Denis, I was awaiting your mail and I admire your perseverence with bringing this topic to our attention.
To your points: Am 12.04.21 um 13:36 schrieb Denis: > The case where two clients collude to mount an attack against a RS is > not addressed. It now needs to be addressed. > > > This should be added in section 1 ( Introduction) > No. > The first sentence of section 3 (The Updated OAuth 2.0 Attacker Model) > clearly states: > > " In the following, this attacker model is updated (...) to > include new types of attackers and to define the attacker model more > clearly". > > Section 3 should include the case of a collusion or a collaboration > attack between clients against a RS, where one of them is a legitimate > client > voluntarily "helping" another client to use or to request access > tokens that would normally "belong" to the legitimate client. > As I'm sure you have noticed, we have updated Section 3 following your last input. It now explicitly says: Attackers can collaborate to reach a common goal. It also says Note that in this attacker model, an attacker (see A1) can be a RO or act as one. For example, an attacker can use his own browser to replay tokens or authorization codes obtained by any of the attacks described above at the client or RS. Your scenario is therefore covered. It was already before, but that was obviously too implicit, so we made it more clear with the recent update. > > Finally, section 4 (Attacks and Mitigations) should include an > additional subsection, e.g. section 4.16, addressing the case of a > collaboration attack > between clients against a RS. > If I remember correctly, you first presented this attack at the OAuth Security Workshop in 2017. Since then, it has been brought up countless times on this mailing list, both with regards to the Security BCP as well as for the JWT Token draft. There has been practically no positive resonance at the meeting 2017 or here on the mailing list as to including this in either of the drafts. A number of reasons come to mind, but first and foremost, I think that what you describe is not perceived as an attack, or, worded differently, it is obvious that what you describe in the "attack" is possible. There is no expectation that OAuth would defend against this kind of thing, just as there is no mitigation against password sharing in password-based authentication. Even though the Security BCP attacker model includes the general setting required for the attack, the attack does not violate an expected security property. I therefore propose to proceed with the Security BCP without including this attack. -Daniel -- https://danielfett.de
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