Explicitly restricting the discard behavior to the management VNI takes
care of my concern.
Thank you,
Joel
On 10/31/2019 11:48 AM, Greg Mirsky wrote:
Hi Jeff,
thank you for the detailed clarification of your questions. Please find
my follow-up notes in-lined tagged GIM2>>.
Regards,
Greg
On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 2:14 PM Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org
<mailto:jh...@pfrc.org>> wrote:
Greg,
On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 01:58:30PM -0700, Greg Mirsky wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 1:27 PM Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org
<mailto:jh...@pfrc.org>> wrote:
>
> > Greg,
> >
> > From the updated text:
> >
> > "At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used
between the
> > tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault
management. In
> > such case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are
> > indistinguishable from data packets. If end-to-end defect
detection is
> > realized as the set of concatenated OAM domains, e.g., VM1-1 -
IP1 --
> > IP2 - VM2-1, then the BFD session over VXLAN between VTEPs SHOULD
> > follow the procedures described in Section 6.8.17 [RFC5880]."
> >
> > In the case that two VMs are running BFD to each other as a user
> > application
> > rather than as part of the virtualized environment, it's
unlikely that
> > they'd be treated as concatenated domains. To do so, the
tenant VMs would
> > have to have a sense that they are indeed virtual.
> >
> > Is your intent in this text that BFD implementations on the
server should
> > detect BFD sessions between servers and change them to a
concatenated
> > session?
> >
> GIM>> No, we do not suggest that the concatenation of BFD sessions be
> automagical. That may be controlled via the management plane though.
Then my suggestion is we may not want this text.
It's fine to say "if tenants want to run BFD to each other, and that is
standard BFD (RFC 5881) from the perspective of those tenants" if that's
your intent. Leave automagic out of the spec. :-)
GIM2>> I'd take the passage referring to the concatenated path out. That
will leave it as:
At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used between the
tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault management.
In such case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are
indistinguishable from data packets.
> > Section 5 comment:
> >
> > : The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet
MUST be
> > : validated to determine if the received packet can be
processed by
> > : BFD. BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address MUST NOT be
> > : forwarded to VMs.
> >
> > I'd suggest pushing the second sentence into the prior section
since it
> > deals with MAC addresses rather than the UDP procedures.
> >
> GIM>> Could you please clarify your suggestion - move to Section
4 or to
> the preceding paragraph? I think it is the latter but wanted to
make sure.
Full section 5 from your draft-8 candidate:
: 5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel
:
: Once a packet is received, the VTEP MUST validate the packet.
If the
: Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame matches one of the MAC
: addresses associated with the VTEP the packet MUST be processed
: further. If the Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame
doesn't
: match any of VTEP's MAC addresses, then the processing of the
: received VXLAN packet MUST follow the procedures described in
: Section 4.1 [RFC7348].
It's not clear what that procedure is, with respect to BFD. Section 4.1
basically says is that when a mapping is discovered, deliver it to
that VM
with headers removed.
Section 4.1 really doesn't discuss dropping behavior.
:
: The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be
: validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by
: BFD.
This is fine.
: BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address MUST NOT be
: forwarded to VMs.
This appears to be clarifying the missing point in the prior
paragraph. If
that's the case, why is this sentence not part of the prior paragraph?
GIM>> So I thought. Moving the sentence to the first paragraph
highlighted the contradiction others had pointed earlier:
On the one hand:
If the Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame doesn't
match any of VTEP's MAC addresses, then the processing of the
received VXLAN packet MUST follow the procedures described in
Section 4.1 [RFC7348].
To which we add:
BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address
MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.
But the unknown MACs are treated as BUM according to the last paragraph
in Section 4.2 of RFC 7348:
Note that multicast frames and "unknown MAC destination" frames are
also sent using the multicast tree, similar to the broadcast frames.
In light of that, can this draft require that BFD packets with unknown
MAC be dropped and not flooded over the corresponding to the VNI domain?
I think that in addition to moving the sentence up the statement must be
updated:
OLD TEXT:
BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address
MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.
NEW TEXT:
If the BFD session is using the Management VNI (Section 6),
BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address
MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.
Comments? Suggestions?
-- Jeff
