Re: NS ROOT queries to root servers
Medina, Antonio wrote: > > We have noticed that each query forwarded towards root servers creates > an extra NS ROOT query. This is due to a long-standing bug which was recently fixed. You need change number 4770 - see https://source.isc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=bind9.git;a=blob;f=CHANGES;hb=v9_9#l169 Complain to your vendor if it isn't present in their mystery meat version. > In addition, we are going to configure a second provider that has warned > us on they do not reply to NS ROOT queries. Could this pose a problem > for our DNS servers? Is it possible to instruct our DNS servers not to > perform root priming? Jeez, are they deliberately trying to break things? :-) You should find that it works as they require if you configure the root zone on your server as a static-stub zone, with the server-addresses clause pointing at your upstreams. From a brief test I think this suppresses the priming queries, but I'm running bleeding edge BIND, so your milage may vary. I have a crazy setup on my test server, with a local mirror of the root zone (which feeds https://twitter.com/diffroot). Because BIND does not normally validate authoritative data, I have separate views for authoritative service and recursive service. The rec view is configured with static-stub versions of all the auth zones, pointing at localhost. When I remove the static-stub root zone and restart the server, it logs about sending priming queries; when I restart with my usual configuration it does not. Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/ - I xn--zr8h punycode Irish Sea: Westerly 5 to 7, occasionally gale 8 at first, becoming variable 3 or 4. Moderate or rough, becoming slight. Wintry showers, rain later in south. Good, occasionally poor. ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Update ACLs dynamically
Hello I would like to know if it is possible to add or remove IP addresses to bind acl list without service restart?Anvar Kuchkartaev an...@aegisnet.eu ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: Update ACLs dynamically
Hi Anvar, Yes, you can change ACLs in named.conf, and then run "rndc reconfig" which will pick up the changes. You don't need to restart BIND. Regards, Anand On 19/01/2018 14:48, Anvar Kuchkartaev via bind-users wrote: > Hello I would like to know if it is possible to add or remove IP addresses to > bind acl list without service restart? ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: intermittent SERVFAIL for high visible domains such as *.google.com
On Thu, 2018-01-18 at 17:46 +, Tony Finch wrote: > Brian J. Murrell wrote: > > On Thu, 2018-01-18 at 15:41 +, Tony Finch wrote: > > > > > > The default is 10 minutes - try reducing it and see if the outage > > > becomes shorter. > > > > If it does, what is that telling me? > > My hypothesis here is that `named` has marked all the nameservers for > the > domain that is failing as lame, so it no longer has anywhere to send > queries for the domain, so it returns a SERVFAIL. Seems this might be the case. Using a trace level of 11, when a failure starts this seems to be the trail... 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.893 resquery 0x7f1010f3bd90 (fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A)): response 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.893 received packet: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 25156 ;; flags: qr; QUESTION: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 15, ADDITIONAL: 27 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1472 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.google.com.IN A ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: com.172800 IN NS a.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS b.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS c.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS d.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS e.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS f.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS g.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS h.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS i.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS j.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS k.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS l.gtld-servers.net. com.172800 IN NS m.gtld-servers.net. com.86400 IN DS 30909 8 2 E2D3C916F6DEEAC73294E8268FB5885044A833FC5459588F4A9184CF C41A5766 com.86400 IN RRSIG DS 8 1 86400 2018020105 2018011904 41824 . IwT0e9jOKKgASgCQXGsryxFFeN5R0e/HPGCzQuD7rhtCYg4UywLcJ9A1 Ftn0drh2mggBE5wWX90dc5u26P8Gt1jkJ8XbxyjNHA5uTmakjVnGGOZ+ 9N/6JMtDApT4F6q/3EN8dkctxWvEe9uph8dFR1Uj0aqCNS3aQ0ge4LkS JPfRQ2FIQCQxsh+Ts2hdiC6mThpWoFmwmfBxGPu/NsS92/iA5EaP4ZOK oIRqrvgyV4PrTDJM8StJJk9qw7z78RC+3/RfEsnwICXKptIGE4AekqIa RiVhkTrXhCZAibab5gtqkCkWZ6kF1/6Xbcjexj4VHL+FxqlQCec6CUcz Wpt/DA== ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: a.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.5.6.30 a.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:a83e::2:30 b.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.33.14.30 b.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:231d::2:30 c.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.26.92.30 c.