Just a reminder that tomorrow (Thursday) Cheryl Misak will be speaking at the Serious Metaphysics Group, on 'Ramsey and Wittgenstein on Generalizations and Hypotheses, circa 1929'. An abstract is included below.
We meet from 1:00 - 2:30 in the Faculty Board Room. Cheers, Georgie Abstract In the 1929 “General Propositions and Causality”, Ramsey put forward a pragmatist account of open universal generalizations, causal laws, and conditionals. I have argued elsewhere that he was well on the way to a pragmatist treatment of all beliefs - they are rules with which we meet the future. In this paper, I will suggest that Ramsey's 1929 arguments were responsible for Wittgenstein's rejection of the Tractarian picture. Wittgenstein adopts, circa 1929, Ramsey’s pragmatism about generalizations and hypotheticals. I shall also argue that Wittgenstein then extended Ramsey’s pragmatism to everyday beliefs, in a way that Ramsey would have objected to, had he lived to see it. _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
