Hi Benjamin,
I think that the latest version of the draft covers your feedback.
Here are the differences between 07 and 08, and 08 and 09:
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-regext-data-escrow-08.txt
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-regext-data-escrow-09.txt
Thoughts?
Thank you,
Gustavo
On 4/20/20, 18:05, "Benjamin Kaduk" <ka...@mit.edu> wrote:
Hi Gustavo,
On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 10:26:40PM +0000, Gustavo Lozano wrote:
> Thank you, Benjamin,
>
> Comments inline, prefixed with GL -.
>
> Regards,
> Gustavo
>
> On 4/8/20, 09:01, "Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker" <nore...@ietf.org>
wrote:
>
> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-regext-data-escrow-07: Discuss
>
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> Please refer to
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> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
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>
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddata-2Descrow_&d=DwICaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=XLPt-K5FLKU1oce9PiZyutUV1_UJqbd348-sDIlLCD8&s=Avsh9DG_m3aLijuq_I7ulh5IMkYG78XIOq1Puctc2ZU&e=
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Let's have a discussion about the overall plans for providing guidance
> on mechanisms for (e.g.) cryptographic confidentiality and integrity
> protection of data both in transit and at-rest,
> authentication/authorization requirements, etc.. In particular, what
> it's appropriate and necessary to include in this document vs. other
> documents, and how to provide some specific general baseline guidance
> that can be used in the absence of conflictinc scenario-specific
> deployment requirements. Some further details in the COMMENT section,
> but in general, it seems like there should be some "off-the-shelf"
> mechanism that can be used without a need for every deployment to do a
> custom thing, for cases where there are not custom requirements. It
may
> not need to be part of this document, but we should have a plan for
> where it will be.
>
> Also, it's not clear to me whether we expect escrow of
> credentials/verifiers used to authenticate/authorize fourth parties
that
> perform operations (e.g., registrations) at the registry (see comment
on
> Section 3), and that is pretty important for knowing what security
> requirements to place on the escrow'd data.
>
>
> GL -
>
> I interpret your message:
>
> A new draft could provide the guidelines to implement an escrow service
that requires strong security controls.
>
> In the gTLD space, the legal agreements and processes (e.g.
accreditation, etc.) that govern escrow services make the need for this new
draft low priority. However, other parties (e.g., ccTLDs) interested in
implementing an escrow service could benefit from such a document.
Maybe we could keep a reference to (e.g.) "Specification 2" of the ICANN
base registry agreement outside of the Implementation Status section (that
will be removed upon pulbication), to give readers a sense for what kind of
prior art there is.
> If the IESG does not object to this idea, probably the current security
section in the draft could work with a few tweaks.
I do not see a reason why someone would object. (I assume that the
"tweaks" would include things like specifying to use TLS 1.3 or something
specific in order to meet the various checking requirements.)
That said, my main question in the first paragraph here was to get a sense
for what has already been done and what plans there are for future work.
Given the existence of ICANN's document and a potential plan to write our
own generic document, I don't feel a strong need to put specific
protocol/mechanism guidance in this document, provided that we can refer to
one or both of the aforementioned items (whether as "WIP" or otherwise).
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I agree with Roman that the link to the charter is tenuous; perhaps
this
> is a "data format for files exchanged between registration entities
that
> needs extraction from EPP or RDAP", but it's not a perfect fit.
>
> Section 1
>
> The goal of data escrow is higher resiliency of registration
> services, for the benefit of Internet users. The beneficiaries of
a
> registry are not just those registering information there, but all
> relying parties that need to identify the owners of objects.
>
> Only relying parties that need to identify *owners* specifically (as
> opposed to consuming other registered data)?
>
> GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you agree?
>
> The goal of data escrow is higher resiliency of registration services,
for the benefit of Internet users. The beneficiaries of a registry are not
just those registering information there, but also the users of services
relying on the registry data.
I agree, thanks.
> In the context of domain name registries, registration data escrow
is
> a requirement for generic top-level domains and some country code
> top-level domain managers are also currently escrowing data. There
> is also a similar requirement for ICANN-accredited domain
registrars.
>
> Are there easy references for these requirements being requirements?
>
> GL - I understand your comment: adding the documents where the
requirements for escrow are defined for gTLDs as informative references in the
draft. Am I correct?
Yes. (I guess I should have read this part before I wrote above about the
ICANN stuff.)
> Section 2
>
> Watermark. If the Timeline Watermark of an Incremental Deposit
were
> to cover the Timeline Watermark of another (Incremental or
> Differential) Deposit since the last Full Deposit, the more recent
> deposit MUST contain all the transactions of the earlier deposit.
>
> Do we define what it means for one Timeline Watermark to "cover"
another?
>
> GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you agree?
>
> If the Timeline Watermark of an Incremental Deposit were to cover (i.e.,
one or more Incremental or Differential deposits exist for the period between
the Timeline Watermark of a Full and an Incremental or Differential Deposit)
the Timeline Watermark of another Incremental or Differential Deposit since the
last Full Deposit, the more recent deposit MUST contain all the transactions of
the earlier deposit.
That should work, yes.
> Section 3
>
> Specifications covering the objects used by registration
> organizations shall identify the format and contents of the
deposits
> a registry has to make, such that a different registry would be
able
> to rebuild the registration services of the former, without its
help,
> in a timely manner, with minimum disruption to its users.
>
> Rebuilding registration *services* as opposed to just *operation*
sounds
> like it will require also escrowing credentials/credential verifiers
> used to authenticate to the registration organization in order to make
> use of such services.
>
> GL - Not necessarily. For example, in the case of a domain Registry, a
domain Registrar could re-set the credential verifier.
>
> Such credentials would of course need very
> careful protection both in transit and at rest, in order to avoid
> compromising the integrity of the primary operations of the current
> registration organization.
>
> GL - Correct, escrowing of credentials/credential verifiers require
strong security controls. See my suggestion at the DISCUSS section of this
email.
Okay, it seems like we are in agreement :)
> Given the requirement for confidentiality and the importance of
> accuracy of the information that is handled in order to offer
> registration services, parties using this specification shall
define
> confidentiality and integrity mechanisms for handling the
> registration data.
>
> Do we have any recommendations/examples of such mechanisms in the
> pipeline?
>
> GL - Not that I am aware of.
>
> Specifications covering the objects used by registration
> organizations shall not include in the specification transient
> objects that can be recreated by the new registry, particularly
those
> of delicate confidentiality, e.g., DNSSEC KSK/ZSK private keys.
>
> I'm not sure this is going to be terribly helpful guidance for
> non-domain-name data. I am acutely aware that cryptographic
(symmetric
> and/or private) keys are not the only type of data that this could
apply
> to, but it is the only type that I know of a concise/precise
description
> for. E.g., "cryptographic key material that is vital to the
integerity
> and/or security of operation of the registry and the systems that rely
> on it but that is not vital to the continuity of operations (e.g.,
> DNSSEC KSK/ZSK private keys)".
>
> Also, I would assume that the authenticatoin credentials I mention
above
> would not qualify for this requirement, since they are not things that
> can be recreated by the new registry.
>
> Details that are a matter of policy should be identified as such
for
> the benefit of the implementers.
>
> (For human consumption or machine consumption?)
>
> GL - Both. For example, in draft-ietf-regext-dnrd-objects-mapping, there
is an object to specify aspects of policy for machine consumption.
Ah, thanks for the pointer.
> Section 4
>
> Could we maybe use the section title "Conventions Used in This
> Document"? "General Conventions" could be interpreted as intended
for a
> broader scope, though based on (e.g.) RFC 8748 I don't think that's
the
> intent.
>
> GL - Agree, changed the title to "Conventions Used in This Document" in
the new version of the draft.
>
> Section 5
>
> registry. The deposits are represented in XML. Only the format of
> the objects deposited is defined, nothing is prescribed about the
> method used to transfer such deposits between the registry and the
> escrow agent or vice versa.
>
> nit: comma splice.
>
> GL - Fixed in new version of the draft.
>
> Also, we said earlier that "parties using this specification shall
> define confidentiality and integrity mechanisms for handling the
> registration data" without, AFAICT, conditions on when that should be
> done. So in some sense we do prescribe properties of the method used
> for transfer, if I'm reading that correctly.
>
> GL - The sentence on section 5 is about not prescribing the transport
mechanism.
>
> Section 5.1.1
>
> A REQUIRED <watermark> element contains the data-time corresponding
> to the Timeline Watermark of the deposit.
>
> I will offer a third opinion, that this was meant to be dateTime.
>
> GL - Correct, changed to date-time in the new version of the draft.
>
> Section 5.1.2
>
> I'm confused about the relationship between the <objURI> elements in
the
> <rdeMenu> and the objects in the <deletes> and <contents> elements --
is
> <rdeMenu> just a list of "here are all objects that this update
> touchers", with the details in the other sections?