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:83eb::30 d.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.31.80.30 d.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:500:856e::30 e.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.12.94.30 e.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:502:1ca1::30 f.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.35.51.30 f.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:d414::30 g.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.42.93.30 g.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:eea3::30 h.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.54.112.30 h.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:502:8cc::30 i.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.43.172.30 i.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:39c1::30 j.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.48.79.30 j.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:502:7094::30 k.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.52.178.30 k.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:503:d2d::30 l.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.41.162.30 l.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:500:d937::30 m.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.55.83.30 m.gtld-servers.net. 172800 IN 2001:501:b1f9::30 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.894 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): noanswer_response 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.894 log_ns_ttl: fctx 0x7f1010f23d90: noanswer_response: www.google.com (in '.'?): 1 518400 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.894 log_ns_ttl: fctx 0x7f1010f23d90: DELEGATION: www.google.com (in 'com'?): 0 518400 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.895 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): cache_message 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.895 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): cancelquery 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.895 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): nameservers now above QDOMAIN 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.895 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): done 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.896 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): stopeverything 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.896 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): cancelqueries Is that reporting that an attempt to resolve www
Re: intermittent SERVFAIL for high visible domains such as *.google.com
Brian J. Murrell wrote: > > Am I interpreting this correctly? If so, why would these queries come > back with responses with no answers? Those responses look like referrals from the root servers to the .com servers; I would expect you to see `named` repeating the queries as it follows the iterative resolution algorithm. If it thinks it is talking to Google's nameservers when it gets that response, then something VERY screwy is happening. (Another advantage of the 9.11 packet tracing change I mentioned previously is that it logs the remote IP address of upstream queries and responses, handy for working out what `named` thinks it is talking to.) Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/ - I xn--zr8h punycode Trafalgar: Northerly or northeasterly 5 or 6, becoming variable 3 or 4 except in southwest. Rough or very rough, but slight or moderate in southeast. Fair. Good. ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: intermittent SERVFAIL for high visible domains such as *.google.com
On Fri, 2018-01-19 at 14:54 +, Tony Finch wrote: > > Those responses look like referrals from the root servers to the .com > servers; Ahhh. Right. That makes sense. > I would expect you to see `named` repeating the queries as it > follows the iterative resolution algorithm. Indeed. I will looking further down the log then... So, between that initial: 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.893 resquery 0x7f1010f3bd90 (fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A)): response is just the referrals to .com for that query and the referrals to .com for the subsequent ns[1-4].google.com queries before we get to: 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): query failed (SERVFAIL) for www.google.com/IN/A at query.c:7007 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): error 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): send 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): sendto 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): senddone 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): next 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): ns_client_detach: ref = 0 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#21585 (www.google.com): endrequest 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 fetch completed at resolver.c:7415 for www.google.com/A in 0.547099: SERVFAIL/success [domain:com,referral:1,restart:0,qrysent:0,timeout:0,lame:0,neterr:0,badresp:0,adberr:0,findfail:0,valfail:0] 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 fetch 0x7f1012541cd0 (fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): query failed (SERVFAIL) for www.google.com/IN/A at query.c:7007 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): error 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): send 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): sendto 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): senddone 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): next 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): ns_client_detach: ref = 0 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.967 client 10.75.22.32#1145 (www.google.com): endrequest 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f102c5def88 (fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fctx 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f10125423f0 (fctx 0x7f1010d86e80(ns1.google.com/A)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fctx 0x7f1010d86e80(ns1.google.com/A): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 adb: fetch of 'ns1.google.com' A failed: SERVFAIL 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 DNS_EVENT_ADBNOMOREADDRESSES 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 cfan: skipping find 0x7f10228d7630 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f10191e91e8 (fctx 0x7f1010d88a40(ns1.google.com/)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fctx 0x7f1010d88a40(ns1.google.com/): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 adb: fetch of 'ns1.google.com' failed: SERVFAIL 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 DNS_EVENT_ADBNOMOREADDRESSES 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 cfan: processing find 0x7f10228d7630 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 sending event 0x7f10228d76b8 to task 0x7f10247a2f10 for find 0x7f10228d7630 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f102069a2d0 (fctx 0x7f1010a83a60(ns2.google.com/A)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fctx 0x7f1010a83a60(ns2.google.com/A): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 adb: fetch of 'ns2.google.com' A failed: SERVFAIL 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 DNS_EVENT_ADBNOMOREADDRESSES 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 cfan: skipping find 0x7f10208679e0 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f10206998b0 (fctx 0x7f1010a83ea0(ns2.google.com/)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fctx 0x7f1010a83ea0(ns2.google.com/): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 adb: fetch of 'ns2.google.com' failed: SERVFAIL 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 DNS_EVENT_ADBNOMOREADDRESSES 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 cfan: processing find 0x7f10208679e0 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 sending event 0x7f1020867a68 to task 0x7f10247a2f10 for find 0x7f10208679e0 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.968 fetch 0x7f102112d400 (fctx 0x7f1010b6bee0(ns3.google.com/)): destroyfetch 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.970 fctx 0x7f1010b6bee0(ns3.google.com/): shutdown 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.970 adb: fetch of 'ns3.google.com' failed: SERVFAIL 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.970 DNS_EVENT_ADBNOMOREADDRESSES 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.970 cfan: skipping find 0x7f102309fc10 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.971 client fd31:aeb1:48df:0:e5f4:253a:6c1f:b73d#16975 (wifi-test.mobidia.com): query failed (SERVFAIL) for wifi-test.mobidia.com/IN/A at query.c:7007 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.971 client fd31:aeb1:48df:0:e5f4:253a:6c1f:b73d#16975 (wifi-test.mobidia.com): error 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.971 client fd31:aeb1:48df:0:e5f4:253a:6c1f:b73d#16975 (wifi-test.mobidia.com): send 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.971 client fd31:aeb1:48df:0:e5f4:253a:6c1f:b73d#16975 (wifi-test.mobidia.com): sendto 19-J
Re: intermittent SERVFAIL for high visible domains such as *.google.com
Brian J. Murrell wrote: > > So, between that initial: > > 19-Jan-2018 09:06:18.893 resquery 0x7f1010f3bd90 (fctx > 0x7f1010f23d90(www.google.com/A)): response > > is just the referrals to .com for that query and the referrals to .com > for the subsequent ns[1-4].google.com queries before we get to: > > [ snip servfail logs ] > > Shouldn't I have seen at least some referrals from a .com NS to the > google.com NSes similar to the referrals from the root server to the > .com NSes? That's what I would expect, yes. You don't have any weird middleboxes between your resolver and the Internet, do you? Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/ - I xn--zr8h punycode Irish Sea: Westerly 5 to 7, occasionally gale 8 at first, becoming variable 3 or 4. Moderate or rough, becoming slight. Wintry showers, rain later in south. Good, occasionally poor. ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: intermittent SERVFAIL for high visible domains such as *.google.com
On Fri, 2018-01-19 at 15:22 +, Tony Finch wrote: > > You don't have any weird middleboxes between your resolver and the > Internet, do you? I don't believe so. Not entirely sure what "weird middleboxes" refers to in this context though. And by resolver are you referring to my BIND9 server or the resolvers on the clients of that server? I've added packet capturing to the debug collection so that I can see what my BIND9 server is sending and receiving in the way of queries and responses when this happens again. Cheers, b. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
