Just a reminder that Mat Simpson will be speaking at the Serious Metaphysics Group tomorrow, on 'Dispositions and General Beliefs'. We'll meet from 1:00 - 2:30pm, in the Faculty Board Room.
Hope to see you there, Georgie Dispositions and General Beliefs I will defend a theory of general beliefs (beliefs whose content is of the form "Everything is F" and "Something is F") which takes them to be certain kinds of dispositions to have singular beliefs, rather than as representing essentially general facts. Call this the disposition theory. This theory has its roots in Ramsey's paper General Propositions and Causality and has been more recently defended by D.M. Armstrong. However they only discuss beliefs of the form "Everything is F"; I'll develop one way of accounting for beliefs of the form "Something is F". I will defend the disposition theory from several objections, but I'll also argue that it has advantages over other theories of general beliefs. _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