>
> GL - Correct. You may want to take a look at the examples in
draft-ietf-regext-dnrd-objects-mapping for further clarity.
Ah, that does look helpful, thanks. Is there a way we could reference that
document from this one as an example application?
> Section 5.1.4
>
> If an object is present in the <contents> section of several
deposits
> (e.g. Full and Differential) the registry data from the latest
> deposit (as defined by the Timeline Watermark) SHOULD be used when
> rebuilding the registry.
>
> Why is this not a MUST?
>
> GL - To cover the case when the more recent differential deposit is
deemed to be invalid, and a previous differential deposit needs to be used for
rebuilding a registry.
>
> Section 6.1
>
> Why is there a 13-character maximum for the deposit ID?
> But client IDs range from 3 to 16 characters (which seems kind of
short
> as a maximum, especially if a registrar wants to use a domain name as
an
> identifier)?
>
> GL - Inherited from EPP.
I don't have a great sense for how strongly the EPP heritage justifies
keeping the (artificial) limit, i.e., whether any non-domain-name usage of
this mechanism would benefit much from longer identifiers.
> <!-- A RDE version number is a dotted pair of decimal numbers -->
> <simpleType name="versionType">
> <restriction base="token">
> <pattern value="[1-9]+\.[0-9]+"/>
> <enumeration value="1.0"/>
> </restriction>
> </simpleType>
>
> I assume the <pattern> is there to give the overall structure that
> subsequently defined <enumeration>s will adhere to?
>
> GL - Correct.
>
> I see the rrType defined but not used anywhere; is it still needed in
> this document?
>
> GL- The element is used in
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dietf-2Dregext-2Ddnrd-2Dobjects-2Dmapping&d=DwIDaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=VbweciUcwYQpIOZDSxl0ezGd1hGDtd-0BvgAgfmwfE0&m=8HUUPMzc75s9UE1V5gfdMVutMywATqGNU1WgLrT_Zqo&s=iYw77kgL26humLs0O00-I6G-NTOlGIOk2iBivV7qWoI&e=
. The element is in the schema for backward compatibility. There is a comment
in the schema explaining that these are auxiliary elements.
What prevents moving the definition to that other document?
> Section 10
>
> Authentication of the parties passing data escrow deposit files is
> also of the utmost importance. The escrow agent SHOULD properly
> authenticate the identity of the registry before accepting data
> escrow deposits. In a similar manner, the registry SHOULD
> authenticate the identity of the escrow agent before submitting any
> data.
>
> I am failing to come up with a scenario in which these SHOULDs would
be
> violated; should they be MUSTs instead? (I'd like for the "encrypting
> the data" in the previous paragraph to be a MUST as well, but that
case
> is less clear-cut.)
>
> GL - I will change the authentication SHOULDs to MUSTs in the new version
of the draft.
>
> Additionally, the registry and the escrow agent SHOULD use
integrity
> checking mechanisms to ensure the data transmitted is what the
source
> intended. Validation of the contents by the escrow agent is
>
> It seems like if there are no integrity checks then the escrow
mechanism
> is not really fit for purpose -- can't this be MUST?
>
> GL - Sounds good, I will change this to a MUST.
>
> Section 11
>
> This specification defines a format that may be used to escrow
> personal data. The process of data escrow is governed by a legal
> document agreed by the parties, and such legal document must
regulate
> the particularities regarding the protection of personal data.
>
> "Regulate the particularities" is an interesting phrase, as it merely
> specifies that some restrictions be made, but nothing about the nature
> of them. Shouldn't we be saying something like "ensure that
> privacy-sensitive and/or personal data receives appropriate
protection"?
>
> GL - I think the following text addresses your comment, do you agree?
>
> This specification defines a format that may be used to escrow personal
data. The process of data escrow is governed by a legal document agreed by the
parties, and such legal document must ensure that privacy-sensitive and/or
personal data receives the required protection.
Yes, thanks!
> Section 14, 15, 16
>
> Could we not reuse the same deposit-id for different examples?
> (Also, using 20191017001 with a watermark date of 2019-10-18
> midnight-UTC is perhaps unnecessary cognitive dissonance.)
>
> GL - Agree, I will change this.
>
> Is it appropriate to use the urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rdeObj[N]
namespaces
> in the examples, vs. a dedicated "example" namespace?
>
> GL - Agree, I will change this to the example URN namespace.
Thanks for this and all the other clarifications and updates that I didn't
specifically respond to!
-Ben
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