Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Am 28.02.2015 um 14:12 schrieb Peter Lebbing :

> On 28/02/15 14:06, Ralph Seichter wrote:
>> but PGP does not work for mass e-mail protection
> 
> Let me stress again that the proper course might be to replace SMTP (e-mail) 
> and
> then work from that. If you have a sieve and wish for something to hold 
> liquids,
> you could plug up all the holes or say "Blow this for a lark" and get a pan.

You mean like BitMessage ?

I think it's the only replacement for mail with cryptography from the start. It 
gets rid of the whole public / private key problem and also gets rid of spam by 
requiring a proof of work to send something.

--
Jonathan


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: trust paths

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Am 28.02.2015 um 19:15 schrieb Johan Wevers 

> I'm not talking about mathematically proving something. After all, a
> government agency could make a false key with Werner Koch's name on it
> and send someone who looks like him with real ID documents to a
> keysigning party. Government-issued ID's are no mathematical proof either.

FWIF, you don't even need to be a government for that. And you don't need to 
look like Werner. Some document looking like a government issued ID showing a 
picture of you with Werner's name will most likely be enough to fool everyone 
who doesn't know Werner personally to sign this fake key.

> If the key was only on the keyservers, sure, then even I could do that
> myself easily. But I'm talking about keys on places where it is unlikely
> anyone has write access to, like the gnupg website or as a signature in
> mailinglist messages. Sure, it could be spoofed - but only a short time
> before it get noticed.
> 
> It would not be the first time I read about a spoofed gpg key on a Linux
> distro server when the server was hacked. The attack works - but not for
> long.

You are assuming it will be spoofed for everyone. It could just be spoofed for 
you. Anybody who can MITM you and give you a fake SSL cert that you accept 
(i.e. every government on the planet, a lot of companies and even some 
individuals) can give you something spoofed and you would not notice. And there 
would be no outcry about spoofed keys, because it's just you being affected.

--
Jonathan
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Bjarni Runar Einarsson]

Jonathan Schleifer  wrote:
> > Let me stress again that the proper course might be to replace SMTP 
> > (e-mail) and
> > then work from that. If you have a sieve and wish for something to hold 
> > liquids,
> > you could plug up all the holes or say "Blow this for a lark" and get a pan.
> 
> You mean like BitMessage ?
> 
> I think it's the only replacement for mail with cryptography from the
> start. It gets rid of the whole public / private key problem and also
> gets rid of spam by requiring a proof of work to send something.

Bitmessage is a toy. An interesting toy, but it's still just a toy.

You can't propose to replace e-mail, a system used by *billions of
people*, with this:

"Just like Bitcoin transactions and blocks, all users would receive all
messages. They would be responsible for attempting to decode each
message with each of their private keys to see whether the message is
bound for them."
  - 

The paper mentions a very hand-wavey, stream sharding concept to improve
scalability, which has not been implemented and there is no math
presented to support the idea that it actually will work.

At scale, any promise of anonymity made by this protocol will be
hampered by the fact that, on average, you have to connect to as many
streams as you have contacts when sending mail, and your contact is
connected to the stream and downloading the mail. Once there are enough
shards to handle global traffic levels, then assuming the network hasn't
already collapsed under its own weight (they talk about hierarchical
shard discovery and signaling between shards), things will be so spread
out that traffic analysis will give very strong clues about who is
talking to whom. How severe this effect is, is for researchers to
quantify - but the Bitmessage paper gives no indication that they're
even aware of the problem.

I'm all for experiments and Bitmessage may flesh these things out over
time, but the paper was written in 2012 and (based on a quick grep of
their github) their codebase still doesn't support more than one stream.
To them, scalability is a "feature" they will implement "later". Until
they do, this is not even remotely a candidate for replacing e-mail.

It's cool tech! It's just not an e-mail replacement.

Having studied the specs for both (various people want us to implement
interesting protocols like this in Mailpile), I'd say DIME is a much
more credible attempt at baking strong crypto into e-mail from the
start, but it is still too new to say much about it.

Cheers,
 - Bjarni

-- 
Sent using Mailpile, Free Software from www.mailpile.is___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Peter Lebbing]

On 01/03/15 13:21, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> You mean like BitMessage ?

It was Werner who floated the idea of replacing SMTP here on gnupg-users. After
thinking about it, it made a lot of sense to me. You could search gnupg-users
for his messages about this. I had a real quick look and couldn't find it just 
now.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Patrick Brunschwig]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patr...@enigmail.net said:
> 
>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an issue. If
>> keyservers would do some sort of verification (e.g. confirmation
>> of the email addresses) then this would lead to much more
>> reliable data.
> 
> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for an 
> arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get such a 
> key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You can do the 
> very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with visting cards 
> are much nicer.
> 
> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key
> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified
> signature certificate.

I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of key.
But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification of keys,
it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.

The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key to
a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to every UID
in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed, the key is
validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just like with any
regular keyserver.

This way, we have a simple verification of the access to the private
the key, as well as access to the email addresses contained in the UID
by quite a simple means. I would say this is about as reliable as
sending an email to someone requesting their key.

- -Patrick
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2
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=m2JV
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
>> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patr...@enigmail.net said:
> 
>>> that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an issue.
>>> If keyservers would do some sort of verification (e.g.
>>> confirmation of the email addresses) then this would lead to
>>> much more reliable data.
> 
>> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
>> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for an
>>  arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get such a
>>  key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You can do the
>>  very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with visting
>> cards are much nicer.
> 
>> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
>> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key 
>> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified 
>> signature certificate.
> 
> I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of
> key. But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification of
> keys, it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.
> 
> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key
> to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to
> every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to
> confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed,
> the key is validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just
> like with any regular keyserver.
> 

You already have a variant of this at https://keyserver.pgp.com
(although I don't recall if they send the requests encrypted, I
haven't looked into the service in years)

In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of identification
that really doesn't provide much of anything useful, but at least the
PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in its methodology by creating a
signature from their CA on the key. Whether you put any merit to
having such a CA signature or not is left up to the user (excluding
for now the "fun" related to the spammy number of signatures from it)

