I had understood that CentOS 7.1 qemu-kvm has RBD support built-in. It was not there on 7.0 but http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/10480 implies it is in 7.1.
You could check on the centos mailing lists to be sure. Tim From: Cynthia Lopes [mailto:clsacrame...@gmail.com] Sent: 02 June 2015 10:57 To: Sławek Kapłoński Cc: openstack-operators@lists.openstack.org Subject: Re: [Openstack-operators] Venom vulnerability Hi guys, I had to recompile qemu-kvm on CentOS7 to enable RBD and be able to use CEPH. Now, what is the best to update for venom vulnerability? Has anyone already recompiled the patched sources and put it in a repository, or the only way is to get the knew sources and recompile again ? In http://vault.centos.org/ les sources don't seen to have been updated yet, where will I find them to recompile if it is the way to go? Thanks a lot! Regards, Cynthia 2015-05-14 23:45 GMT+02:00 Sławek Kapłoński <sla...@kaplonski.pl<mailto:sla...@kaplonski.pl>>: Hello, Ok, thx for explanations :) Yep, I know that best is to restart qemu process but this makes that I can now sleep littlebit more peacefully :) -- Best regards / Pozdrawiam Sławek Kapłoński sla...@kaplonski.pl<mailto:sla...@kaplonski.pl> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 05:38:56PM -0400, Favyen Bastani wrote: > On 05/14/2015 05:23 PM, Sławek Kapłoński wrote: > > Hello, > > > > So if I understand You correct, it is not so dangeorus if I'm using > > ibvirt with apparmor and this libvirt is adding apparmor rules for > > every qemu process, yes? > > > > > > You should certainly verify that apparmor rules are enabled for the qemu > processes. > > Apparmor reduces the danger of the vulnerability. However, if you are > assuming that virtual machines are untrusted, then you should also > assume that an attacker can execute whatever operations permitted by the > apparmor rules (mostly built based on abstraction usually at > /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt-qemu); so you should check that you have > reasonable limits on those permissions. Best is to restart the processes > by way of live migration or otherwise. > > Best, > Favyen _______________________________________________ OpenStack-operators mailing list OpenStack-operators@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-operators@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-operators
_______________________________________________ OpenStack-operators mailing list OpenStack-operators@lists.openstack.org http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-operators
