Greetings, * Magnus Hagander (mag...@hagander.net) wrote: > On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 8:06 PM Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> wrote: > > * Magnus Hagander (mag...@hagander.net) wrote: > > > On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 7:44 PM Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > > > > BTW, do we have a client-side setting to insist that passwords not be > > > > sent in MD5 hashing either? A person who is paranoid about this would > > > > likely want to disable that code path as well. > > > > > > I don't think we do, and we possibly should. You can require channel > > > binding which will require scram which solves the problem, but it does > > > so only for scram. > > > > > > IIRC we've discussed having a parameter that says "allowed > > > authentication methods" on the client as well, but I don't believe it > > > has been built. But it wouldn't be bad to be able to for example force > > > the client to only attempt gssapi auth, regardless of what the server > > > asks for, and just fail if it's not there. > > > > The client is able to require a GSS encrypted connection, and a savy > > user will realize that they should 'kinit' (or equivilant) locally and > > never provide their password explicitly to the psql (or equivilant) > > command, but that's certainly less than ideal. > > Sure, but even if you do, then if you connect to a server that has gss > support but is configured for password auth, it will perform password > auth.
Right, and that's bad. Think we agree on that. I was just saying that someone who understanding how GSS works wouldn't actually provide their password at that point. Trusting to that is definitely not sufficient though. > > Having a way to explicitly tell libpq what auth methods are acceptable > > was discussed previously and does generally seem like a good idea, as > > otherwise there's a lot of risk of what are essentially downgrade > > attacks. > > That was my point exactly.. Yes, it was my intention to agree with you on this. :) Thanks, Stephen
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