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"Excellence is not a singular act but a habit. You are what you do
repeatedly."
(Shaquille O'Neal)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU8ykPAAoJEP7VAChXwav67LoIAJdaEldVcwdGAXE0u+Bk4pse
N93PY/LUYiDeEZvnfaa75EBSKBllnYZdDW0Dk9TAPos/PE1XWa4BFN4VIpjpa665
Hy94vpiE2Fvx+MYGO52qz/AHmSMkAD8z3wxIVLX+5MSFLRP/gmJz1E6/2YL9afEt
I2DSaE5XS2NNL9w6cX3SRgK52bEP1XZlRa3n+sSYAzGwZiGbthr67RV3jqadYbCw
hU7MDKhgrARc6ZSpycDbs1kLacgrXBsx2PpvqDPHghU1SuoglkJ8ZFYz/Y725k9z
LPmIvhx7jXHdqVo9JiTeDVubMylU2oqdnjBer9IrVywUCLEwKRGifhFMZOUV52U=
=uiJ3
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line

[René Puls]

Hi,

is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
(a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
secret key is available and GnuPG is configured correctly. It is okay
if the process is somewhat lossy; signatures or attachments do not need
to be preserved, although I would not mind that either. :-)

Background: I would like to decrypt e-mails permanently for archiving
and searching, and run this utility over hundreds of e-mails in a
single batch.

Alternatively, if there is a way to permanently decrypt an e-mail in
Claws Mail, that would help me as well. It seems that Enigmail has such
a feature[1] (or will have it soon), but I have not found anything
similar for Claws Mail and would prefer a general-purpose utility which
I can just run as a filter, independent of my e-mail client.

René

[1] http://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/1/

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Patrick Brunschwig]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 15:58, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
>> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
>>> On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patr...@enigmail.net said:
> 
 that anyone can upload _every_ key to a keyserver is an
 issue. If keyservers would do some sort of verification
 (e.g. confirmation of the email addresses) then this would
 lead to much more reliable data.
> 
>>> We have such a system. It is called S/MIME.
> 
>>> Ever tried to find an S/MIME (X.509) key (aka certificate) for
>>> an arbitrary mail address?  The only working solution to get
>>> such a key is by sending a mail and asking for the key.  You
>>> can do the very same with PGP of course.  Keyservers along with
>>> visting cards are much nicer.
> 
>>> So, why is there no public service to distribute X.509 keys? 
>>> Because nobody want to be legally responsible for such a key 
>>> unless you push a stack of money over the table for a qualified
>>>  signature certificate.
> 
>> I would not go that far as trying to guarantee the identity of 
>> key. But I think if a keyserver could do some basic verification
>> of keys, it would make OpenPGP a lot easier to use for email.
> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> 
> You already have a variant of this at https://keyserver.pgp.com 
> (although I don't recall if they send the requests encrypted, I 
> haven't looked into the service in years)
> 
> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of
> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything useful,
> but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in its
> methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the key.
> Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or not is
> left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related to the
> spammy number of signatures from it)

Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with
re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about
keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to go
in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in email
(which requires in some way or another to download missing keys
automatically).

- -Patrick

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2
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=c5nb
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 04:35 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> On 01.03.15 15:58, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> On 03/01/2015 03:41 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
>>> On 27.02.15 20:56, Werner Koch wrote:
 On Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:26, patr...@enigmail.net said:
> 


..

> 
>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of 
>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything
>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in
>> its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the
>> key. Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or
>> not is left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related
>> to the spammy number of signatures from it)
> 
> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with 
> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about 
> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to
> go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in
> email (which requires in some way or another to download missing
> keys automatically).

You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. Anyone
could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the keyserver network.

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"The best way to predict the future is to invent it"
(Alan Kay)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU8zJoAAoJEP7VAChXwav6vlgH/3ZBDMyOF4TfkDaBb+N5f45n
crBiableZ/2I5Flq/dR5UierB1FtEPKKifdPNG/oa36gqLfFHeVpP8DGOTTGyl5S
pkhR/1SNSKIpQyfCe0nOTeaxsCR0M6lmCudrtFsUf0kokTZ8SnWgwgonP5AQPde6
w+UCXUJmjwQechR6donoHOye19eo6SQI1byo0LpKO1NMl+5ErpCFOJrcnwDE93n1
nEWJA5hytTfM6cvXJkgUJ64WogRxS7xRUbQ4dTVG3wEPl9H+IaIOMCxKWGcq7SNC
hSDa/evtdtWpjo7zSLo2lpVf03fM020ax1PHLBiItJnTAszhvWkA9bfZGrdB1mg=
=EW11
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption]

[MFPA]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512



On Saturday 28 February 2015 at 5:54:21 PM, in
, Johan Wevers wrote:


> For once, it
> requires much contextual knowledge about what both
> persons know of each other.

Why? Most of my phone calls to regular business contacts consist
entirely of discussing the matter at hand, not chit-chat.


- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

Raining cats and dogs is better than hailing taxis.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=
=9nmV
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Patrick Brunschwig]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 16:38, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of 
>>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything 
>>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane
>>> in its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on
>>> the key. Whether you put any merit to having such a CA
>>> signature or not is left up to the user (excluding for now the
>>> "fun" related to the spammy number of signatures from it)
> 
>> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with 
>> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about 
>> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need
>> to go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP
>> in email (which requires in some way or another to download
>> missing keys automatically).
> 
> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all.
> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the
> keyserver network.

Perfectly correct, yes. This is exactly what I'm proposing. I believe
that the current keyserver network cannot do this. I just don't have
the time to (also) work on this...

- -Patrick
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2
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=Mejp
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Marco Zehe]

Hi Patrick,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig :
> 
> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a key to
> a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email to every UID
> in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
> email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed, the key is
> validated and the keyserver will allow access to it just like with any
> regular keyserver.

I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that doesn’t hurt 
anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic level, that the key isn’t 
completely bogus.

