We're aiming for a Spec "Proposal" Freeze deadline for Liberty of June 23rd, but are requiring that specs are approved by our spec reviewers by that date. The spec [1] is currently pretty straightforward and provides us several benefits, so I don't expect it to be a complicated process, but is currently pending a revision from myself. I'm confident in Liberty at this point.
[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/ On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 10:35 AM, John Wood <john.w...@rackspace.com> wrote: > Hello folks, > > Thanks for the consideration of this feature. Does it seem realistic for > a Liberty release of Keystone middleware to expose X-Group-Ids, or would > this be an M and beyond sort of thing? > > Thanks, > John > > > From: Henry Nash <henryna...@mac.com> > Reply-To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" < > openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org> > Date: Friday, June 5, 2015 at 12:49 PM > > To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" < > openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org> > Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > The one proviso is that in single LDAP situations, the cloud provider > can chose (for backward compatibility reasons) to allow the underlying LDAP > user/group ID….so we might want to advise this to be disabled (there’s a > config switch to use the Public ID mapping for even this case). > > Henry > > On 5 Jun 2015, at 18:19, Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Henry Nash <henry.n...@uk.ibm.com> wrote: > >> So I think that GroupID's are actually unique and safe....since in the >> multi LDAP case we provide an indirection already in Keystone and issue a >> "Public ID" (this is true for bother users and groups), that we map to the >> underlying local ID in the particular LDAP backend. > > > Oh, awesome! I didn't realize we did that for groups as well. So then, > we're safe exposing X-Group-Ids to services via > keystonemiddleware.auth_token but still not X-Group-Names (in any trivial > form). > > >> >> >> Henry >> >> >> From: Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com> To: "OpenStack >> Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" < >> openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>, Henry Nash <hen...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, >> Henry Nash/UK/IBM@IBMGB Date: 05/06/2015 15:38 Subject: Re: >> [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing X-Group-xxxx in >> token validation >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 10:17 PM, John Wood <*john.w...@rackspace.com* >> <john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: >> Hello folks, >> >> Regarding option C, if group IDs are unique within a given cloud/context, >> and these are discoverable by clients that can then set the ACL on a secret >> in Barbican, then that seems like a viable option to me. As it is now, the >> user information provided to the ACL is the user ID information as found in >> X-User-Ids now, not user names. >> >> To Kevin’s point though, are these group IDs unique across domains now, >> or in the future? If not the more complex tuples suggested could be used, >> but seem more error prone to configure on an ACL. >> >> Well, that's a good question, because that depends on the backend, and >> our backend architecture has recently gotten very complicated in this area. >> >> If groups are backed by SQL, then they're going to be globally unique >> UUIDs, so the answer is always yes. >> >> If they're backed by LDAP, then actually it depends on LDAP, but the >> answer should be yes. >> >> But the nightmare scenario we now support is domain-specific identity >> drivers, where each domain can actually be configured to talk to a >> different LDAP server. In that case, I don't think you can make any >> guarantees about group ID uniqueness :( Instead, each domain could provide >> whatever IDs it wants, and those might conflict with those of other >> domains. We have a workaround for a similar issue with user IDs, but it >> hasn't been applied to groups, leaving them quite broken in this scenario. >> I'd consider this to be an issue we need to solve in Keystone, though, not >> something other projects need to worry about. I'm hoping Henry Nash can >> chime in and correct me! >> >> >> Thanks, >> John >> >> *From: *<Fox>, Kevin M <*kevin....@pnnl.gov* <kevin....@pnnl.gov>> >> * Reply-To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage >> questions)" <*openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* >> <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> >> * Date: *Thursday, June 4, 2015 at 6:01 PM >> * To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" < >> *openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> >> >> * Subject: *Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing >> X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> >> In Juno I tried adding a user in Domain A to group in Domain B. That >> currently is not supported. Would be very handy though. >> >> We're getting a ways from the original part of the thread, so I may have >> lost some context, but I think the original question was, if barbarian can >> add group names to their resource acls. >> >> Since two administrative domains can issue the same group name, its not >> safe I believe. >> >> Simply ensuring the group name is associated with a user and the domain >> for the user matches the domain for the group wouldn't work because someone >> with control of their own domain can just make a >> user and give them the group with the name they want and come take your >> credentials. >> >> What may be safe is for the barbican ACL to contain the group_id if they >> are uniqueue across all domains, or take a domain_id & group_name pair for >> the acl. >> >> Thanks, >> Kevin >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> *From:* Dolph Mathews [*dolph.math...