Of course, I should also have provided the details of time and location for Nakul Krishna's talk at the Moral Sciences Club. This talk will take place at 2:30pm tomorrow in the Sidgwick Room of Newnham College.
Best, Adam -- Daisy Dixon and Adam Bales Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge [email protected] http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc On 26 October 2015 at 09:18, Moral Sciences Club <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear all, > > Just a reminder that tomorrow at the Moral Sciences Club, Nakul Krishna > will be giving a talk titled *Two Conceptions of Common-Sense Morality*. > > Note that there's a fee to attend MSC meetings. This can either be paid as > a yearly membership (£7.50 for students, £15 for others) or a one-off fee > for a single week's meeting (£2 students, £3 others). These can both be > paid online at > http://onlinesales.admin.cam.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=1&catid=75&prodvarid=87 > (alternatively, > these can be paid in cash on the day). > > We look forward to seeing many of you there. > > Best wishes, > > Adam Bales and Daisy Dixon > > *Abstract* > > The notion of ‘common-sense morality’ has, from the mid-nineteenth century > onward, constituted the naïve backdrop to moral philosophy. Moral > philosophers have standardly construed the aims of ethics in terms of the > interpretation and critique of common-sense morality. In this, they have > adopted a method self-consciously defended by Henry Sidgwick in his > influential book The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick saw himself > practising philosophy in a basically Socratic tradition, working out what > ‘we’ believe and subjecting those beliefs to criticisms in the light of our > other beliefs, and more general theoretical considerations. I shall argue > that Sidgwick’s focus on finding criteria for right and wrong action drew > attention away from two things Socrates acknowledged: that much about our > ethical outlooks is poorly captured in our beliefs, and that our ethical > beliefs (when we have them) are often not beliefs about right and wrong. > Coming to understand the historical contingency of Sidgwick’s approach to > ethics can help us to pose the question of what, if anything, is lost in > conceiving of ethics as Sidgwick did? Are there other ways in which modern > ethics could be Socratic? > -- > Daisy Dixon and Adam Bales > Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club > Faculty of Philosophy > University of Cambridge > [email protected] > http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc > _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