I have seen part of this in a different context in Mozilla’s Bugzilla, when one 
uploads one’s public key into the Bugzilla account to be able to receive 
security-sensitive messages. After submitting the form, Bugzilla sends an 
encrypted message to the account’s e-mail address, assuming the public key just 
uploaded belongs to that address. It doesn’t go as far as requiring 
verification via a link, but it definitely confirms if the key is working for 
the user.

Marco



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[MFPA]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512



On Friday 27 February 2015 at 12:23:18 PM, in
, Ralph Seichter wrote:


> The thought of letting PGP die as an e-mail encryption
> mechanism for the "masses" (the non-tech-savvy average
> users) and to have it replaced with something my mother
> could use is valid.

Has OpenPGP ever been an e-mail encryption mechanism for the "masses"?
It is certainly not used by most.



> Alice can't just send an e-mail to Bob, she needs to acquire and
> verify Bob's public key first.

Depends on the threat model. If Alice knows Bobs email address and
there is a matching key on the keyservers, isn't it likely to be
better to opportunistically encrypt to that key rather than to send
the message unencrypted?



- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

Was time invented by an Irishman named O'Clock?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=
=pfFQ
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Marco Zehe]

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 16:38 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
> :
> 
> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. Anyone
> could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the keyserver network.

In theory, yes. And keybase.io goes in that direction, although they don’t do 
the verification of e-mail addresses themselves, only the e-mail address one 
signs up with for the account.

But why should key servers not do that? Why add this extra level of complexity?

Marco



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:36 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 16:38 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> :
>> 
>> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. 
>> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the 
>> keyserver network.
> 
> In theory, yes. And keybase.io goes in that direction, although
> they don’t do the verification of e-mail addresses themselves, only
> the e-mail address one signs up with for the account.
> 
> But why should key servers not do that? Why add this extra level
> of complexity?
> 

It isn't more complex, it is LESS complex to do it as a standalone CA.

We currently have about 150 different key servers in the main
gossipping network, you would have to establish severe trust
mechanisms between them as to convey the verification data, change the
gossiping protocol to accomodate this, implement crypto in the
keyservers, possibly have keyservers shut down for legal reasons as
possible verctors of legal attack for some additional data; data that,
in its concept is the job of a CA in the first place.
- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"I have always wished that my computer would be as easy to use as my
telephone.
My wish has come true -- I no longer know how to use my telephone"
(Bjarne Stroustrup, April 1999)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU80EMAAoJEP7VAChXwav6MEcIAKh5s2A01wUQZgF1Wh9chtRo
tQ6pk05FnEYhyYi/9GBcehf2mqlnkbvBjvw74L1JJWsJdR3i5Z2VGhmVVMFOo4iW
99fX1rD1imM4PiRtAQ3gwvmJNm6u/65mfRFN8M3hyVLjWndkot3i3jCTGzT9oF6t
QWcyUFPKAVck+B7VTmn6kt6td8rmYzeIp/0g7a6Q+BCeGNLMKzwdfofMRH0ueMys
0sTkA+73BKKYQITgFh2t+CvCNtoYd5IT8JFrk4lqdeCcb1HVuys0u1J8oLy1ppSr
869cwZ2nhwV4AOczDLAbMlwitDpWTLWpZ+epkkP4hOYii48neSXsc5XQwJr9RBU=
=63S3
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Ludwig Hügelschäfer]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 01.03.15 17:31, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Patrick,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig 
>> :
>> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that
> doesn’t hurt anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic
> level, that the key isn’t completely bogus.

Yes. And it would automate a process which would have to be done
manually during a sensible key verification.

Ludwig
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2
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=1JPX
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Marco Zehe]

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:36 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
> :
> 
> Seriously? Please look at
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487regarding that
> implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts to {S,C}
> key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material for different
> purposes... BAD)

Do you have any insight to share in that bug that might help my colleagues move 
fixing it forward? I’m sure it would be highly appreciated! :)

Marco



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[MFPA]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 12:21:20 PM, in
, Jonathan
Schleifer wrote:


> and also gets rid of spam
> by requiring a proof of work to send something.

Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
billions of people, lots of energy.

- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=
=tNNO
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:45 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:36 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> :
>> 
>> Seriously? Please look at 
>> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487regarding that
>>  implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts
>> to {S,C} key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material
>> for different purposes... BAD)
> 
> Do you have any insight to share in that bug that might help my 
> colleagues move fixing it forward? I’m sure it would be highly 
> appreciated! :)
> 

Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take security
seriously.

The proper solution seems to be a re-implementation of the system to
use gpgme for encryption. I'm also worried about the system's key
management in the case of
(i) revocations; as I'm not aware of any key refreshes being made,
meaning a revocation certificate uploaded to public keyserver network
would not be honored and still constitute information leak.
(ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key rotation
would not be automatically taken into consideration and would have to
be uploaded manually to each bugzilla implementation using that flawed
piece of software (the securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Timendi causa est nescire
The cause of fear is ignorance
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU80QyAAoJEP7VAChXwav6NLcH/2mkfs2MRRHhSc1ZcEVWstJ5
0ZDSGVHUDsAFqUGxXyxbOj+nc1yrZBlQCxFhd3dogtIMYUDkCckEDEIahT029jsL
dJ3GvXjf3ZdKKCsIl+MTypr1ToyMJ0r0DpTv90XxdX97svdc7VUi5wIMdNiL3mbV
dLbUXt8e1qTt1Y9ie08vhGVmSP3IesSztLlWkxyIPL7NFDNqMwTUCk/RAZx4qwpT
Ore/QxzBYlBrauYJpyUrNhKX6atF1GmCT8w0AKI1E55TUJSDmadOzt8T4rGYRkD0
Hz3OWjdGsUETjDy0JFbwnky1a+RBKXqrEtmHmFw+5dE6IiqEXKe+hBrTRlMqQUQ=
=g23o
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Marco Zehe]

Hi Kristian,

> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
> :
> 
> Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
> bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take security
> seriously.

Error in judgement that has since been corrected. These things sometimes 
happen, but this should definitely not be generalized.

