On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Henry Nash <henry.n...@uk.ibm.com> wrote:
> So I think that GroupID's are actually unique and safe....since in the > multi LDAP case we provide an indirection already in Keystone and issue a > "Public ID" (this is true for bother users and groups), that we map to the > underlying local ID in the particular LDAP backend. Oh, awesome! I didn't realize we did that for groups as well. So then, we're safe exposing X-Group-Ids to services via keystonemiddleware.auth_token but still not X-Group-Names (in any trivial form). > > > Henry > > > From: Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com> To: "OpenStack Development > Mailing List (not for usage questions)" <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>, > Henry Nash <hen...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Henry Nash/UK/IBM@IBMGB Date: > 05/06/2015 > 15:38 Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding > exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > ------------------------------ > > > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 10:17 PM, John Wood <*john.w...@rackspace.com* > <john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: > Hello folks, > > Regarding option C, if group IDs are unique within a given cloud/context, > and these are discoverable by clients that can then set the ACL on a secret > in Barbican, then that seems like a viable option to me. As it is now, the > user information provided to the ACL is the user ID information as found in > X-User-Ids now, not user names. > > To Kevin’s point though, are these group IDs unique across domains now, or > in the future? If not the more complex tuples suggested could be used, but > seem more error prone to configure on an ACL. > > Well, that's a good question, because that depends on the backend, and our > backend architecture has recently gotten very complicated in this area. > > If groups are backed by SQL, then they're going to be globally unique > UUIDs, so the answer is always yes. > > If they're backed by LDAP, then actually it depends on LDAP, but the > answer should be yes. > > But the nightmare scenario we now support is domain-specific identity > drivers, where each domain can actually be configured to talk to a > different LDAP server. In that case, I don't think you can make any > guarantees about group ID uniqueness :( Instead, each domain could provide > whatever IDs it wants, and those might conflict with those of other > domains. We have a workaround for a similar issue with user IDs, but it > hasn't been applied to groups, leaving them quite broken in this scenario. > I'd consider this to be an issue we need to solve in Keystone, though, not > something other projects need to worry about. I'm hoping Henry Nash can > chime in and correct me! > > > Thanks, > John > > *From: *<Fox>, Kevin M <*kevin....@pnnl.gov* <kevin....@pnnl.gov>> > * Reply-To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage > questions)" <*openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* > <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> > * Date: *Thursday, June 4, 2015 at 6:01 PM > * To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" < > *openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> > > * Subject: *Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > In Juno I tried adding a user in Domain A to group in Domain B. That > currently is not supported. Would be very handy though. > > We're getting a ways from the original part of the thread, so I may have > lost some context, but I think the original question was, if barbarian can > add group names to their resource acls. > > Since two administrative domains can issue the same group name, its not > safe I believe. > > Simply ensuring the group name is associated with a user and the domain > for the user matches the domain for the group wouldn't work because someone > with control of their own domain can just make a > user and give them the group with the name they want and come take your > credentials. > > What may be safe is for the barbican ACL to contain the group_id if they > are uniqueue across all domains, or take a domain_id & group_name pair for > the acl. > > Thanks, > Kevin > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* Dolph Mathews [*dolph.math...@gmail.com* <dolph.math...@gmail.com> > ] > * Sent:* Thursday, June 04, 2015 1:41 PM > * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > Problem! In writing a spec for this ( > *https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/* > <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/> ), I remembered that groups > are domain-specific entities, which complicates the problem of providing > X-Group-Names via middleware. > > The problem is that we can't simply expose X-Group-Names to underlying > services without either A) making a well-documented assumption about the > ONE owning domain scope of ALL included groups, B) passing significantly > more data to underlying services than just a list of names (a domain scope > for every group), C) passing only globally-unique group IDs (services would > then have to retrieve additional details about each from from keystone if > they so cared). > > Option A) More specifically, keystone could opt to enumerate the groups > that belong to the same domain as the user. In this case, it'd probably > make more sense from an API perspective if the "groups" enumeration were > part of the "user" resources in the token response body (the "user" object > already has a containing domain ID. That means that IF a user were to be > assigned a group membership in another domain (assuming we didn't move to > disallowing that behavior at some point), then it would have to be excluded > from this list. If that were true, then I'd also follow that X-Group-Names > become X-User-Group-Names, so that it might be more clear that they belong > to the X-User-Domain-*. > > Option B) This is probably the most complex solution, but also the most > explicit. I have no idea how this interface would look in terms of headers > using current conventions. If we're going to break conventions, then I'd > want to pass a id+domain_id+name for each group reference. So, rather than > including a list of names AND a list of IDs, we'd have some terribly > encoded list of group objects (I'm not sure what the HTTP convention is on > this sort of use case, and hoping someone can illustrate a better solution > given the representation below): > > X-Groups: > id%3D123%2Cdomain_id%3D456%2Cname%3Dabc,id%3D789%2Cdomain_id%3D357%2Cname%3Ddef > > Option C) Federated tokens would actually require solution (C) today > because they only include group IDs, not names. But the group enumeration > in federated tokens was also only intended to be consumed by keystone, so > that's not really an issue for that one use case. But option (C) would mean > there are no X-Group-Names passed to services, just X-Group-Ids. I'm > guessing this won't provide the user experience that Barbican is looking > for? > > > I'm leaning towards solution (A), but curious if that'll work for Barbican > and/or if anyone has an idea that I'm overlooking. > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.math...