On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:40 AM Joe Touch <[email protected]> wrote:
> Take that to the standards wg. Don’t stick your head in the sand and try > to do an end run in ops. And don’t call any of this a security issue that > it isn’t. > > > Joe, I think one of the 3 pillars of security is: "Availability" (the other two are 'Confidentiality' and 'Integrity') I think the point that Nick and Gert are outlining is that if the case is that the hardware available will have no fast-path processing for packets with obtuse patterns or sets of extension headers those packets will get sent to the control-plane (slow-path). That slow-path being congested will cause availability problems. Actually, whether or not the control-plane fails under such load may not even matter, if the rate-limiting of the packets here is such that (as gert said) all but a trickle of the interesting packets are forwarded. A solution might be to have a mode where a router may just ignore all headers except the src/dst-ip and simply forward all packets, trusting that the conversing adults will sort out problems with unknown/new/experimental headers or with a tortured ordering of headers (for instance). This will also cause some operational headaches: "Please drop all traffic toward ipX with protoY and dst-port Z" but perhaps it's still acceptable to some folk to operate like this?
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