We'll be getting together on Monday around 1700 UTC to work through this together in a debug session in #openstack-infra (I'm too sick this weekend, plus we need a time when more infra-root folks with the institutional knowledge are around). On Feb 27, 2016 05:37, "Marton Kiss" <marton.k...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Yeah, the Settings.php was overriden by the latest puppet run. We need to > wait for some infra guys to approve my patches and make it permanent: > https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based auth > https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend > > M. > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:27 PM JP Maxwell <j...@tipit.net> wrote: > >> FYI. Still seeing the mobile view... >> >> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com >> On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.k...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new >>> spam content / user accounts. >>> >>> M. >>> JP Maxwell <j...@tipit.net> (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt >>> írta: >>> >>>> Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should >>>> we clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB? >>>> >>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com >>>> On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.k...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch: >>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend >>>>> >>>>> M. >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss <marton.k...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are >>>>>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad >>>>>> openid auth is not affected at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this: >>>>>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G; >>>>>> *************************** 1. row *************************** >>>>>> user_id: 7494 >>>>>> user_name: CedricJamieson >>>>>> user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson >>>>>> user_password: >>>>>> :pbkdf2:sha256:10000:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY= >>>>>> user_newpassword: >>>>>> user_newpass_time: NULL >>>>>> user_email: balashkina.evdok...@mail.ru >>>>>> user_touched: 20160227052454 >>>>>> user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379 >>>>>> user_email_authenticated: NULL >>>>>> user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320 >>>>>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441 >>>>>> user_registration: 20160227052441 >>>>>> user_editcount: 2 >>>>>> user_password_expires: NULL >>>>>> >>>>>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this >>>>>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty. >>>>>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords: >>>>>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != ''; >>>>>> +----------+ >>>>>> | count(*) | >>>>>> +----------+ >>>>>> | 423 | >>>>>> +----------+ >>>>>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec) >>>>>> >>>>>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary >>>>>> email confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard >>>>>> user login page, as described here: >>>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages >>>>>> >>>>>> And I made this patch to make it permanent: >>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based >>>>>> auth >>>>>> >>>>>> Just for the record, the last spam user account: >>>>>> 7536 | EarthaChester22 >>>>>> >>>>>> Marton >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss <marton.k...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that: >>>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to >>>>>>> wiki.o.o >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Marton >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell <j...@tipit.net> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today. It >>>>>>>> appears the spam continues to flow: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you >>>>>>>> want to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key >>>>>>>> attached). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ssh-rsa >>>>>>>> AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q== >>>>>>>> jpmax...@tipit.net >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur < >>>>>>>> ji...@openstack.org> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last >>>>>>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like >>>>>>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach. Based on the >>>>>>>>> work we did >>>>>>>>> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a >>>>>>>>> patch to >>>>>>>>> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software, >>>>>>>>> not for web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's >>>>>>>>> needed here is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, >>>>>>>>> waiting >>>>>>>>> for a +1, then getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> paste the logs is a pretty time consuming process for what should be a >>>>>>>>> series of rapid-fire changes/fixes on the server. Especially when >>>>>>>>> we're >>>>>>>>> dealign with an active attack. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We can then have somebody look at the logs. I think it is more about >>>>>>>>> scheduling >>>>>>>>> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle >>>>>>>>> last night >>>>>>>>> and today. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or >>>>>>>>> more). Tom Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> through another week and no closer to stemming the flow. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the >>>>>>>>> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this >>>>>>>>> from a >>>>>>>>> web development perspective instead of a software development >>>>>>>>> perspective. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Jimmy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Last email from me, just on a plane. Will follow up when I land. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com >>>>>>>>> [http://www.fibercove.com] >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger >>>>>>>>> <pabelan...@redhat.com> <pabelan...@redhat.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest >>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root >>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2 >>>>>>>>> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same >>>>>>>>> thing, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really >>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> way >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it >>>>>>>>> shouldn't be >>>>>>>>> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please >>>>>>>>> elaborate. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki >>>>>>>>> manually, >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be >>>>>>>>> working >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> changes into -infra workflow in parallel. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra >>>>>>>>> machines, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a >>>>>>>>> place >>>>>>>>> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to >>>>>>>>> set >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> credentials with varying levels of access. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't >>>>>>>>> require >>>>>>>>> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose >>>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes >>>>>>>>> are, >>>>>>>>> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki >>>>>>>>> if we >>>>>>>>> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Jimmy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> extension, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers >>>>>>>>> crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> see >>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to >>>>>>>>> test >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> against. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com >>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"<j...@tipit.net> >>>>>>>>> <j...@tipit.net> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> working on production because the spam either stops or not. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com >>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelan...@redhat.com> >>>>>>>>> <pabelan...@redhat.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I really think you might consider the option that there is a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> vulnerability >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ongoing wild goose chase. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy >>>>>>>>> question impossible and see if the spam continues. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be >>>>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> dev >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> instance for us to work on, rather then production. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com >>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelan...@redhat.com> >>>>>>>>> <pabelan...@redhat.com> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley<fu...@yuggoth.org> >>>>>>>>> <fu...@yuggoth.org> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile >>>>>>>>> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for >>>>>>>>> JpMaxMan. Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you >>>>>>>>> were aware. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> fact >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We >>>>>>>>> probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it >>>>>>>>> bypasses OpenID authentication entirely. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> issue. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Otherwise, quick update here: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to >>>>>>>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We are >>>>>>>>> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> impossible >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion. So, either our captcha >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is too >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> easy, or we didn't set it up properly. I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> others >>>>>>>>> will have to check logs. I did test new pages and edits, and was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> promoted >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> captcha. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> configuration >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> blacklist IPs. I am reading up on that now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listopenstack-in...@lists.openstack.org >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listopenstack-in...@lists.openstack.org >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing >>>>>>>>> listOpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing >>>>>>>>> listOpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing >>>>>>>>> listOpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing list >>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.org >>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> > _______________________________________________ > OpenStack-Infra mailing list > OpenStack-Infra@lists.openstack.org > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra > >
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