On Sun, Jan 08, 2023 at 04:33:08AM -0600, Matthew McGehrin wrote: > The majority of the CBC_SHA ciphers are considered weak and should be > replaced with stronger ciphers.
Are considered weak for use in browsers when either the server or client does not support the "Encrypt then MAC" (EtM) TLS extension. They are in fact more robust that AES GCM in most applications (no reliance on fragile nonce-reuse avoidance), the performance advantage of GCM is not significant in SMTP. > See also: > > https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/159543 > > Recommended ciphers would be: Recommended is to not waste time tweaking the cipherlists, with opportunistic security this is not infrequently counterproductive. -- Viktor.
