Also the authz endpoint is required to force tls. So if the client doesn't do it the authz should reject (eg by upgrading to tls).
Phil > On Jan 25, 2016, at 19:29, Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: > > When the RP acting as the client issues a authorize redirect to the UA it has > to make it with TLS > > Phil > >> On Jan 25, 2016, at 17:53, Nov Matake <mat...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> It doen't say anything about the first request which initiate the login flow. >> It is still a reasonable assumption that RP puts a "login with FB" button on >> a non TLS-protected page. >> >> nov >> >>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 10:45, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >>> >>> I would find it hard to believe that is true. >>> >>> From 6749 Sec 3.1 >>> Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user >>> authentication and the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the >>> HTTP response), the authorization server MUST require the use of TLS >>> as described in Section 1.6 when sending requests to the >>> authorization endpoint. >>> >>> Sec 3.1.2.1 >>> The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described >>> in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token", >>> or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of >>> sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does >>> not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing, >>> requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for many >>> client developers. If TLS is not available, the authorization server >>> SHOULD warn the resource owner about the insecure endpoint prior to >>> redirection (e.g., display a message during the authorization >>> request). >>> >>> Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the >>> security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized >>> to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly >>> critical when the authorization process is used as a form of >>> delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g., third-party >>> sign-in service). >>> >>> Section 10.5 talks about transmission of authorization codes in connection >>> with redirects. >>> >>> Also see 6819, Sec 4.4.1.1 regarding eavesdropping or leaking of authz >>> codes. >>> >>> >>> Phil >>> >>> @independentid >>> www.independentid.com >>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 4:52 PM, nov matake <mat...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> The first assumption is coming from the original security report at >>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229. >>>> RFC 6749 requires TLS between RS and AS, and also between UA and AS, but >>>> not between UA and RS. >>>> >>>> The blog post is based on my Japanese post, and it describes multi-AS case. >>>> Nat's another post describes the case which can affect single-AS case too. >>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/22/code-phishing-attack-on-oauth-2-0-rfc6749/ >>>> >>>> nov >>>> >>>>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 08:22, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Sorry, meant to reply-all. >>>>> >>>>> Phil >>>>> >>>>> @independentid >>>>> www.independentid.com >>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation >>>>>> Date: January 25, 2016 at 3:20:19 PM PST >>>>>> To: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> >>>>>> >>>>>> I am having trouble with the very first assumption. The user-agent sets >>>>>> up a non TLS protected connection to the RP? That’s a fundamental >>>>>> violation of 6749. >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, the second statement says the RP (assuming it acts as OAuth >>>>>> client) is talking to two IDPs. That’s still a multi-AS case is it not? >>>>>> >>>>>> Phil >>>>>> >>>>>> @independentid >>>>>> www.independentid.com >>>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 2:58 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Phil, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since I was not in Darmstadt, I really do not know what was discussed >>>>>>> there, but with the compromised developer documentation described in >>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/15/idp-mix-up-attack-on-oauth-rfc6749/, >>>>>>> all RFC6749 clients with a naive implementer will be affected. The >>>>>>> client does not need to be talking to multiple IdPs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nat >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2016年1月26日(火) 3:58 Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.h...@oracle.com>: >>>>>>>> I recall making this point in Germany. 99% of existing use is fine. >>>>>>>> OIDC is probably the largest community that *might* have an issue. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I recall proposing a new security document that covers oauth security >>>>>>>> for dynamic scenarios. "Dynamic" being broadly defined to mean: >>>>>>>> * clients who have configured at runtime or install time (including >>>>>>>> clients that do discovery) >>>>>>>> * clients that communicate with more than one endpoint >>>>>>>> * clients that are deployed in large volume and may update frequently >>>>>>>> (more discussion of "public" cases) >>>>>>>> * clients that are script based (loaded into browser on the fly) >>>>>>>> * others? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Phil >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> > On Jan 25, 2016, at 10:39, George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > would >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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