@gmail.com* > <dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: > To clarify: we already have to include the groups produced as a result of > federation mapping **in the payload** of Fernet tokens so that scoped > tokens can be created later: > > > *https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523* > <https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523> > > These are OpenStack group IDs, so it's up to the deployer to keep those > under control to keep Fernet token sizes down. It's the only place in the > current Fernet implementation that's (somewhat alarmingly) unbounded in the > real world. > > But we do **not** have a use case to add groups to *all* Fernet payloads: > only to token creation & validation responses. > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 2:36 AM, Morgan Fainberg < > *morgan.fainb...@gmail.com* <morgan.fainb...@gmail.com>> wrote: > For Fernet, the groups would only be populated on validate as Dolph > outlined. They would not be added to the core payload. We do not want to > expand the payload in this manner. > > --Morgan > > Sent via mobile > > On Jun 3, 2015, at 21:51, Lance Bragstad <*lbrags...@gmail.com* > <lbrags...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > I feel if we allowed group ids to be an attribute of the Fernet's core > payload, we continue to open up the possibility for tokens to be greater > than the initial "acceptable" size limit for a Fernet token (which I > believe was 255 bytes?). With this, I think we need to provide guidance on > the number of group ids allowed within the token before that size limit is > compromised. > > We've landed patches recently that allow for id strings to be included in > the Fernet payload [0], regardless of being uuid format (which can be > converted to bytes before packing to save space, this is harder for us to > do with non-uuid format id strings). This can also cause the Fernet token > size to grow. If we plan to include more information in the Fernet token > payload I think we should determine if the original acceptable size limit > still applies and regardless of what that size limit is provide some sort > of "best practices" for helping deployments keep their token size as small > as possible. > > > Keeping the tokens user (and developer) friendly was a big plus in the > design of Fernet, and providing resource for deployments to maintain that > would be helpful. > > > [0] > *https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z* > <https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z> > > On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 10:19 PM, Steve Martinelli <*steve...@ca.ibm.com* > <steve...@ca.ibm.com>> wrote: > Dozens to hundreds of roles or endpoints could cause an issue now :) > > But yeah, groups are much more likely to number in the dozens than roles > or endpoints. But I think the Fernet token size is so small that it could > probably handle this (since it does so now for the federated workflow). > > Thanks, > > Steve Martinelli > OpenStack Keystone Core > > > > From: "Fox, Kevin M" <*kevin....@pnnl.gov* <kevin....@pnnl.gov>> > To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" > <*openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org* <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> > Date: 06/03/2015 11:14 PM > Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding > exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation > ------------------------------ > > > > > Will dozens to a hundred groups or so on one user cause issues? :) > > Thanks, > Kevin > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Morgan Fainberg > * Sent:* Wednesday, June 03, 2015 7:23:22 PM > * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > In general I am of the opinion with the move to Fernet there is no good > reason we should avoid adding the group information into the token. > > --Morgan > > Sent via mobile > > On Jun 3, 2015, at 18:44, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.math...@gmail.com* > <dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 5:58 PM, John Wood <*john.w...@rackspace.com* > <john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: > Hello folks, > > There has been discussion about adding user group support to the > per-secret access control list (ACL) feature in Barbican. Hence secrets > could be marked as accessible by a group on the ACL rather than an > individual user as implemented now. > > Our understanding is that Keystone does not pass along a user’s group > information during token validation however (such as in the form of > X-Group-Ids/X-Group-Names headers passed along via Keystone middleware). > > The pre-requisite for including that information in the form of headers > would be adding group information to the token validation response. In the > case of UUID, it would be pre-computed and stored in the DB at token > creation time. In the case of PKI, it would be encoded into the PKI token > and further bloat PKI tokens. And in the case of Fernet, it would be > included at token validation time. > > Including group information, however, would also let us efficient revoke > tokens using token revocation events when group membership is affected in > any way (user being removed from a group, a group being deleted, or a > group-based role assignment being revoked). The OS-FEDERATION extension is > actually already including groups in tokens today, as a required part of > the federated workflow. We'd effectively be introducing that same behavior > into the core Identity API (see the federated token example): > > > *https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token* > <https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token> > > This would allow us to address bugs such as: > > *https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751* > <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751> > > In the past, we shied away from including groups if only to avoid bloating > the size of PKI tokens any further (but now we have Fernet tokens providing > a viable alternative). Are there any other reasons not to add group > information to the token validation response? > > > Would the community consider this a useful feature? Would the community > consider adding this support to Liberty? > > Thank you, > John > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: > *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe> > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org* > <openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: > *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe> > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: > *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe> > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org* > <openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: > *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe> > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: > *openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe* > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe> > *http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev* > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > > > Unless stated otherwise above: > IBM United Kingdom Limited - Registered in England and Wales with number > 741598. > Registered office: PO Box 41, North Harbour, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO6 3AU >
__________________________________________________________________________ OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
