Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> writes:
> I've never found a reason to use hostaddr, so I don't particularly care,
> but it doesn't seem right to break Kerberos auth if you were only given
> an IP address unless hostaddr's entire point is that it will prevent a
> DNS lookup from happening, ever.
Well, given your description we *can't* prevent Kerberos auth from doing
a synchronous reverse-DNS lookup. So the question is why did that test
get put in, back in 2005? I have no objection to removing it if that
doesn't lead to crashing, but ...
regards, tom lane
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