Thank you, Ben,
I think that the last sentence in the following proposed text for the second
paragraph of the security section could attend your second discuss point:
Depending on local policies, some elements, or, most likely, the whole deposit
will be considered confidential. As such, the parties SHOULD take all the
necessary precautions such as encrypting the data at rest and in transit to
avoid inadvertent disclosure of private data. Regardless of the precautions
taken by the parties regarding data at rest and in transit, authentication
credentials MUST NOT be escrowed.
If you agree that this covers your feedback, I will include it in the next
version of the draft.
Regards,
Gustavo
On 5/21/20, 15:07, "Benjamin Kaduk" <ka...@mit.edu> wrote:
Hi Gustavo,
Thanks for the updates!
I think the mention of the ICANN base agreement in the introduction serves
to give some examples of well-reviewed procedures for escrow, and is enough
to resolve my first discuss point.
I don't see a whole lot that looks relevant to my second point about
(potential) escrow of authentication credentials, though. If I remember
correctly we discussed that the intent was for those to not be included in
the escrow dumps, but I don't remember whether we talked about putting any
clarifying text in the document.
Thanks,
Ben
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 06:45:38PM +0000, Gustavo Lozano wrote:
> Hi Benjamin,
>
> I think that the latest version of the draft covers your feedback.
>
> Here are the differences between 07 and 08, and 08 and 09:
>
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_rfcdiff-3Furl2-3Ddraft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddata-2Descrow-2D08.txt&d=DwIDaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=VDCiJAnAswUQ4avJ55sPxmYR4hLKtN9JoiudmZhps0M&s=ilArbwqLMrfNyTwmcvU6fk9KseAXlQKxRccN-kUQhOo&e=
>
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_rfcdiff-3Furl2-3Ddraft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddata-2Descrow-2D09.txt&d=DwIDaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=VDCiJAnAswUQ4avJ55sPxmYR4hLKtN9JoiudmZhps0M&s=iNhLzs77vPa3t0ibX42lkY967mU9pwYMkPEIU1slI1U&e=
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Thank you,
> Gustavo
>
> On 4/20/20, 18:05, "Benjamin Kaduk" <ka...@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi Gustavo,
>
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 10:26:40PM +0000, Gustavo Lozano wrote:
> > Thank you, Benjamin,
> >
> > Comments inline, prefixed with GL -.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Gustavo
> >
> > On 4/8/20, 09:01, "Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker"
<nore...@ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-regext-data-escrow-07: Discuss
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
to all
> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
cut this
> > introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_iesg_statement_discuss-2Dcriteria.html&d=DwICaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=XLPt-K5FLKU1oce9PiZyutUV1_UJqbd348-sDIlLCD8&s=9EVCPSTvj9RgWF9Z3e7HBLsbaPg6R2CPwDhbFPM8sEM&e=
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found
here:
> >
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddata-2Descrow_&d=DwICaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=XLPt-K5FLKU1oce9PiZyutUV1_UJqbd348-sDIlLCD8&s=Avsh9DG_m3aLijuq_I7ulh5IMkYG78XIOq1Puctc2ZU&e=
> >
> >
> >
> >
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > DISCUSS:
> >
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Let's have a discussion about the overall plans for providing
guidance
> > on mechanisms for (e.g.) cryptographic confidentiality and
integrity
> > protection of data both in transit and at-rest,
> > authentication/authorization requirements, etc.. In
particular, what
> > it's appropriate and necessary to include in this document vs.
other
> > documents, and how to provide some specific general baseline
guidance
> > that can be used in the absence of conflictinc scenario-specific
> > deployment requirements. Some further details in the COMMENT
section,
> > but in general, it seems like there should be some
"off-the-shelf"
> > mechanism that can be used without a need for every deployment
to do a
> > custom thing, for cases where there are not custom
requirements. It may
> > not need to be part of this document, but we should have a plan
for
> > where it will be.
> >
> > Also, it's not clear to me whether we expect escrow of
> > credentials/verifiers used to authenticate/authorize fourth
parties that
> > perform operations (e.g., registrations) at the registry (see
comment on
> > Section 3), and that is pretty important for knowing what
security
> > requirements to place on the escrow'd data.
