Dear all,

Just a reminder that tomorrow at the Moral Sciences Club, Nakul Krishna
will be giving a talk titled *Two Conceptions of Common-Sense Morality*.

Note that there's a fee to attend MSC meetings. This can either be paid as
a yearly membership (£7.50 for students, £15 for others) or a one-off fee
for a single week's meeting (£2 students, £3 others). These can both be
paid online at
http://onlinesales.admin.cam.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=1&catid=75&prodvarid=87
(alternatively,
these can be paid in cash on the day).

We look forward to seeing many of you there.

Best wishes,

Adam Bales and Daisy Dixon

*Abstract*

The notion of ‘common-sense morality’ has, from the mid-nineteenth century
onward, constituted the naïve backdrop to moral philosophy. Moral
philosophers have standardly construed the aims of ethics in terms of the
interpretation and critique of common-sense morality. In this, they have
adopted a method self-consciously defended by Henry Sidgwick in his
influential book The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick saw himself
practising philosophy in a basically Socratic tradition, working out what
‘we’ believe and subjecting those beliefs to criticisms in the light of our
other beliefs, and more general theoretical considerations. I shall argue
that Sidgwick’s focus on finding criteria for right and wrong action drew
attention away from two things Socrates acknowledged: that much about our
ethical outlooks is poorly captured in our beliefs, and that our ethical
beliefs (when we have them) are often not beliefs about right and wrong.
Coming to understand the historical contingency of Sidgwick’s approach to
ethics can help us to pose the question of what, if anything, is lost in
conceiving of ethics as Sidgwick did? Are there other ways in which modern
ethics could be Socratic?
--
Daisy Dixon and Adam Bales
Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
[email protected]
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc
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