> 
> 
> The proper solution seems to be a re-implementation of the system to
> use gpgme for encryption. I'm also worried about the system's key
> management in the case of
>   (i) revocations; as I'm not aware of any key refreshes being made,
> meaning a revocation certificate uploaded to public keyserver network
> would not be honored and still constitute information leak.
Yes, the public key doesn’t come from a key server in the first place, but 
needs to be copy and pasted into a standard HTML textarea while filling in the 
form for that Securemail extension. So it is the key owner’s responsibility to 
keep it up to date. As far as I know, there is no interaction with any outside 
source in this matter.


> 
>   (ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key rotation
> would not be automatically taken into consideration and would have to
> be uploaded manually to each bugzilla implementation using that flawed
> piece of software (the securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).

Yes, these instances are all acting independently, there is no exchange between 
totally unrelated Bugzilla instances.

Marco



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[MFPA]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512



On Friday 27 February 2015 at 11:15:36 AM, in
, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> So what did this key attract, being on the keyserver
> for four years now?

> 22 Nigerian 419 scams. That's it. Twenty-two! They came
> in batches; I haven't seen anything since March last
> year.

I have such a key up for nearly five years. The only email the
address has received is a test message from myself to check
the address still works.


- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

A bird in the hand makes it awfully hard to blow your nose
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=
=jib3
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 05:31 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Patrick,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 15:41 schrieb Patrick Brunschwig 
>> :
>> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> I like this idea very, very much! This is a confirmation that
> doesn’t hurt anybody, and it is something that insures on a basic
> level, that the key isn’t completely bogus.
> 
> I have seen part of this in a different context in Mozilla’s 
> Bugzilla, when one uploads one’s public key into the Bugzilla
> account to be able to receive security-sensitive messages. After
> submitting the form, Bugzilla sends an encrypted message to the
> account’s e-mail address, assuming the public key just uploaded
> belongs to that address. It doesn’t go as far as requiring
> verification via a link, but it definitely confirms if the key is
> working for the user.

Seriously? Please look at
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790487 regarding that
implementation, which opens up another can of worms (encrypts to {S,C}
key, not encryption key, dual usage of same key material for different
purposes... BAD)

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
"I have always wished that my computer would be as easy to use as my
telephone.
My wish has come true -- I no longer know how to use my telephone"
(Bjarne Stroustrup, April 1999)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU80AlAAoJEP7VAChXwav6EtYH/2s7omGB617SiAYBuBD11izv
+7XErPLC0LMLAYTkxleHwZ2f+CDfL4Tf2g429i3XFYEeX2ysqJxq6vq4DVmbASe6
tEj8JpBRksUQB3FiIlnDrSBD2L8l4NgATeCVimUy8CJ19NoCixR6bVoZarFTKVus
93XS9GmD0wOBc2fWFqu3vnAqmHTaxi8UULtjqHGogEgaq9q2lLd13mbXP9MwX9zw
oqpmiwi86tEZ1KpUc6AHBeEqmbTk1iZJHS4oNOks0OqYmro56fMXkVX1S9zx1lan
fJdhS25d97MLl6yHSdQQGALGGdj+DNihcl77XvY5k8eUmURy13fXuqQf67mY/Us=
=gvNe
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 06:01 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
> Hi Kristian,
> 
>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>> :
>> 
>> Since the author's first reaction was closing it WONTFIX I didn't
>>  bother, with that kind of behavior they can't possibly take 
>> security seriously.
> 
> Error in judgement that has since been corrected. These things 
> sometimes happen, but this should definitely not be generalized.
> 

fair enough, but it does tell something about culture that it happens,
even if corrected.

>> (ii) Ditto for the issue of replacing the subkeys, as key
>> rotation would not be automatically taken into consideration and
>> would have to be uploaded manually to each bugzilla
>> implementation using that flawed piece of software (the
>> securemail extension, not bugzilla itself).
> 
> Yes, these instances are all acting independently, there is no 
> exchange between totally unrelated Bugzilla instances.

And there shouldn't be interaction between the various bugzilla
instances, but there should be lookups to keyserver networks
(preferably to a locally controlled keyserver to avoid certain
information leakages, but that is another matter). In my own case I'm
on some 10-15 bugzillas, with at least an annual rotation of the
encryption subkey of my main key, meaning I have to manually update
the key in these instances (that currently involve manual key
splitting and pasting non-conforming OpenPGP data) on the bugzillas
that have enabled it. Another issue with the current implementation,
btw, is that there is no way to define group based keys (see gpg's
- --group) , so aliases can't be used e.g. for an alias such as
security@participant.invalid, this should be integrated into the
already existing group restriction possibility in bugzilla), which
ironically will send unencrypted email messages fondly even though
something is restricted...


- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Veni vidi velcro
I came, I saw, I got stuck
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU80ekAAoJEP7VAChXwav6hVkH/j4kbWapWqGC7ij1nYB6zG6d
dDFHwN7A7IsrIuXH4o/CZmdeidNB3lUk2KZ2woksa0XO+QRLwz34pZjTAdHUrJVe
C/vxELcBqoF6kBDBrOzKU7suT5at8rrTMVtUXviT1nZuu+SCW2TOxpWNAfuLyS9j
IDryaAot9CUPrarzclQfIn7VLMnH6aCPKDk5mli8mmdf0mD52YK7hHUWhYrQtXHF
egxOPnaaiYEy7P2mm3vaYboJWlezv+EIZ8Ly0czSSpVJ1ryrL/ps5tm8Z/9U2njC
QTnumYKa6cHeZtRLPYLQ56TeazifgYN+3ls9IAlcCn0ydOnlu7T2hK2Vsh8AEG4=
=B5DB
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[MFPA]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512



On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 2:41:33 PM, in
, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:



> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you
> upload a key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send
> an encrypted email to every UID in the key. Each
> encrypted mail contains a unique link to confirm the
> email address. Once all email addresses are confirmed,
> the key is validated and the keyserver will allow
> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.

What about keys with UIDs containing no email address?



