Greetings, * Magnus Hagander (mag...@hagander.net) wrote: > On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 7:44 PM Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > > BTW, do we have a client-side setting to insist that passwords not be > > sent in MD5 hashing either? A person who is paranoid about this would > > likely want to disable that code path as well. > > I don't think we do, and we possibly should. You can require channel > binding which will require scram which solves the problem, but it does > so only for scram. > > IIRC we've discussed having a parameter that says "allowed > authentication methods" on the client as well, but I don't believe it > has been built. But it wouldn't be bad to be able to for example force > the client to only attempt gssapi auth, regardless of what the server > asks for, and just fail if it's not there.
The client is able to require a GSS encrypted connection, and a savy user will realize that they should 'kinit' (or equivilant) locally and never provide their password explicitly to the psql (or equivilant) command, but that's certainly less than ideal. Having a way to explicitly tell libpq what auth methods are acceptable was discussed previously and does generally seem like a good idea, as otherwise there's a lot of risk of what are essentially downgrade attacks. Thanks, Stephen
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature