David Schwartz wrote:
"Does the domain name in the server's certificate match the domain name of
the server itself? This step confirms that the server is actually located at
the same network address specified by the domain name in the server
certificate. Although step 4 is not technically part of the SSL protocol, it
provides the only protection against a form of security attack known as a
Man-in-the-Middle Attack. Clients must perform this step and must refuse to
authenticate the server or establish a connection if the domain names don't
match. If the server's actual domain name matches the domain name in the
server certificate, the client goes on to Step 5."
Uh, I'm a wee bit annoyed at the invocation of MITM. It seems
to me that SSLv3.0/TLSv1.0 with server auth protects against
MITM, and it has nothing to do with the validation described.
We know at the conclusion of the handshake that we are talking to
the server which presented its certificate, and we presume (absent
its inclusion in a CRL, OCSP response, etc.) the security of the
associated private key. This entire negotiation is proof against
MITM. We've validated the cert according to local rules (we
trust the signer, have done chain validation, whatever).
Fine, all SSL/TLS does is establish a secure channel between (in this
case) the authenticated server and the client.
Trust management is entirely outside the scope of the protocol.
This has nothing to do with MITM.
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