- --
Best regards

MFPAmailto:2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net

The best way to destroy your enemy is to make him your friend.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=
=gDmu
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Patrick Brunschwig]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 01.03.15 18:11, MFPA wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday 1 March 2015 at 2:41:33 PM, in 
> , Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> The idea I have in mind is roughly as follows: if you upload a
>> key to a keyserver, the keyserver would send an encrypted email
>> to every UID in the key. Each encrypted mail contains a unique
>> link to confirm the email address. Once all email addresses are
>> confirmed, the key is validated and the keyserver will allow 
>> access to it just like with any regular keyserver.
> 
> What about keys with UIDs containing no email address?

The purpose of such a keyserver would be primarily targeted to email.
Thus I think such keys should be refused.

- -Patrick


-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2
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=pm11
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/01/2015 06:08 PM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> On 03/01/2015 06:01 PM, Marco Zehe wrote:
>> Hi Kristian,
> 
>>> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:54 schrieb Kristian Fiskerstrand 
>>> :
>>> 

...

> that have enabled it. Another issue with the current
> implementation, btw, is that there is no way to define group based
> keys (see gpg's --group) , so aliases can't be used e.g. for an
> alias such as security@participant.invalid, this should be
> integrated into the already existing group restriction possibility
> in bugzilla), which ironically will send unencrypted email messages
> fondly even though something is restricted...
> 

To elaborate on this, in the absence of this I would also accept that
bugs that have been restricted simply send a generic update message.
"An update has occured on bug #XX, please log in to see the update"

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The
other is to gain it.
 - George Bernard Shaw
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU802IAAoJEP7VAChXwav68egH/2saK0x2MLOnzRZJbrIP41dF
yKp9K+u/cq3Fk6hAvuZoJ0nGYBKuhh59mifvkMZrV4JEvBQ5NXjXWPD8wpJScaeL
/K9dDKLifwxDpNWiFVK3ISO8jcJRbUYkOwMYd1SmcsKXz1fmB5qPyYGflJxJkME+
2JI76K0FmeDnpNI/lyB2jFyi2uhfHxSDWIX80rqO+Hc0zMduKJsnAWfsVZmDbiGt
JRjOe0aW2Qgkwvjx0tjEYw0Vbxp5ENfK6tpSCVbcoIQnuCwZz0E3MGrKAbJp3cUW
w8XG9+rv9HqjGLp/txS4kjgqjmTkoiHFPvXW75OfK8xPGieA5epjjyVyowEW30Y=
=RWnn
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Am 01.03.2015 um 17:45 schrieb MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net>:

>> and also gets rid of spam
>> by requiring a proof of work to send something.
> 
> Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
> unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
> billions of people, lots of energy.

That "wasted energy" is a lot less than the energy we currently waste on spam, 
especially if you take into consideration the amount of human time wasted. The 
majority of the e-mail traffic is used up by spam.

--
Jonathan


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line

[Werner Koch]

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rp...@kcore.de said:

> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The

Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
general purpose command line tool.

You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.

If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
MIME container.  Then use mimencode or similar tools.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: A forgotten patch?

[Werner Koch]

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 03:29, a...@raxys.net said:

> I think the majority of people work for people they don't necessarily
> like that much. I suppose it's related to the unfair distribution of
> wealth in our world. Being funded by Facebook isn't the most reputable
> thing either.

Yeah right, or Google or Microsoft, or Apple, you name it.

[For some people raised in the 70ies and earlier "Bild" is a paper they
 won't even touch if they are in urgent need for paper. ]

> Is there anything in the patch you would reconsider to accept, if
> there

I have not seen anything - I might have not seen the tree for all the
assert(), though.

> was a bug report for the patch? I would gladly write one if that would

Well written bug reports are always appreciated.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

New "validating keyserver" architecture (was: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption)

[Matthias Mansfeld]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 1 Mar 2015 at 17:21, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:

> On 01.03.15 16:38, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> >>> In general I believe this to be an insufficient form of
> >>> identification that really doesn't provide much of anything
> >>> useful, but at least the PGP keyserver does it reasonably sane in
> >>> its methodology by creating a signature from their CA on the key.
> >>> Whether you put any merit to having such a CA signature or not is
> >>> left up to the user (excluding for now the "fun" related to the
> >>> spammy number of signatures from it)
> >
> >> Yes, I know. The re-confirmation every few months together with
> >> re-signing the keys is among the things I dislike about
> >> keyserver.pgp.com. But in general, I think that keyservers need to
> >> go in that direction if we want to enable easy use of OpenPGP in
> >> email (which requires in some way or another to download missing
> >> keys automatically).
> >
> > You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all.
> > Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the
> > keyserver network.
>
> Perfectly correct, yes. This is exactly what I'm proposing. I believe
> that the current keyserver network cannot do this. I just don't have
> the time to (also) work on this...
>
> - -Patrick

I like this idea very much. (I must admit, I did not take notice of
this feature at keyserver.pgp.com, However, I just tried it, but it
refused my whole pubkey because it contains an expired subkey, but
that's not a problem of the concept...).
Uploadingonly with validation by e-mail to all (or at least a
selected one) user-ids like keyserver.pgp.com does would be a really
huge improvement and would address the initial problem about fake
keys which lead the guy at c't to his PGP bashing.
Key distribution between the keyservers same as now, and deleting a
key on all servers (manually or after "Timeout" without confirmation)
should be possible from any of these servers, not just this one the
key was initially uploaded.

And the objective should be to replace or retrofit the current system
of keyservers. Two concurrent systems would not make OpenPGP more
user friendly.

What about crowdfunding such a development?