@gmail.com* >> <dolph.math...@gmail.com>] >> * Sent:* Thursday, June 04, 2015 1:41 PM >> * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing >> X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> >> Problem! In writing a spec for this ( >> *https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/* >> <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/> ), I remembered that groups >> are domain-specific entities, which complicates the problem of providing >> X-Group-Names via middleware. >> >> The problem is that we can't simply expose X-Group-Names to underlying >> services without either A) making a well-documented assumption about the >> ONE owning domain scope of ALL included groups, B) passing significantly >> more data to underlying services than just a list of names (a domain scope >> for every group), C) passing only globally-unique group IDs (services would >> then have to retrieve additional details about each from from keystone if >> they so cared). >> >> Option A) More specifically, keystone could opt to enumerate the groups >> that belong to the same domain as the user. In this case, it'd probably >> make more sense from an API perspective if the "groups" enumeration were >> part of the "user" resources in the token response body (the "user" object >> already has a containing domain ID. That means that IF a user were to be >> assigned a group membership in another domain (assuming we didn't move to >> disallowing that behavior at some point), then it would have to be excluded >> from this list. If that were true, then I'd also follow that X-Group-Names >> become X-User-Group-Names, so that it might be more clear that they belong >> to the X-User-Domain-*. >> >> Option B) This is probably the most complex solution, but also the most >> explicit. I have no idea how this interface would look in terms of headers >> using current conventions. If we're going to break conventions, then I'd >> want to pass a id+domain_id+name for each group reference. So, rather than >> including a list of names AND a list of IDs, we'd have some terribly >> encoded list of group objects (I'm not sure what the HTTP convention is on >> this sort of use case, and hoping someone can illustrate a better solution >> given the representation below): >> >> X-Groups: >> id%3D123%2Cdomain_id%3D456%2Cname%3Dabc,id%3D789%2Cdomain_id%3D357%2Cname%3Ddef >> >> Option C) Federated tokens would actually require solution (C) today >> because they only include group IDs, not names. But the group enumeration >> in federated tokens was also only intended to be consumed by keystone, so >> that's not really an issue for that one use case. But option (C) would mean >> there are no X-Group-Names passed to services, just X-Group-Ids. I'm >> guessing this won't provide the user experience that Barbican is looking >> for? >> >> >> I'm leaning towards solution (A), but curious if that'll work for >> Barbican and/or if anyone has an idea that I'm overlooking. >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.math...@gmail.com* >> <dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> To clarify: we already have to include the groups produced as a result of >> federation mapping **in the payload** of Fernet tokens so that scoped >> tokens can be created later: >> >> >> *https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523* >> <https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523> >> >> These are OpenStack group IDs, so it's up to the deployer to keep those >> under control to keep Fernet token sizes down. It's the only place in the >> current Fernet implementation that's (somewhat alarmingly) unbounded in the >> real world. >> >> But we do **not** have a use case to add groups to *all* Fernet payloads: >> only to token creation & validation responses. >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 2:36 AM, Morgan Fainberg < >> *morgan.fainb...@gmail.com* <morgan.fainb...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> For Fernet, the groups would only be populated on validate as Dolph >> outlined. They would not be added to the core payload. We do not want to >> expand the payload in this manner. >> >> --Morgan >> >> Sent via mobile >> >> On Jun 3, 2015, at 21:51, Lance Bragstad <*lbrags...@gmail.com* >> <lbrags...