Hi Mike, This is a call for *adoption*, not a WGLC. Our thinking was that these were fine problems for the WG to work on. The adoption question is whether we believe the WG will succeed at that, i.e., whether we pretty much know how to solve the problems. As your email points out, there have been a bunch of good discussions about these problems, and broad agreement on solutions. We will get a draft out in time for Dublin with a first pass at getting them reflected in text.
But resolving these problems should not be a blocker to adoption. Thanks, --Richard On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 3:55 PM Michael Jones <michael_b_jo...@hotmail.com> wrote: > I regret to have to report that the issues that I believe resulted in the > first call for adoption failing, despite being discussed on-list and at > IETF 120, have not been addressed in the specification > <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-barnes-oauth-pika-01.html>. I did > have a productive conversation with Richard in Vancouver, which resulting > in him mentioning some of the problems in his presentation > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/materials/slides-120-oauth-pika-01>. > Here are the problems that have not been addressed since the first call for > adoption: > > > > 1. *Application-level use of PKI trust chains.* As I wrote in my > response to the first call for adoption > <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/rPPI9E8fwN1NiMM1TkaQUfFYEDI/>, > “Other than for TLS certificates, the OAuth and JOSE specs generally > steer clear of dependence upon X.509 certificates. Especially for a spec > focused on JWK Sets, it’s odd to require an X.509 certificate to secure > them.” This problem is acknowledged in Issue 1 of Slide 7 of Richard’s > presentation > > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/materials/slides-120-oauth-pika-01>. > As I also wrote > <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/zvIsbxHTFC4YXozOgOfQutR6GN8/>, > “application-level X.509 … is an anachronism that OAuth and JOSE have > moved away from”. > 2. *Reuse of keys intended for one purpose for a different purpose.* > PIKA uses WebPKI keys for signing things that are not Web resources. Key > reuse is not a good security practice. This problem is acknowledged in > Issue 2 of Slide 7 of Richard’s presentation > > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/materials/slides-120-oauth-pika-01> > . > 3. *Authorities with paths not secured.* In OAuth, authorities such > as issuers can have a path component in their URL. But the spec says “The > contents of this field *MUST* represent a certificate chain that > authenticates the domain name in the iss field” – meaning that the path > component of the issuer is not secured. > 4. *Odd hybrid of JWKs and X.509.* The spec uses both JSON Web Keys > and X.509 certificates in the trust evaluation, which is an odd intermixing > of technologies with overlapping purposes. Architecturally, it would be > cleaner to go all in on one or the other. This is evident in Slide 5 of > Richard’s > presentation > > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/materials/slides-120-oauth-pika-01> > . > 5. *Upgrade path not defined.* As Slide 7 of Richard’s presentation > > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/120/materials/slides-120-oauth-pika-01> > says, “Need to make sure that systems using PIKA have a clear > upgrade/interop path to alternatives to application-level certificates > (e.g., OpenID Federation)”. This is a point that I know John Bradley made > to Richard in person in Vancouver. This problem is not addressed in the > specification. > > > > I’m also personally uncomfortable with the *direction of travel* embraced > by this specification. For over a decade, we’ve been consciously working > to move OAuth away from X.509 and towards JOSE and this specification goes > in the opposite direction. > > > > As documented above, these problems were discussed and acknowledged. > Therefore, it’s disappointing to me that the updated draft didn’t address > these previously identified issues. > > > > Therefore, I believe this specification should not be adopted, as the > problems that caused it to not be previously adopted have not been > addressed. > > > > Sincerely, > > -- Mike > > > > *From:* Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.i...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 3, 2024 3:47 AM > *To:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org> > *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - PIKA > > > > All, > > As per the discussion in Vancouver, this is a call for adoption for the *Proof > of Issuer Key Authority (PIKA) *draft: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-oauth-pika/ > > Please, reply on the mailing list and let us know if you are in favor or > against adopting this draft as WG document, by *Sep 17th*. > > Regards, > Rifaat & Hannes > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-le...@ietf.org >
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