> >
> >
> > GL -
> >
> > I interpret your message:
> >
> > A new draft could provide the guidelines to implement an escrow
service that requires strong security controls.
> >
> > In the gTLD space, the legal agreements and processes (e.g.
accreditation, etc.) that govern escrow services make the need for this new
draft low priority. However, other parties (e.g., ccTLDs) interested in
implementing an escrow service could benefit from such a document.
>
> Maybe we could keep a reference to (e.g.) "Specification 2" of the
ICANN
> base registry agreement outside of the Implementation Status section
(that
> will be removed upon pulbication), to give readers a sense for what
kind of
> prior art there is.
>
> > If the IESG does not object to this idea, probably the current
security section in the draft could work with a few tweaks.
>
> I do not see a reason why someone would object. (I assume that the
> "tweaks" would include things like specifying to use TLS 1.3 or
something
> specific in order to meet the various checking requirements.)
>
>
> That said, my main question in the first paragraph here was to get a
sense
> for what has already been done and what plans there are for future
work.
> Given the existence of ICANN's document and a potential plan to write
our
> own generic document, I don't feel a strong need to put specific
> protocol/mechanism guidance in this document, provided that we can
refer to
> one or both of the aforementioned items (whether as "WIP" or
otherwise).
>
> >
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> >
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > I agree with Roman that the link to the charter is tenuous;
perhaps this
> > is a "data format for files exchanged between registration
entities that
> > needs extraction from EPP or RDAP", but it's not a perfect fit.
> >
> > Section 1
> >
> > The goal of data escrow is higher resiliency of registration
> > services, for the benefit of Internet users. The
beneficiaries of a
> > registry are not just those registering information there,
but all
> > relying parties that need to identify the owners of objects.
> >
> > Only relying parties that need to identify *owners*
specifically (as
> > opposed to consuming other registered data)?
> >
> > GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you
agree?
> >
> > The goal of data escrow is higher resiliency of registration
services, for the benefit of Internet users. The beneficiaries of a registry
are not just those registering information there, but also the users of
services relying on the registry data.
>
> I agree, thanks.
>
> > In the context of domain name registries, registration data
escrow is
> > a requirement for generic top-level domains and some country
code
> > top-level domain managers are also currently escrowing data.
There
> > is also a similar requirement for ICANN-accredited domain
registrars.
> >
> > Are there easy references for these requirements being
requirements?
> >
> > GL - I understand your comment: adding the documents where the
requirements for escrow are defined for gTLDs as informative references in the
draft. Am I correct?
>
> Yes. (I guess I should have read this part before I wrote above
about the
> ICANN stuff.)
>
> > Section 2
> >
> > Watermark. If the Timeline Watermark of an Incremental
Deposit were
> > to cover the Timeline Watermark of another (Incremental or
> > Differential) Deposit since the last Full Deposit, the more
recent
> > deposit MUST contain all the transactions of the earlier
deposit.
> >
> > Do we define what it means for one Timeline Watermark to
"cover" another?
> >
> > GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you
agree?
> >
> > If the Timeline Watermark of an Incremental Deposit were to cover
(i.e., one or more Incremental or Differential deposits exist for the period
between the Timeline Watermark of a Full and an Incremental or Differential
Deposit) the Timeline Watermark of another Incremental or Differential Deposit
since the last Full Deposit, the more recent deposit MUST contain all the
transactions of the earlier deposit.
>
> That should work, yes.
>
> > Section 3
> >
> > Specifications covering the objects used by registration
> > organizations shall identify the format and contents of the
deposits
> > a registry has to make, such that a different registry would
be able
> > to rebuild the registration services of the former, without
its help,
> > in a timely manner, with minimum disruption to its users.
> >
> > Rebuilding registration *services* as opposed to just
*operation* sounds
> > like it will require also escrowing credentials/credential
verifiers
> > used to authenticate to the registration organization in order
to make
> > use of such services.
> >
> > GL - Not necessarily. For example, in the case of a domain
Registry, a domain Registrar could re-set the credential verifier.