Matthias
- --
Matthias Mansfeld Elektronik * Printed Circuit Board Design and
Assembly
Neithardtstr. 3, D-85540 Haar, GERMANY
Phone: +49-89-4620 0937, Fax: +49-89-4620 0938
Internet: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de
OpenPGP: http://www.mansfeld-elektronik.de/gnupgkey/mansfeld.asc
Fingerprint: 6563 057D E6B8 9105 1CE4 18D0 4056 1F54 8B59 40EF


-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1 - GPGrelay v0.962

iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJU83WjAAoJEEBWH1SLWUDvqu0IAK8N/mUf5/T2hPCX4qMrpZyG
c0SbxyECIk44/VCp9hOnp+fYd01Ocgv29P/w1KUSJsp5JrtxG3hkK+2SbYV6x+po
dbSSPlyY8MOMQinYKyIP0VVSfVz5mScnxyjXZIMpmwbe6TYNacj/8DscVVXlBH8m
afSTHIJDcMdvVn4fWOsvLufEUpCvmzbRuxEpSISJBRDgNlNE8DVAckfOoC+vIrbp
4Dr5BU4jJH3oFtG6p3yRt6bNW9wkPfYSp0mohVIO0KjSDMnrNq7t456xikehHxBn
Q/e11FNv2bNvuPCZ3iET0ZfxUjvYlbS28Du7CgDRooA6jt7RLsULU3SmJuW4k/o=
=2TV/
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Whishlist for next-gen card

[Peter Lebbing]

On 01/03/15 17:43, NdK wrote:
> while I was talking of remote user auth (so using openpgp card instead of
> ~/.ssh/id_* keys -- something that's already doable).

No, I'm talking about that as well. And I don't think the fingerprint of
the host is part of the signed data or the signature. Why do you think the
fingerprint of the host is part of that?

By /host/ authentication I mean that you verify that the host your are
connecting to is in fact the host you wanted to connect to; and /that/ is
through the public key of the host, of which you can verify the fingerprint.
Let's call this keypair A.

After you've verified the fingerprint, a copy of the hosts' public key, A, is
stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts on your client machine.

But when the host is authenticating that you are in fact the user you are
claiming to be, you sign a challenge that only you could sign because you have
the private key, let's call it B. That is /user/ authentication.

The host checks that your public key B is in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on the
server machine; if so, you're authenticated.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: strength of voice authentication [was: Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption]

[flapflap]

Johan Wevers:
> On 28-02-2015 15:09, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> 
>> We had this discussion recently over on messag...@moderncrypto.org.
> 
> What is described there is a much more confined problem.
> 
>> It's far from "trivial", but breaking voice-based authentication
>> (particularly in the already-noisy realm of mobile phone calls) with
>> high probability doesn't seem to be beyond serious researchers.
> 
> Fooling a computer that a certain voice belongs to someone else, sure,
> I'm sure that is or will be possible. Fooling me that a short, fixed
> string is spoken by someone I know when in fact it is not, sure, that too.
> 
> But fooling me that the person on the other end of the line is someone I
> know well by only technically impersonating his voice while having an
> actual conversation... I don't believe it very likely to happen in the
> near future. Perhaps it could work on someone I barely know, but pick
> only once the wrong person and I might become very suspicious. It
> requires not only changing the voice but also solving a problem much
> harder than the classic Turing test. For once, it requires much
> contextual knowledge about what both persons know of each other.
> 

Apparently, it is very easy to fool people by voice on the telephone.

Just think about the "grandchild trick" ([0], unfortunately not in
English) which is a method where the criminals phone (often elder)
people and tell them that they are a grandchild, nephew, or other remote
relative and need some money for some reason (need a new car and the like).
According to the article, they often start the conversation with a
question like "Guess who's calling?" and then the victims think some
time and seem to remember someone of their family and answer "Hi $Name"
so the callers know a name of a relative they now can impersonate.
You'd think that people are very careful with regard to money, but the
trick is a huge "success" and the criminals got more than CHF 50k _per
case_ in 2013 in Switzerland.

This is because the telephone channel does not prove authenticity of the
caller and thus cannot be secure.

~flapflap

[0] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enkeltrick



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Ingo Klöcker]

On Sunday 01 March 2015 19:58:19 Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Am 01.03.2015 um 17:45 schrieb MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-
gro...@riseup.net>:
> >> and also gets rid of spam
> >> by requiring a proof of work to send something.
> > 
> > Surely, "proof of work" is evidence of performing some otherwise
> > unnecessary CPU cycles. This wastes energy. In a system used by
> > billions of people, lots of energy.
> 
> That "wasted energy" is a lot less than the energy we currently waste on
> spam, especially if you take into consideration the amount of human time
> wasted. The majority of the e-mail traffic is used up by spam.

And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much energy 
the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because the bots cannot 
hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per second, but your 
hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is unrealistic.


Regards,
Ingo


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Jonathan Schleifer]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Am 01.03.2015 um 23:25 schrieb Ingo Klöcker :

> And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much
> energy the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because
> the bots cannot hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per
> second, but your hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is
> unrealistic.

I don't really agree with that. The goal is that the proof of work for a
single message takes 4 minutes. At that rate, sending spam really is not
profitable. In 4 minutes, spammers can currently send hundreds of
thousands of mails. At that rate, they can afford to send it to every
address they can find. With only one mail per machine every 4 minutes,
they really need to be careful where to send it. Let's assume they have
1 machines (which is unrealistic - most machines are behind a dialup
connection from which no provider will accept mail). That's only 2500
mails a minute. If global spam were just 2500 spam messages a minute,
spam would hardly be a problem.

- --
Jonathan
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EARYKAAYFAlTzle0ACgkQM+YcY+tK57UH+wEA2vgeaGeMeZ8daVMhQnJHsibz
CP2bH4N9Jur5NMcu0G4BAACkAVlj0D5KKr6MfMcVb5dYoCRvn5mqOv/eoZPmLKEI
=xAfS
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Ingo Klöcker]

On Sunday 01 March 2015 23:43:25 Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Am 01.03.2015 um 23:25 schrieb Ingo Klöcker :
> > And most spam is sent by bots. The spammers don't really care how much
> > energy the bots burn. Yes, the amount of spam might decrease because
> > the bots cannot hammer out that many bitmessages as SMTP messages per
> > second, but your hypothesis that BitMessage would get rid of spam is
> > unrealistic.
> 
> I don't really agree with that. The goal is that the proof of work for a
> single message takes 4 minutes.

On what kind of hardware? A high-end gamer PC? Or a low end mobile phone?


