I ran an exit node, but gave up after too many abuse reports that annoyed my
ISP. So I turned al exit ports off, and reports stopped as a rely.After
months and many terabytes of data I get an abuse complaint that my tor IP
has been used for espionage.
"NCSC have been made aware of a repor
My bet is that the recorded IP address dates back to the days when your node
was an exit. Naturally the Russian hackers have used Tor, probably in tandem
with a VPN - it would have been stupid of them not to, and stupid they are
not.
And you are right - now the US government will blame Tor exit
On 01/02/2017 12:53 AM, Rana wrote:
> @Mirimir
>>> This is not Blockchain where hundreds of thousands of greedy selfish
>>> genes are working together for non-collusion. A practically zero-
>>> effort collusion of already fully cooperating FIVE EYE agencies (US,
>>> UK, Canada, Australia, New Z
that.
>Or is it that my relay was being used to transfer the data?
>
>I assume my IP was found by way of a DNS leak which I need to look
>into.
>There is nothing else I can do as a relay to stop this or is there?
>
>Gerry
>
>
>
>-- next part --
>An H
Dr Gerard Bulger wrote:
I ran an exit node, but gave up after too many abuse reports that
annoyed my ISP. So I turned al exit ports off, and reports stopped as a
rely.After months and many terabytes of data I get an abuse
complaint that my tor IP has been used for espionage.
“NCSC have
> > Tor model breaks down when facing a modest government adversary for the
> > simple reason that having only 7000 relays total, with a minority of
> > them carrying most of the traffic, invites cheap infiltration and
> > takeover by state adversaries.
>
> Yeah, that's a problem :(
That’s a theo
> Currently, most of the major guard operators are well known people
are you sure?
- Zwiebel, 33rd on that list
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Sorry
-Original Message-
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of
Aeris
Sent: Monday, January 02, 2017 3:56 PM
>Currently, most of the major guard operators are well known people and no
>doubt they’re not engaged with three-letter agencies.
>https:/
Known to whom? Is there a Tor police that researches "unknown" guards? How do
you measure "known"? How do they become "known"? Something akin to key signing
parties? Secret meetings in Munich biergartens?
Conversely, if someone installs a high performance relay, during the first 70
days is ther
> I do not know how to interpret this table. How many guards are there at any
> given time?
Currently, we have 2442 guards.
This number is not fix but vary each days depending of community efforts to
maintain stable nodes with enough bandwidth.
> Known to whom? Is there a Tor police that researc
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 01/02/2017 04:32 PM, Aeris wrote:
> Tor node selection for circuits will address this trouble and avoid you to
> use
> more than 1 of their nodes in the same circuit, preventing any anonymity
> problem.
*any* sounds a little bit too optimistic
> *any* sounds a little bit too optimistic IMO, but it reduces the risk of
> being deanonymized (always under the assumption of the threat model).
If family name is correctly defined, Tor ensure you will only use one of those
nodes on your circuits.
If family name not correctly defined, Tor proj
On Mon, 02 Jan 2017 08:28:52 +, Rana wrote:
...
> That US agencies are actively working to destroy anonymity of (hopefully only
> selected, but who knows?) Tor users is an undisputable fact. Your implicit
> assumption that Russia is also attacking Tor is, however, unfounded.
Now, what is the
Just to play devils advocate here - when a single hacker can control tens of
thousands of devices in a botnet - just how easy would it be for a "state"
agency to control a few hundred tor nodes? We can always assume, possibly to our
own demise, that they utilize it to some degree themselves, and le
On 01/02/2017 06:56 AM, Aeris wrote:
>>> Tor model breaks down when facing a modest government adversary for the
>>> simple reason that having only 7000 relays total, with a minority of
>>> them carrying most of the traffic, invites cheap infiltration and
>>> takeover by state adversaries.
>>
>> Ye
Hi zwiebeln,
thanks for adding your 31. relay nicknamed 'hecker' !
Please do not forget to update your MyFamily on all relays.
Tipp:
If you are planing to grow beyond your 31 relays I recommend you
preemptively generate the keys for your upcoming relays so you don't
have to touch all other relay
Hi Lewis,
thanks for adding your 6 tor relays to the network!
Please do not forget to set the MyFamily parameter in your torrc
configuration to tell clients your relays belong to a single operator.
If you need help with the MyFamily option let us know.
thanks,
nusenu
++--
On 01/01/2017 11:28 PM, Rana wrote:
> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
> and to push real traffic through them.
Alternately, you need lots of small relays, running (with plausible
deniability) on I
> On 3 Jan 2017, at 11:46, Mirimir wrote:
>
>> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
>> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
>> and to push real traffic through them.
>
> Alternately, you need lots of small relays, running (with plausible
>
On 01/02/2017 06:08 PM, teor wrote:
>
>> On 3 Jan 2017, at 11:46, Mirimir wrote:
>>
>>> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
>>> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
>>> and to push real traffic through them.
>>
>> Alternately, you need lot
> On 28 Dec 2016, at 02:50, Rana wrote:
>
> Speaking of guards, could someone come with a theory pf what happened here?
> The IP is static, the relay exists for 18 days and has Stable flag since
> maybe 2 weeks, the measured bandwidth -153 KB/s - exactly equals the
> bandwidth limit in torrc
> On 27 Dec 2016, at 03:47, Gage Parrott wrote:
>
> Morning, everyone,
>
> I recently migrated my bridge relay over to a VM and everything seems to be
> working fine except for one oddity. I consistently see lines like this in
> tor's log file on the new machine:
>
> Dec 25 23:48:14.000 [no
To recap, we are talking about
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/707A9A3358E0D8653089AF32A097570A96400C
C6
Thanks but your explanation does not seem to apply here. The measured BW is
equal to the limit and has been the same rock solid number (153.6 KB/s) for
weeks. As you see on the graph, the
> On 24 Dec 2016, at 18:56, Rana wrote:
>
> ...
>
> What is needed is a standardized feedback on WHY the relay has such a low
> rating. This could cause at least part of the operators to take care of the
> bottleneck (eg moving the relay to another location, or abandoning the home
> relay an
@teor
>I think you are talking about a different network, which is not Tor as
currently designed, implemented, and deployed.
>In particular, how do you get decent throughput, reliability, and low-
latency out of tens of thousands of devices?
>This is an open research problem, which the Tor design d
> On 3 Jan 2017, at 17:21, Rana wrote:
>
> To recap, we are talking about
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/707A9A3358E0D8653089AF32A097570A96400C
> C6
>
> Thanks but your explanation does not seem to apply here. The measured BW is
> equal to the limit and has been the same rock solid num
@teor
I hereby volunteer to maintain a FAQ for operators of small relays (or noob
operators). Which means I would be watching this list, generating the Q&A
and from time to time alerting this list to the appearance of new questions
and answers, to allow knowledgeable people to do quality control. A
> On 22 Dec 2016, at 18:19, balbea16 wrote:
>
> Hi There,
> I only have a dynamic IP address and my ISP changes it almost every time
> after 24 hours. It is somehow sad to see 1.400 connections drop to almost
> none. After the change it takes 20 minutes until my OR notices this (our IP
> Addr
28 matches
Mail list logo
