On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 10:35 AM Robert Haas <robertmh...@gmail.com> wrote: > Maybe I'm missing something here, but why doesn't sslnegotiation > override sslmode completely? Or alternatively, why not remove > sslnegotiation entirely and just have more sslmode values? I mean > maybe this shouldn't happen categorically, but if I say I want to > require a direct SSL connection, to me that implies that I don't want > an indirect SSL connection, and I really don't want a non-SSL > connection.
I think that comes down to the debate upthread, and whether you think it's a performance tweak or a security feature. My take on it is, `direct` mode is performance, and `requiredirect` is security. (Especially since, with the current implementation, requiredirect can slow things down?) > I think it's pretty questionable in 2024 whether sslmode=allow and > sslmode=prefer make any sense at all. I don't think it would be crazy > to remove them entirely. But I certainly don't think that they should > be allowed to bleed into the behavior of new, higher-security > configurations. Surely if I say I want direct SSL, it's that or > nothing, right? I agree, but I more or less lost the battle at [1]. Like Matthias mentioned in [2]: > I'm not sure about this either. The 'gssencmode' option is already > quite weird in that it seems to override the "require"d priority of > "sslmode=require", which it IMO really shouldn't. Thanks, --Jacob [1] https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAOYmi%2B%3DcnV-8V8TndSkEF6Htqa7qHQUL_KnQU8-DrT0Jjnm3_Q%40mail.gmail.com [2] https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAEze2Wi9j5Q3mRnuoD2Hr%3DeOFV-cMzWAUZ88YmSXSwsiJLQOWA%40mail.gmail.com