> >
> > Such credentials would of course need very
> > careful protection both in transit and at rest, in order to
avoid
> > compromising the integrity of the primary operations of the
current
> > registration organization.
> >
> > GL - Correct, escrowing of credentials/credential verifiers require
strong security controls. See my suggestion at the DISCUSS section of this
email.
>
> Okay, it seems like we are in agreement :)
>
> > Given the requirement for confidentiality and the importance
of
> > accuracy of the information that is handled in order to offer
> > registration services, parties using this specification
shall define
> > confidentiality and integrity mechanisms for handling the
> > registration data.
> >
> > Do we have any recommendations/examples of such mechanisms in
the
> > pipeline?
> >
> > GL - Not that I am aware of.
> >
> > Specifications covering the objects used by registration
> > organizations shall not include in the specification
transient
> > objects that can be recreated by the new registry,
particularly those
> > of delicate confidentiality, e.g., DNSSEC KSK/ZSK private
keys.
> >
> > I'm not sure this is going to be terribly helpful guidance for
> > non-domain-name data. I am acutely aware that cryptographic
(symmetric
> > and/or private) keys are not the only type of data that this
could apply
> > to, but it is the only type that I know of a concise/precise
description
> > for. E.g., "cryptographic key material that is vital to the
integerity
> > and/or security of operation of the registry and the systems
that rely
> > on it but that is not vital to the continuity of operations
(e.g.,
> > DNSSEC KSK/ZSK private keys)".
> >
> > Also, I would assume that the authenticatoin credentials I
mention above
> > would not qualify for this requirement, since they are not
things that
> > can be recreated by the new registry.
> >
> > Details that are a matter of policy should be identified as
such for
> > the benefit of the implementers.
> >
> > (For human consumption or machine consumption?)
> >
> > GL - Both. For example, in draft-ietf-regext-dnrd-objects-mapping,
there is an object to specify aspects of policy for machine consumption.
>
> Ah, thanks for the pointer.
>
> > Section 4
> >
> > Could we maybe use the section title "Conventions Used in This
> > Document"? "General Conventions" could be interpreted as
intended for a
> > broader scope, though based on (e.g.) RFC 8748 I don't think
that's the
> > intent.
> >
> > GL - Agree, changed the title to "Conventions Used in This
Document" in the new version of the draft.
> >
> > Section 5
> >
> > registry. The deposits are represented in XML. Only the
format of
> > the objects deposited is defined, nothing is prescribed
about the
> > method used to transfer such deposits between the registry
and the
> > escrow agent or vice versa.
> >
> > nit: comma splice.
> >
> > GL - Fixed in new version of the draft.
> >
> > Also, we said earlier that "parties using this specification
shall
> > define confidentiality and integrity mechanisms for handling the
> > registration data" without, AFAICT, conditions on when that
should be
> > done. So in some sense we do prescribe properties of the
method used
> > for transfer, if I'm reading that correctly.
> >
> > GL - The sentence on section 5 is about not prescribing the
transport mechanism.
> >
> > Section 5.1.1
> >
> > A REQUIRED <watermark> element contains the data-time
corresponding
> > to the Timeline Watermark of the deposit.
> >
> > I will offer a third opinion, that this was meant to be
dateTime.
> >
> > GL - Correct, changed to date-time in the new version of the draft.
> >
> > Section 5.1.2
> >
> > I'm confused about the relationship between the <objURI>
elements in the
> > <rdeMenu> and the objects in the <deletes> and <contents>
elements -- is
> > <rdeMenu> just a list of "here are all objects that this update
> > touchers", with the details in the other sections?
> >
> > GL - Correct. You may want to take a look at the examples in
draft-ietf-regext-dnrd-objects-mapping for further clarity.
>
> Ah, that does look helpful, thanks. Is there a way we could
reference that
> document from this one as an example application?
>
> > Section 5.1.4
> >
> > If an object is present in the <contents> section of several
deposits
> > (e.g. Full and Differential) the registry data from the
latest
> > deposit (as defined by the Timeline Watermark) SHOULD be
used when
> > rebuilding the registry.
> >
> > Why is this not a MUST?