> At that rate, sending spam really is not
> profitable. In 4 minutes, spammers can currently send hundreds of
> thousands of mails. At that rate, they can afford to send it to every
> address they can find. With only one mail per machine every 4 minutes,
> they really need to be careful where to send it. Let's assume they have
> 1 machines (which is unrealistic - most machines are behind a dialup
> connection from which no provider will accept mail).

There are much larger bot nets, e.g the ramnit bot net apparently controlled 
3.2 million (!) machines (see http://heise.de/-2559388, in German). And with 
regard to providers not accepting those mails you seem to be missing that the 
bots simply (ab)use the mail accounts of the bot owners.


> That's only 2500
> mails a minute. If global spam were just 2500 spam messages a minute,
> spam would hardly be a problem.

Of course, 800,000 spam messages per minute is still many magnitudes less than 
now.

I don't see BitMessage killing spam. But it will surely kill mailing lists.


Regards,
Ingo


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On Sun 2015-03-01 20:01:05 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rp...@kcore.de said:
>
>> is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
>> (a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The
>
> Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
> bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
> message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
> general purpose command line tool.

python's email module is quite good for programmatically handling mime
parts if you want to manipulate an e-mail (though it may not be so good
for reconstructing it in some sort of bytewise exact fashion).

> You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
> part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
> which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.
>
> If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
> Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
> MIME container.

You should also note that any decryption like this is likely to remove
any OpenPGP signature as well, for those MUAs that do the
encryption+signing step all in one OpenPGP piece (i believe that the
gpgtools mail.app plugin places the OpenPGP signature inside a
multipart/signed MIME message, which is then itself encrypted, rather
than placing encryption and signatures all in the OpenPGP part
directly).

A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into an
OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original signature would
be a really nice tool to have.

 --dkg

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: Decrypting PGP/MIME on the command line

[Doug Barton]

On 3/1/15 3:34 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

On Sun 2015-03-01 20:01:05 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:

On Sun,  1 Mar 2015 15:32, rp...@kcore.de said:


is there a command line utility that takes a PGP/MIME encrypted message
(a plain RFC 2822 text file) and outputs an unencrypted copy? The


Not really.  MIME is a structured format and as such it may result in a
bunch of encrypted, non-nencrypted, signed, unsigned,
message/alternative sub-documents.  Thus it is not easy to write a
general purpose command line tool.


python's email module is quite good for programmatically handling mime
parts if you want to manipulate an e-mail (though it may not be so good
for reconstructing it in some sort of bytewise exact fashion).


You may start with gpgparsemail which is not installed bald build as
part of gnupg in the tools directory.  It returns an annotated format
which might be easier for further processing steps than plain MIME.

If you only want to decrypt a standard MIME encrypted mail, it is easy.
Simply pipe the entire mail through gpg and you will get the decrypted
MIME container.


You should also note that any decryption like this is likely to remove
any OpenPGP signature as well, for those MUAs that do the
encryption+signing step all in one OpenPGP piece (i believe that the
gpgtools mail.app plugin places the OpenPGP signature inside a
multipart/signed MIME message, which is then itself encrypted, rather
than placing encryption and signatures all in the OpenPGP part
directly).

A tool that transforms an OpenPGP encrypted+signed MIME message into an
OpenPGP-signed MIME message while retaining the original signature would
be a really nice tool to have.


The signature is an attachment on a PGP/MIME message of course, so you'd 
have to preserve the two files separately.


My (Al)pine PGP filters are shell scripts that (amongst other things) 
will verify and decrypt PGP/MIME messages. You could easily adapt that 
code to output the canonical version of the message to a file, along 
with the corresponding signature.


hope this helps,

Doug

https://dougbarton.us/PGP/ppf/index.html


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Jonathan Schleifer]

On Mon, 2 Mar 2015 00:13:07 +0100, Ingo Klöcker  wrote:

> On what kind of hardware? A high-end gamer PC? Or a low end mobile phone?

According to the paper, the goal is to take 4 minutes on an average PC and that 
it shall be adjusted according to hardware improvements.
 
> There are much larger bot nets, e.g the ramnit bot net apparently controlled 
> 3.2 million (!) machines (see http://heise.de/-2559388, in German). And with 
> regard to providers not accepting those mails you seem to be missing that the 
> bots simply (ab)use the mail accounts of the bot owners.

Abusing mail accounts only works if they are mail accounts with crappy hosts. 
Sane providers will block your account if you start sending 100 mails in 1 
minute ;).

> Of course, 800,000 spam messages per minute is still many magnitudes less 
> than 
> now.

The question is if that would still be profitable for spammers. Currently, they 
just send their spam to millions of addresses hoping that one of them is stupid 
enough to fall for it. They can do that because it's cheap. But if sending 
isn't cheap, sending to millions to just get one idiot who falls for it isn't 
an option anymore.

> I don't see BitMessage killing spam. But it will surely kill mailing lists.

It would just need to be extended to groups. The protocol is not set in stone.

In any case, I'm not suggesting we all switch to BitMessage. I'm just saying 
this is going in the right direction.

-- 
Jonathan


pgpBKEMKJpQhY.pgp
Description: PGP signature
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: How to send a key to a keyserver?

[Helmut Waitzmann]

Kristian Fiskerstrand  writes:

>On 02/27/2015 12:57 PM, Philip Jackson wrote:
>> On 26/02/15 18:15, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
>>> I tried
>>> 
>>> gpg2 --verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
>>> --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
>>> 
>>> and got the message
>>> 
>>> gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server
>>> pool.sks-keyservers.net gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The
>>> requested URL returned error: 417 gpg: keyserver internal error 
>>> gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error

>417 really shouldn't happen for any of the servers in the pool, as it
>is explicitly checked that this return code should not be used.

>For 1.4/2.0, please use --keyserver-options debug,verbose to get more
>information about the interaction from the curl helpers, this will be
>useful for debugging.

