(Copying in Stefan since he was looking at DBus for virtiofs) * Marc-André Lureau (marcandre.lur...@redhat.com) wrote: > Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lur...@redhat.com> > --- > docs/interop/dbus.rst | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > docs/interop/index.rst | 1 + > 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 docs/interop/dbus.rst > > diff --git a/docs/interop/dbus.rst b/docs/interop/dbus.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..c08f026edc > --- /dev/null > +++ b/docs/interop/dbus.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ > +===== > +D-Bus > +===== > + > +Introduction > +============ > + > +QEMU may be running with various helper processes involved: > + - vhost-user* processes (gpu, virtfs, input, etc...) > + - TPM emulation (or other devices) > + - user networking (slirp) > + - network services (DHCP/DNS, samba/ftp etc) > + - background tasks (compression, streaming etc) > + - client UI > + - admin & cli > + > +Having several processes allows stricter security rules, as well as > +greater modularity. > + > +While QEMU itself uses QMP as primary IPC (and Spice/VNC for remote > +display), D-Bus is the de facto IPC of choice on Unix systems. The > +wire format is machine friendly, good bindings exist for various > +languages, and there are various tools available. > + > +Using a bus, helper processes can discover and communicate with each > +other easily, without going through QEMU. The bus topology is also > +easier to apprehend and debug than a mesh. However, it is wise to > +consider the security aspects of it. > + > +Security > +======== > + > +A QEMU D-Bus bus should be private to a single VM. Thus, only > +cooperative tasks are running on the same bus to serve the VM. > + > +D-Bus, the protocol and standard, doesn't have mechanisms to enforce > +security between peers once the connection is established. Peers may > +have additional mechanisms to enforce security rules, based for > +example on UNIX credentials. > + > +dbus-daemon can enforce various policies based on the UID/GID of the > +processes that are connected to it. It is thus a good idea to run > +helpers as different UID from QEMU and set appropriate policies (so > +helper processes are only allowed to talk to qemu for example). > + > +For example, this allows only ``qemu`` user to talk to ``qemu-helper`` > +``org.qemu.Helper1`` service: > + > +.. code:: xml > + > + <policy user="qemu"> > + <allow send_destination="org.qemu.Helper1"/> > + <allow receive_sender="org.qemu.Helper1"/> > + </policy> > + > + <policy user="qemu-helper"> > + <allow own="org.qemu.Helper1"/> > + </policy> > + > + > +dbus-daemon can also perfom SELinux checks based on the security > +context of the source and the target. For example, ``virtiofs_t`` > +could be allowed to send a message to ``svirt_t``, but ``virtiofs_t`` > +wouldn't be allowed to send a message to ``virtiofs_t``.
I think we need to start thinking about this more now rather than 'can'. . Dave > +Guidelines > +========== > + > +When implementing new D-Bus interfaces, it is recommended to follow > +the "D-Bus API Design Guidelines": > +https://dbus.freedesktop.org/doc/dbus-api-design.html > + > +The "org.qemu*" prefix is reserved for the QEMU project. > diff --git a/docs/interop/index.rst b/docs/interop/index.rst > index b4bfcab417..fa4478ce2e 100644 > --- a/docs/interop/index.rst > +++ b/docs/interop/index.rst > @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Contents: > :maxdepth: 2 > > bitmaps > + dbus > live-block-operations > pr-helper > vhost-user > -- > 2.23.0 > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilb...@redhat.com / Manchester, UK