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> I feel if we allowed group ids to be an attribute of the Fernet's core >> payload, we continue to open up the possibility for tokens to be greater >> than the initial "acceptable" size limit for a Fernet token (which I >> believe was 255 bytes?). With this, I think we need to provide guidance on >> the number of group ids allowed within the token before that size limit is >> compromised. >> >> We've landed patches recently that allow for id strings to be included in >> the Fernet payload [0], regardless of being uuid format (which can be >> converted to bytes before packing to save space, this is harder for us to >> do with non-uuid format id strings). This can also cause the Fernet token >> size to grow. If we plan to include more information in the Fernet token >> payload I think we should determine if the original acceptable size limit >> still applies and regardless of what that size limit is provide some sort >> of "best practices" for helping deployments keep their token size as small >> as possible. >> >> >> Keeping the tokens user (and developer) friendly was a big plus in the >> design of Fernet, and providing resource for deployments to maintain that >> would be helpful. >> >> >> [0] >> *https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z* >> <https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z> >> >> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 10:19 PM, Steve Martinelli <*steve...@ca.ibm.com* >> <steve...@ca.ibm.com>> wrote: >> Dozens to hundreds of roles or endpoints could cause an issue now :) >> >> But yeah, groups are much more likely to number in the dozens than roles >> or endpoints. But I think the Fernet token size is so small that it could >> probably handle this (since it does so now for the federated workflow). >> >> Thanks, >> >> Steve Martinelli >> OpenStack Keystone Core >> >> >> >> From: "Fox, Kevin M" <*kevin....@pnnl.gov* <kevin....@pnnl.gov>> >> To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage >> questions)" <*openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* >> <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> >> Date: 06/03/2015 11:14 PM >> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding >> exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> >> Will dozens to a hundred groups or so on one user cause issues? :) >> >> Thanks, >> Kevin >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Morgan Fainberg >> * Sent:* Wednesday, June 03, 2015 7:23:22 PM >> * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing >> X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> >> In general I am of the opinion with the move to Fernet there is no good >> reason we should avoid adding the group information into the token. >> >> --Morgan >> >> Sent via mobile >> >> On Jun 3, 2015, at 18:44, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.math...@gmail.com* >> <dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 5:58 PM, John Wood <*john.w...@rackspace.com* >> <john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: >> Hello folks, >> >> There has been discussion about adding user group support to the >> per-secret access control list (ACL) feature in Barbican. Hence secrets >> could be marked as accessible by a group on the ACL rather than an >> individual user as implemented now. >> >> Our understanding is that Keystone does not pass along a user’s group >> information during token validation however (such as in the form of >> X-Group-Ids/X-Group-Names headers passed along via Keystone middleware). >> >> The pre-requisite for including that information in the form of headers >> would be adding group information to the token validation response. In the >> case of UUID, it would be pre-computed and stored in the DB at token >> creation time. In the case of PKI, it would be encoded into the PKI token >> and further bloat PKI tokens. And in the case of Fernet, it would be >> included at token validation time. >> >> Including group information, however, would also let us efficient revoke >> tokens using token revocation events when group membership is affected in >> any way (user being removed from a group, a group being deleted, or a >> group-based role assignment being revoked). The OS-FEDERATION extension is >> actually already including groups in tokens today, as a required part of >> the federated workflow. We'd effectively be introducing that same behavior >> into the core Identity API (see the federated token example): >> >> >> *https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token* >> <https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token> >> >> This would allow us to address bugs such as: >> >> *https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751* >> <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751> >> >> In the past, we shied away from including groups if only to avoid >> bloating the size of PKI tokens any further (but now we have Fernet tokens >> providing a viable alternative). Are there any other reasons not to add >> group information to the token validation response? >> >> >> Would the community consider this a useful feature? Would the community >> consider adding this support to Liberty? >> >> Thank you, >> John >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: >> *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org* >> <openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: >> *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: >> *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org* >> <openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: >> *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: >> *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> >> >> Unless stated otherwise above: >> IBM United Kingdom Limited - Registered in England and Wales with number >> 741598. >> Registered office: PO Box 41, North Harbour, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO6 3AU >> > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > >
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