+ gpg2 --version
gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.14
libgcrypt 1.4.5
Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later 
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Home: /home/helmut/helmut/private/.gnupg
Supported algorithms:
Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA
Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, 
CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256
Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224
Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2

+ gpg2 --verbose --keyserver-options debug,verbose --keyserver 
hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-keys -- 
72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.21.0 GnuTLS/2.8.6 zlib/1.2.3.4 libidn/1.15
* About to connect() to proxy proxy.zuhause.test port 3128 (#0)
*   Trying 192.168.0.1... * connected
* Connected to proxy.zuhause.test (192.168.0.1) port 3128 (#0)
> POST http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/add HTTP/1.1
Host: pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371
Accept: */*
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3239
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Expect: 100-continue

* The requested URL returned error: 417
* Closing connection #0
gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The requested URL returned error: 417
gpg: keyserver internal error
gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error
+ printf 'exit code: %s\n' 2
exit code: 2

Ah!  gpg is using my http proxy.  proxy.zuhause.test is only known to my
own DNS service, resolving (after following an alias) to IP address
192.168.0.1.

Issuing same gpg2-command again, after unsetting the environment
variable http_proxy:

+ gpg2 --verbose --keyserver-options debug,verbose --keyserver 
hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-keys -- 
72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net
gpgkeys: curl version = libcurl/7.21.0 GnuTLS/2.8.6 zlib/1.2.3.4 libidn/1.15
* About to connect() to pool.sks-keyservers.net port 11371 (#0)
*   Trying 23.226.129.243... * connected
* Connected to pool.sks-keyservers.net (23.226.129.243) port 11371 (#0)
> POST /pks/add HTTP/1.1
Host: pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371
Accept: */*
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3239
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Expect: 100-continue

< HTTP/1.1 100 Continue
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2015 01:31:08 GMT
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
< Content-Length: 129
< Connection: keep-alive
< Server: sks_www/1.1.5
< Cache-Control: no-cache
< Pragma: no-cache
< Expires: 0
< X-HKP-Results-Count: 1
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Via: 1.1 keys.jhcloos.com:11371 (nginx)
< 
* Connection #0 to host pool.sks-keyservers.net left intact
* Closing connection #0
+ printf 'exit code: %s\n' 0
exit code: 0

So it's a problem with my http proxy?

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: German ct magazine postulates death of pgp encryption

[Chuck Peters]

Kristian Fiskerstrand said:
> >> 
> >> You wouldn't need the keyservers to be involved in this at all. 
> >> Anyone could set up such a mail verification CA outside of the 
> >> keyserver network.

How about storing keys in a more distributed manner, DNS, in addition to some 
other method of authentication, DNSSEC and DANE?

Paul Wouters and others are working on it:

Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02

Paul recently gave a presentation about it at an ICANN meeting:
Slides
http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/mon-tech/presentation-new-dnssec-technologies-09feb15-en.pdf
Video, via Adobe Connect starts about 4:49:00 and goes to about 5:08:00:
https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p2j5gtoni79/?launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pbMode=normal
Audio:
http://audio.icann.org/meetings/singapore2015/tech-09feb15-en.mp3

Slide 1 of the presentation shows, not including the title slide, how you can 
obtain Paul's key with dig and slide 2 shows the easier method using 
hash-slinger:
openpgpkey --fetch email_address

Slide 5 shows how to create the DNS record:
openpgpkey --create email_address --output rfc

Slide 9 Paul talks about openpgpkey-milter which is a postfix and sendmail 
plugin to auto-encrypt email. Note it is not recommended for production use yet.


And to make mail servers less NSA friendly we should be setting up DANE and 
requiring starttls with forward secrecy anyway!  It's on my TODO list!


Chuck


___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: How to send a key to a keyserver?

[Xavier Maillard]

Helmut Waitzmann  writes:

> So it's a problem with my http proxy?

Seems like actually.

-- Xavier.

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Re: How to send a key to a keyserver?

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 03/02/2015 02:45 AM, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
> Kristian Fiskerstrand 
> writes:
> 
>> On 02/27/2015 12:57 PM, Philip Jackson wrote:
>>> On 26/02/15 18:15, Helmut Waitzmann wrote:
 I tried
 
 gpg2 --verbose --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net 
 --send-keys -- 72ABFF0923A87CF22D0ED7C4FDEE765D017077F1
 
 and got the message
 
 gpg: sending key FDEE765D017077F1 to hkp server 
 pool.sks-keyservers.net gpgkeys: HTTP post error 22: The 
 requested URL returned error: 417 gpg: keyserver internal
 error gpg: keyserver send failed: Keyserver error
> 
>> 417 really shouldn't happen for any of the servers in the pool,
>> as it is explicitly checked that this return code should not be
>> used.
> 
>> For 1.4/2.0, please use --keyserver-options debug,verbose to get
>> more information about the interaction from the curl helpers,
>> this will be useful for debugging.
> 

..

> 
> Ah!  gpg is using my http proxy.  proxy.zuhause.test is only known
> to my own DNS service, resolving (after following an alias) to IP
> address 192.168.0.1.
> 
> Issuing same gpg2-command again, after unsetting the environment 
> variable http_proxy:


..

> 
> So it's a problem with my http proxy?
> 

Anything else would surprise me. A hint is to look for any mismatch
handling of HTTP/1.0 vs HTTP/1.1 with regards to the 100-Expect, you
can find some information on the matter for the keyserver operators at [0]

References:
https://bitbucket.org/skskeyserver/sks-keyserver/wiki/Peering

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aurum est Potestas
Gold is power
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJU9BSUAAoJEP7VAChXwav66pwH/1fZIfNadxa2cEpgvsScQVid
ggaJSfVrNyAye1bFacSjhMBxL61G7jVuGQkvOq+l1WNOYNzwP2ZsjQJ7XpaCP0IM
bE1omqNwYM5GNk4eA1PTjxJjoX1O2l8+umzIOZ7lMOWnB8YsqziIwPz36RCVGQ15
cYzK9G+Ca7uCmyQ09dYnY7MvfN+U49SoSPz3PJJgGKD+9nuStSphaY7Bu8kWqXOm
JyW4BgPThQvhLjqOIStbPIvFRC9BTSibRiCI5Bc3NMljYC/RFuXzmDyveVbf9jjc
fN/X5tn0Ygax3AKZryGYynjOiDA+tQuazf+LzqZ0apHT+guEF1vW6zkS8xWN1s4=
=mr9o
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users