On Thu, Feb 16, 2012, Jakob Bohm wrote:

> On 2/16/2012 11:36 AM, Magosányi Árpád wrote:
> >Hi!
> >
> >Is the sentence "It checks that p and q are in fact prime, and
> >that n = p*q" in RSA_check_key's documentation mean that it checks
> >for weak primes, like the ones mentioned here?:
> >http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/02/crypto-shocker-four-of-every-1000-public-keys-provide-no-security.ars
> >
> >As I understand there are two cases.
> >One is when the prime is not exactly prime. I would expect
> >RSA_check_key to find this out, but what is the extent of the
> >check?
> >The other cause is a clash with already existing prime factors out
> >there. I guess that checking for this would involve looking up a
> >list of prime factors collected on the net. Is there such tool
> >accessible to mere mortals?
> >
> All the practical ways of creating and checking primes for
> use in crypto have the following features:
> 
> 1. They are statistical tests, each round of testing that
> passes increases the probability that this is really a
> prime, you stop if it says "not a prime" (an absolute
> non-statistical rejection) or until the combined
> probability is big enough for you.  Someone else on this
> list can hopefully give you the number of rounds and
> resulting probabilities used by OpenSSL.
> 

OpenSSL uses trial division and a slight variation of the Miller Rabin
algorithm. See the macro BN_prime_checks_for_size and the associated comments
in that header file for references.

Provable prime schemes do exist such as the Shawe-Taylor algorithm mentioned
in FIPS 186-3 et al but OpenSSL doesn't currently use them.

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
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