It doen't say anything about the first request which initiate the login flow. It is still a reasonable assumption that RP puts a "login with FB" button on a non TLS-protected page.
nov > On Jan 26, 2016, at 10:45, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: > > I would find it hard to believe that is true. > > From 6749 Sec 3.1 > Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user > authentication and the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the > HTTP response), the authorization server MUST require the use of TLS > as described in Section 1.6 when sending requests to the > authorization endpoint. > > Sec 3.1.2.1 > The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described > in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token", > or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of > sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does > not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing, > requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for many > client developers. If TLS is not available, the authorization server > SHOULD warn the resource owner about the insecure endpoint prior to > redirection (e.g., display a message during the authorization > request). > > Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the > security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized > to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly > critical when the authorization process is used as a form of > delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g., third-party > sign-in service). > > Section 10.5 talks about transmission of authorization codes in connection > with redirects. > > Also see 6819, Sec 4.4.1.1 regarding eavesdropping or leaking of authz codes. > > > Phil > > @independentid > www.independentid.com > phil.h...@oracle.com > > > > > >> On Jan 25, 2016, at 4:52 PM, nov matake <mat...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> The first assumption is coming from the original security report at >> http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229. >> RFC 6749 requires TLS between RS and AS, and also between UA and AS, but not >> between UA and RS. >> >> The blog post is based on my Japanese post, and it describes multi-AS case. >> Nat's another post describes the case which can affect single-AS case too. >> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/22/code-phishing-attack-on-oauth-2-0-rfc6749/ >> >> nov >> >>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 08:22, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >>> >>> Sorry, meant to reply-all. >>> >>> Phil >>> >>> @independentid >>> www.independentid.com >>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>> >>>> From: Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> >>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation >>>> Date: January 25, 2016 at 3:20:19 PM PST >>>> To: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> >>>> >>>> I am having trouble with the very first assumption. The user-agent sets up >>>> a non TLS protected connection to the RP? That’s a fundamental violation >>>> of 6749. >>>> >>>> Also, the second statement says the RP (assuming it acts as OAuth client) >>>> is talking to two IDPs. That’s still a multi-AS case is it not? >>>> >>>> Phil >>>> >>>> @independentid >>>> www.independentid.com >>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 2:58 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Phil, >>>>> >>>>> Since I was not in Darmstadt, I really do not know what was discussed >>>>> there, but with the compromised developer documentation described in >>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/15/idp-mix-up-attack-on-oauth-rfc6749/, >>>>> all RFC6749 clients with a naive implementer will be affected. The client >>>>> does not need to be talking to multiple IdPs. >>>>> >>>>> Nat >>>>> >>>>> 2016年1月26日(火) 3:58 Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.h...@oracle.com>: >>>>>> I recall making this point in Germany. 99% of existing use is fine. OIDC >>>>>> is probably the largest community that *might* have an issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> I recall proposing a new security document that covers oauth security >>>>>> for dynamic scenarios. "Dynamic" being broadly defined to mean: >>>>>> * clients who have configured at runtime or install time (including >>>>>> clients that do discovery) >>>>>> * clients that communicate with more than one endpoint >>>>>> * clients that are deployed in large volume and may update frequently >>>>>> (more discussion of "public" cases) >>>>>> * clients that are script based (loaded into browser on the fly) >>>>>> * others? >>>>>> >>>>>> Phil >>>>>> >>>>>> > On Jan 25, 2016, at 10:39, George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com> wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > would >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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