Hi Torsten,

A few comments having just read this afresh:

2.1: 'Clients SHALL avoid’ - is that normatively different to ’SHOULD’ given it 
appears to be permitted?

I find it a little hard to understand exactly what "avoid any redirects or 
forwards which can be parameterized by URI query parameters” means 
(particularly as it comes directly after a paragraph on the redirect_uri and I 
initially thought it was talking about that. Perhaps something along the lines 
of “avoid forwarding the user’s browser to a value from a uri query parameter” 
might be clearer.

" Clients SHALL ensure to only process “ could just be written ‘Client SHALL 
only process” I think.


2.1.1:

"Authorization servers SHALL consider the”  - is ’SHALL consider’ different to 
’SHOULD’? Or does it mean something like “SHALL implement at least one 
countermeasure from <…>”.

3.2.4:

This says "Authorization codes SHOULD be invalidated by the AS after their 
first use at the token endpoint”.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.5 says:

"Authorization codes MUST be short lived and single-use.”.

Does this "MUST be single-use” not effectively already require the code is 
invalidated after first use? If so why downgrade this to a “SHOULD”?


Cheers,

Joseph


> On 9 Nov 2018, at 09:42, Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> 
> Hi all, 
> 
> the new revision incorporates the recommendation to use more secure grant 
> types instead of implicit we agreed to add during the WG session on Monday. 
> It also has more text around justifications for our recommendation. 
> Especially, there is a new section 3.6 on access token injection. 
> 
> I also posted about this topic on LinkedIn 
> (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-you-should-stop-using-oauth-implicit-grant-torsten-lodderstedt/)
>  and Medium 
> (https://medium.com/@torsten_lodderstedt/why-you-should-stop-using-the-oauth-implicit-grant-2436ced1c926)
> 
> kind regards,
> Torsten. 
> 
>> Am 09.11.2018 um 09:32 schrieb internet-dra...@ietf.org:
>> 
>> 
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>> directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.
>> 
>>       Title           : OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
>>       Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
>>                         John Bradley
>>                         Andrey Labunets
>>                         Daniel Fett
>>      Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09.txt
>>      Pages           : 35
>>      Date            : 2018-11-09
>> 
>> Abstract:
>>  This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0.
>>  It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to
>>  incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was
>>  published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader
>>  application of OAuth 2.0.
>> 
>> 
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics/
>> 
>> There are also htmlized versions available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09
>> 
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09
>> 
>> 
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>> 
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
> _______________________________________________
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