Well - first of all that it uses all the recommend validation techniques - state validation + protection - nonce validation - at_hash validation - identity token validation - discovery
+ solid and tested JS code I don’t see extra value for a JS client in things like “signed requests” - as I said before - at the end of the day the access token will end up in the browser. Regardless how secure you made the authentication request in the first place. ------- Dominick Baier On 17 February 2017 at 19:06:23, Jim Manico (j...@manicode.com) wrote: > Given a solid client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use. If you can, can you dig deeper here? What is it about this particular library that makes its use of the OAuth 2 implicit flow secure? Signed messages? Only supports registered clients? Something else? Aloha, Jim On 2/17/17 8:02 AM, Dominick Baier wrote: Given a solid client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use. But I agree that there are many “home grown” implementation out there that are not secure - and the necessary JS code to write a good client is not necessarily the “pit of success”. You should give this lib a go (it’s also a certified RP): https://github.com/IdentityModel/oidc-client-js Many people argue that handling the protocol and crypto pieces in JS is problematic (and I agree if no proper lib is used for that) - but at then end of the day the access token will end up in the browser - and a sloppy developer (e.g. not using CSP) will always write bad code that might lead to leaking a token. ------- Dominick Baier On 17 February 2017 at 18:43:25, Adam Lewis ( adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com) wrote: +1000 We are currently going through internal turmoil over the usage of implicit grant for ua-based apps. The webapp case is well understood and the WG has work in progress to define best practices for native apps. Having one for ua-based apps would be HUGELY beneficial On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Jim Manico <j...@manicode.com> wrote: > Thank you to those answering my question on implicit for JS clients. > > The responses so far seem to represent what the security world is saying > about the implicit grant - keep away from it other than for a few OIDC use > cases. > > Does anyone think it would be valuable to author a brief RFC to give clear > OAuth 2 recommendations for JavaScript client developers? > > I mean - the OAuth 2 body of work just needs a few more RFC's, right? :) > > Aloha, Jim > > > > On 2/17/17 6:03 AM, sebastian.ebl...@telekom.de wrote: > > Same for Deutsche Telekom. Our javascript clients also use code flow with > CORS processing and of course redirect_uri validation. > > > > Best regards > > > > Sebastian > > > > * Von:* OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org <oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] *Im > Auftrag von* Bill Burke > *Gesendet:* Freitag, 17. Februar 2017 00:14 > *An:* oauth@ietf.org > *Betreff:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Google's use of Implicit Grant Flow > > > > For our IDP [1], our javascript library uses the auth code flow, but > requires a public client, redirect_uri validation, and also does CORS > checks and processing. We did not like Implicit Flow because > > 1) access tokens would be in the browser history > > 2) short lived access tokens (seconds or minutes) would require a browser > redirect > > I'd be really curious to hear other's thoughts though. > > [1] http://keycloak.org > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__keycloak.org&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=YExyuyZO5YNpSvS3mEUG5pjKAjRXXVT8Xvk8hIb-Efw&e=> > > > > > > > > On 2/16/17 5:44 PM, Jim Manico wrote: > > Hello Folks, > > I noticed that Google supports the OAuth 2 Implicit flow for third-party > JavaScript applications. > > https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2UserAgent > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__developers.google.com_identity_protocols_OAuth2UserAgent&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=_Mig-zmCt1y9dZpCece1dqby3VmcZVOu2JPcmAwzwKU&e=> > > Isn't this generally discouraged from a security POV? *Is there a better > OAuth 2 flow for third party SPA applications?* > > Aloha, > > -- > > Jim Manico > > Manicode Security > > https://www.manicode.com > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.manicode.com&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=H8pXLA4TE27vW-gz5Sbr9VOUP-KZMmd-gQ-okH4ohMU&e=> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_oauth&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=jAjifWdP3vqnDgWricLE62R9_d0BQReWRUitqM5S1JU&e=> > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_mailman_listinfo_oauth&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=jAjifWdP3vqnDgWricLE62R9_d0BQReWRUitqM5S1JU&e=> > > -- > Jim Manico > Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.manicode.com&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=H8pXLA4TE27vW-gz5Sbr9VOUP-KZMmd-gQ-okH4ohMU&e=> > > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Jim Manico Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
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