMBLT area (again, just asked for 1 block).

 

 I seem to be missing something here.   IBM doc not the greatest on
using these services

  


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Re: DASD-only logging

2019-04-12 Thread Tom Russell
A Coupling Facility Logical Partition can run on shared CPs.  It does not 
require an ICF engine.  Normally I would not recommend the use of a CP, but if 
you are careful not to use the CF a lot, and use DYNDISP=thin, it can be quite 
useful. If all the connectors to the CF are in the same CEC, then there is no 
real CF link hardware required. Connecting multiple CECs will require 
purchasing hardware CF links.  

G. Tom Russell
“Stay calm. Be brave. Wait for the signs” — Jasper FriendlyBear
“… and remember to leave good news alone.” — Gracie HeavyHand 



-Original Message-

Date:Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:05:40 +
From:Jesse 1 Robinson 
Subject: Re: DASD-only logging

This box is for DASD mirroring (SDM) and system recovery. It has only one CP 
except when CBU is fired up. No data host at all under normal circumstances. As 
modestly priced as a CF might be, I don't think we could sell the idea just for 
the benefit of sysprogs.  

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Re: OpenSSH upgrade option

2019-04-12 Thread Andrew Rowley

On 12/04/2019 5:35 pm, Timothy Sipples wrote:

Paul Jodlowski wrote:

Currently OpenSSH is at 6.4p1, I have been asked by our
Network Security Team to upgrade to OpenSSH 7.4.

That's an "amusing" recommendation from your Network Security Team. Unless
security patches have been backported and applied to a particular
distribution of OpenSSH, OpenSSH 7.4p1 has at least three known security
vulnerabilities that I see: CVE-2018-15919, CVE-2018-15473, and
CVE-2017-15906.

So is your Network Security Team running around and getting lots of other
systems "updated" to an insecure release of OpenSSH (7.4), if those other
systems don't have backported security patches? Probably. Ooops.


As far as I can see those CVEs also apply to 6.4p1. How would you go 
about verifying that they had been fixed in z/OS ssh? Suggesting that 
their existence means that 7.4 is insecure (more so than 6.4p1) seems 
very misleading to me.


Looking at the CVE list, I can guess that the security team might be 
interested in the more severe CVEs applying to ssh before 7.4, e.g. 
CVE-2016-10010, CVE-2016-10012. How would you verify that the fixes are 
applied to z/OS 6.4p1? (Reading between the lines the changes sound 
significant enough to make backporting unlikely.)


Andrew Rowley

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