9.11 can't validate sss.gov
I've run into an odd problem. On the same host with nearly identical configurations. Bind 9.10.6 can resolve and DNSSEC validate sss.gov but Bind 9.11.2 cannot. If I turn off DNSSEC validation 9.11.2 resolves it just fine. According to http://dnsviz.net/d/sss.gov/dnssec/ it looks like the the domain is properly signed and valid. I get the following in the log when validation fails. Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: starting Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: attempting insecurity proof Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: checking existence of DS at 'gov' Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: checking existence of DS at 'sss.gov' Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: insecurity proof failed Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: validating sss.gov/A: got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: dnssec: info: validating sss.gov/A: got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: insecurity proof failed resolving 'sss.gov/A/IN': 2001:428::7#53 Jan 19 09:26:20 stout named[11872]: client @0x7fa6ec5ef6d0 10.9.2.18#39295 (sss.gov): view internal: query: sss.gov IN A +E(0) (10.1.1.5) Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: starting Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: attempting insecurity proof Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: checking existence of DS at 'gov' Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: checking existence of DS at 'sss.gov' Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: debug 3: validating sss.gov/A: insecurity proof failed Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: validating sss.gov/A: got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: dnssec: info: validating sss.gov/A: got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure Jan 19 09:26:21 stout named[11872]: insecurity proof failed resolving 'sss.gov/A/IN': 63.150.72.5#53 Jan 19 09:26:23 stout named[11872]: client @0x7fa725012090 2606:1c00:2802:9::6#40869 (sss.gov): view internal: query failed (SERVFAIL) for sss.gov/IN/A at query.c:8302 Jan 19 09:26:23 stout named[11872]: client @0x7fa728a30e50 10.9.2.18#39295 (sss.gov): view internal: query failed (SERVFAIL) for sss.gov/IN/A at query.c:8302 Oddly enough other signed domains seem to validate correctly. What might have changed between 9.10 and 9.11? I'm guessing that 9.11 is probably more closely requiring some kind of standard conformance and sss.gov is maybe not conforming completely. Any thoughts? It is kind of important for us. As a University we are required to verify that our students are properly registered with the selective service(sss.gov). -- Timothy A. Holtzen Campus Network Administrator Nebraska Wesleyan University Public PGP key CFB4 3AE8 B726 DEBF 00D9 CCFC 426E 76AF DABC B3D7 signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: 9.11 can't validate sss.gov
Timothy A. Holtzen wrote: > I've run into an odd problem. On the same host with nearly identical > configurations. Bind 9.10.6 can resolve and DNSSEC validate sss.gov but > Bind 9.11.2 cannot. Ah, this is because sss.gov is hosted on Qwest's DNS servers that have broken EDNS logic which is incompatible with DNS cookies. I have a short script (quoted below) which generates a blacklist of broken servers which is included in my `named.conf`. The number of problem reports I've received is mercifully small - Qwest are the worst cookie offenders. #!/bin/sh set -eu noedns=roles/named/files/named.conf.noedns : >$noedns # qwest - bea.gov # barclays - myapplication.international.barclays.com for s insauthns1.qwest.net. \ sauthns2.qwest.net. \ ns21.barclays.com. \ ns22.barclays.net. \ ns23.barclays.com. \ ns24.barclays.net. do dig +noall +nottl +noclass +answer $s a $s done | sort | while read s t a do echo "server $a { send-cookie no; }; # $s" done>>$noedns Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/ - I xn--zr8h punycode Hebrides, Bailey, Fair Isle, Faeroes, Southeast Iceland: Cyclonic 4 or 5, occasionally 6 in Hebrides, Bailey and Southeast Iceland. Moderate or rough, occasionally very rough in Hebrides and Bailey. Wintry showers. Good, occasionally poor.___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: Update ACLs dynamically
But if you have more than 1000 client ip addresses which dynamically added and removed to acl will rndc reconfig not take too much performance? Anvar Kuchkartaev an...@aegisnet.eu Original Message From: Anand Buddhdev Sent: viernes, 19 de enero de 2018 14:53 To: Anvar Kuchkartaev; bind-users@lists.isc.org Subject: Re: Update ACLs dynamically Hi Anvar, Yes, you can change ACLs in named.conf, and then run "rndc reconfig" which will pick up the changes. You don't need to restart BIND. Regards, Anand On 19/01/2018 14:48, Anvar Kuchkartaev via bind-users wrote: > Hello I would like to know if it is possible to add or remove IP addresses to > bind acl list without service restart? ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: Update ACLs dynamically
