We are starting a new reading group, which aims to provide a platform for the interchange of ideas between medieval and contemporary philosophy. The focus of the group is on arguments that have a more or less direct bearing on our interpretation of scientific knowledge. Its premise is that such comparative discussion may nuance our reading of medieval and modern philosophy and also, perhaps, suggest some fresh perspectives on their common concerns.
No expertise in either contemporary or medieval philosophy is presumed. However, it is hoped that those who do have expertise in either subject area will be of assistance to those who do not, enabling a fruitful extension of the discussion beyond the individual readings. We will meet fortnightly on Tuesdays, from 4.00 - 5.30 pm, starting October 14, in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room. In the first term we will be concentrating our attention on 'Structural Realism', an outlook that is increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of science. Very loosely, Structural Realism is a family of interpretations of science that share a common emphasis on the importance of pattern and organisation in (or in our representations of) the external world. On the one hand, the structuralist viewpoint seems to offer hope to a beleaguered scientific realism, suggesting a view of scientific knowledge that is compatible with theory change and does justice to the ever increasing importance of mathematics in science. On the other hand, it is often claimed that Structural Realism is ill-defined, and that its core notion of 'structure' is either vague or incoherent. In Michaelmas we will be comparing issues, raised and confronted by this outlook, with extracts from the writings of Aquinas. In the four sessions of the term we will examine the status of primitive matter, natural form, individuation, and abstraction in the knowledge of nature. Maddie Geddes-Barton (mlg42) John Marenbon (jm258) _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