> >
> > GL - To cover the case when the more recent differential deposit is
deemed to be invalid, and a previous differential deposit needs to be used for
rebuilding a registry.
> >
> > Section 6.1
> >
> > Why is there a 13-character maximum for the deposit ID?
> > But client IDs range from 3 to 16 characters (which seems kind
of short
> > as a maximum, especially if a registrar wants to use a domain
name as an
> > identifier)?
> >
> > GL - Inherited from EPP.
>
> I don't have a great sense for how strongly the EPP heritage justifies
> keeping the (artificial) limit, i.e., whether any non-domain-name
usage of
> this mechanism would benefit much from longer identifiers.
>
> > <!-- A RDE version number is a dotted pair of decimal
numbers -->
> > <simpleType name="versionType">
> > <restriction base="token">
> > <pattern value="[1-9]+\.[0-9]+"/>
> > <enumeration value="1.0"/>
> > </restriction>
> > </simpleType>
> >
> > I assume the <pattern> is there to give the overall structure
that
> > subsequently defined <enumeration>s will adhere to?
> >
> > GL - Correct.
> >
> > I see the rrType defined but not used anywhere; is it still
needed in
> > this document?
> >
> > GL- The element is used in
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddnrd-2Dobjects-2Dmapping&d=DwIDaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=8HUUPMzc75s9UE1V5gfdMVutMywATqGNU1WgLrT_Zqo&s=iYw77kgL26humLs0O00-I6G-NTOlGIOk2iBivV7qWoI&e=
. The element is in the schema for backward compatibility. There is a comment
in the schema explaining that these are auxiliary elements.
>
> What prevents moving the definition to that other document?
>
> > Section 10
> >
> > Authentication of the parties passing data escrow deposit
files is
> > also of the utmost importance. The escrow agent SHOULD
properly
> > authenticate the identity of the registry before accepting
data
> > escrow deposits. In a similar manner, the registry SHOULD
> > authenticate the identity of the escrow agent before
submitting any
> > data.
> >
> > I am failing to come up with a scenario in which these SHOULDs
would be
> > violated; should they be MUSTs instead? (I'd like for the
"encrypting
> > the data" in the previous paragraph to be a MUST as well, but
that case
> > is less clear-cut.)
> >
> > GL - I will change the authentication SHOULDs to MUSTs in the new
version of the draft.
> >
> > Additionally, the registry and the escrow agent SHOULD use
integrity
> > checking mechanisms to ensure the data transmitted is what
the source
> > intended. Validation of the contents by the escrow agent is
> >
> > It seems like if there are no integrity checks then the escrow
mechanism
> > is not really fit for purpose -- can't this be MUST?
> >
> > GL - Sounds good, I will change this to a MUST.
> >
> > Section 11
> >
> > This specification defines a format that may be used to
escrow
> > personal data. The process of data escrow is governed by a
legal
> > document agreed by the parties, and such legal document must
regulate
> > the particularities regarding the protection of personal
data.
> >
> > "Regulate the particularities" is an interesting phrase, as it
merely
> > specifies that some restrictions be made, but nothing about the
nature
> > of them. Shouldn't we be saying something like "ensure that
> > privacy-sensitive and/or personal data receives appropriate
protection"?
> >
> > GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you
agree?
> >
> > This specification defines a format that may be used to escrow
personal data. The process of data escrow is governed by a legal document
agreed by the parties, and such legal document must ensure that
privacy-sensitive and/or personal data receives the required protection.
>
> Yes, thanks!
>
> > Section 14, 15, 16
> >
> > Could we not reuse the same deposit-id for different examples?
> > (Also, using 20191017001 with a watermark date of 2019-10-18
> > midnight-UTC is perhaps unnecessary cognitive dissonance.)
> >
> > GL - Agree, I will change this.
> >
> > Is it appropriate to use the urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rdeObj[N]
namespaces
> > in the examples, vs. a dedicated "example" namespace?
> >
> > GL - Agree, I will change this to the example URN namespace.
>
> Thanks for this and all the other clarifications and updates that I
didn't
> specifically respond to!
>
> -Ben
>
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