On 19.01.18 19:26, Anvar Kuchkartaev via bind-users wrote: But if you have more than 1000 client ip addresses which dynamically added and removed to acl will rndc reconfig not take too much performance? yes, it will. If you have that much clients, either authentize them via TSIG or let them use VPN -- Matus UHLAR - fantomas, uh...@fantomas.sk ; http://www.fantomas.sk/ Warning: I wish NOT to receive e-mail advertising to this address. Varovanie: na tuto adresu chcem NEDOSTAVAT akukolvek reklamnu postu. Chernobyl was an Windows 95 beta test site. ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: [ASK] Block Malware Generate Random Subdomain, Domain and TLD
Hi Daniel thank you very much for your answer. i want ask much more but my english not good so once again thank you very much. -- Sent from: http://bind-users-forum.2342410.n4.nabble.com/ ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: 9.11 can't validate sss.gov
Yes, qwest were informed years ago that there severs are broken. Report this to the .gov site operators. The servers return BADVERS to the queries which was never part of the EDNS spec and is a invention of the servers developers. FORMERR was permissible by STD13 but this was tightened when the EDNS spec was revised to say ignore unknown EDNS options. -- Mark Andrews > On 20 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Tony Finch wrote: > > Timothy A. Holtzen wrote: > >> I've run into an odd problem. On the same host with nearly identical >> configurations. Bind 9.10.6 can resolve and DNSSEC validate sss.gov but >> Bind 9.11.2 cannot. > > Ah, this is because sss.gov is hosted on Qwest's DNS servers that have > broken EDNS logic which is incompatible with DNS cookies. > > I have a short script (quoted below) which generates a blacklist of broken > servers which is included in my `named.conf`. > > The number of problem reports I've received is mercifully small - Qwest > are the worst cookie offenders. > > > > #!/bin/sh > > set -eu > > noedns=roles/named/files/named.conf.noedns > > : >$noedns > > # qwest - bea.gov > # barclays - myapplication.international.barclays.com > > for s insauthns1.qwest.net. \ >sauthns2.qwest.net. \ >ns21.barclays.com. \ >ns22.barclays.net. \ >ns23.barclays.com. \ >ns24.barclays.net. > do >dig +noall +nottl +noclass +answer $s a $s > done | > sort | > while read s t a > do echo "server $a { send-cookie no; }; # $s" > done>>$noedns > > > > Tony. > -- > f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/ - I xn--zr8h punycode > Hebrides, Bailey, Fair Isle, Faeroes, Southeast Iceland: Cyclonic 4 or 5, > occasionally 6 in Hebrides, Bailey and Southeast Iceland. Moderate or rough, > occasionally very rough in Hebrides and Bailey. Wintry showers. Good, > occasionally poor. > ___ > Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe > from this list > > bind-users mailing list > bind-users@lists.isc.org > https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: [ASK] Block Malware Generate Random Subdomain, Domain and TLD
You might want to check out the free service offered by Quad Nine (9.9.9.9), they use RPZ in the backend to filter out known malicious domain names. I do not know if they can filter out malware-related names. On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 7:02 AM Syaifudin wrote: > Hi Daniel > > thank you very much for your answer. i want ask much more but my english > not good so once again thank you very much. > > > > -- > Sent from: http://bind-users-forum.2342410.n4.nabble.com/ > ___ > Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to > unsubscribe from this list > > bind-users mailing list > bind-users@lists.isc.org > https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users > ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: [ASK] Block Malware Generate Random Subdomain, Domain and TLD
As i know RPZ is usefull for random subdomain. So we can respon it localy. But if request with random sub domain, random domain and random tld its imposible to use RPZ. Dns server will check to root server. For now i still use iptables with regex to block that request so request not to dns but droped by iptablesOn Jan 20, 2018 08:29, Josh Kuo wrote:You might want to check out the free service offered by Quad Nine (9.9.9.9), they use RPZ in the backend to filter out known malicious domain names. I do not know if they can filter out malware-related names.On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 7:02 AM Syaifudinwrote:Hi Daniel thank you very much for your answer. i want ask much more but my english not good so once again thank you very much. -- Sent from: http://bind-users-forum.2342410.n4.nabble.com/ ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
No more idea about loging...?
On 01/18/2018 05:48 PM, Pierre Couderc wrote: On 01/18/2018 01:01 PM, Anand Buddhdev wrote: I don't know what the function "isc_file_isplainfile" checks for, but perhaps the executable bits on the file are causing the failure. Log files shouldn't be executable, so you normally need mode 0644 for them. Try changing the mode, and seeing if that helps. Thnk you I have tried all possible combiations without success ___ No more idea about loging? ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users